Normativity and the Politics of Form by Schlag, Pierre
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
1991 
Normativity and the Politics of Form 
Pierre Schlag 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Education Commons, 
Legal Profession Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Citation Information 
Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/895. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 1990-1991 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Aug  8 18:49:55 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope







VOL. 139 APRIL 1991 No. 4
Symposium
THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY
ARTICLES
NORMATIVITY AND THE POLITICS OF FORM*
PIERRE SCHLAGt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. (VIRTUALLY) ALWAYS AND ALREADY NORMATIVE......... 808
A. Normative Legal Thought v. Descriptive Legal Thought .. 811
* © Copyright 1991, Pierre Schlag.
t Professor of Law, University of Colorado. For comments and criticisms, I am
grateful to Richard Delgado, Bob Fishman, Deborah Maranville, David Skover, Steve
Smith, and Steve Winter.
This essay is part of a larger enterprise-an attempt to understand the character
and status of contemporary normative legal thought. For other installments, see
Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi': The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631 (1990); Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
43 STAN. L. REV. 167.(1990); Schlag, The Problem of the Subject (forthcoming 69 TEX.
L. REV. (1991)).
(801)
802 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:801
B. Normative Legal Thought v. Conceptualism ........... 814
C. Normative Legal Thought v. Nihilism ............... 828
D. Discussion ................................ 832
H. How To BE NORMATIVE, WIN FRIENDS, AND INFLUENCE
CONNECTIONS ............................... 843
III. L.A. LAW'S EMPIRE ............................ 852
IV. WHY HERCULES CAN'T Do L.A. LAW'S EMPIRE ......... 870
V. THE THEATER OF THE RATIONAL .................... 884
VI. THE POLITICS OF FORM ........................ 905
A. Premature Politicization ........................ 906
B. The Politics of Nostalgia ....................... 906
C. Slippage and Resonance ....................... 909
D. Nesting . .................................. 911
E. Border Patrol Jurisprudence: The Uses of the Inside/Outside
Distinction ................................ 916
F. The Birth of the Clinic ........................ 926
CONCLUSION ..................................... 929
If the sociology of the system of education and the intellectual
world seems to me to be fundamental, this is because it also
contributes to our knowliedge of the subject of cognition by
introducing us.... to the unthought categories of thought which
limit the thinkable and predetermine what is actually thought: I
need merely refer to the universe of prejudice, repression and
omission that every successful education makes you accept, and
makes you remain unaware of, tracing out that magic circle of
powerless complacency in which the elite schools imprison their
elect.
1
What should be done? How should we live? What should the
law be? These are the momentous questions. These are the hard
questions. These are the -questions that animate virtually all of
contemporary legal thought--from the most modest doctrinal reform
proposals to the most ambitious utopian speculation. In our classes
and in our writings, we speak ceaselessly of ways to improve law.
1 P. BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS 178 (1990).
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We seek to bring law into greater consonance with moral value, or
the public interest, or justice, or some other worthy conception that
celebrates its own take on the social good.
Because we are constantly engaged in this great prescriptive
effort to better law, our thought often appears extraordinarily
ennobling. Indeed, our contributions to legal thought routinely
affirm that we are working on the side of the good, the right, or the
just-at least as we understand those concepts. We are part of a
laudable enterprise, and in our teaching and writing we seek to
enlist others, our students and colleagues, in this enterprise-in the
notion that law can be perfected, can be improved through
reasoned argument about the good, the right, the just, and the like.
It must thus come as quite a shock to discover (as one invariably
does) that this passionate normative life of the law has no readily
apparent relation to the actual structure or content of legal
practice. 2 For our students, the transition is extremely abrupt. For
three years, the talk is of bringing law in accord with purposive
reason, of refining the efficiency calculus, of being very pragmatic
and oh so contextual. Rudely, however, these three years are
brought to a close by the vulgar reality principle of the bar exam.
This is quickly followed by one (quite possibly) last, exceedingly
hedonistic vacation.
This vacation typically ends badly with the law student finding
himself confined in a small cool cubicle with a window, a couple of
diplomas, one potted plant, and a very bad view. From that cubicle,
law begins to seem far less genteel, far less intellectualized, and,
most of all, far less respectful of its own inner normative text than
it did in law school. In that cubicle (and in tens of thousands like
it), the student-become-lawyer will learn and learn quickly that law
is a power game. In that cubicle, doctrine, arguments, causes of
action, defenses, and the like will undergo an almost magical
metamorphosis. They will be recast as the rhetorical moves that
allow lawyers, clients, and courts, to get more of what it is they
want. In legal practice, the noble values immanent in positive law
will lose much of their moral sheen. They will be recognized for
what they effectively are: part of the arsenal of rhetorical levers by
which institutional authorities can be instrumentally summoned to
visit coercion on selectively named parties.3 The normative values
2 Normative legal thought has some relations to the content and structure of legal
practice, but these relations are not the readily apparent ones.
' For a graphic demonstration, see Yablon, Form, 11 CARDozo L. REV. 1348
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embedded in law will become part of the prime cultural set pieces
by which lawyers manipulate the self-image ofjurors, clients, judges,
and other lawyers to get more of what it is the lawyers ostensibly
want. For many students-become-lawyers, this will seem a very
glamorous and exciting game-one that smacks of real conse-
quences, real power, and real life. And it will continue to seem
glamorous and exciting at least so long as the student-become-
lawyer continues to believe that he is in control of the power game.
It will not be until much later (if at all) that the student-become-
lawyer will recognize that it is more likely the other way around.
If this seems like an unusually dark vision of the practice of law,
it is likely to be so only for those whose understanding of law is
informed principally by the dreamy normative visions that issue
routinely from the legal academy. Practicing lawyers, by contrast,
are likely to find this vision unexceptionable: practicing lawyers
experience law as a complex network of bureaucratic power
arrangements that they have learned to manipulate. 4 That is what
legal practice is about. Words get used, arguments get made,
institutional pressure builds, situations become increasingly
intolerable, somebody gives, and a settlement is reached, or a
contract is signed, or ajury comes back with a verdict. It's law. It's
power.
Against this backdrop of bureaucratic power games, it becomes
an interesting question just what all of our passionate and very
moral normative conversation does or does not contribute. Against
the backdrop of this power game of law, our normative conversation
can seem exceedingly polite-given to a rather unbelievable
romanticization of the enterprise we call "law."
Many legal thinkers understand this dramatic conflict in terms
of an opposition between the "realities" of practice and the "ideals"
of the legal academy. For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially
urgent to ask once again: 'What should be done? How should we
live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These
are the momentous questions.
(1990).
4 As Sarat and Felstiner observe, a common understanding of professional power
is "based not on rules but on local knowledge, insider access, connections, and
reputation. Lawyers often suggest that their most important contribution is
knowledge of the ropes, not knowledge of the rules; they describe a system that is not
bureaucratically rational but is, nonetheless, accessible to its 'priests.'" Sarat &
Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office 98
YALE L.J. 1663, 1685 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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And they are the wrong ones.
They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that
reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the
cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the
reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of
legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these
normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves
from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the
reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be
coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implica-
tion. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics
to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures
as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist
subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal
thinkers to assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs,
personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance
requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitor-
ing-they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It
is these normative questions that enable them to represent them-
selves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal
humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in
control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the
Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts.
It isn't so. 5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make
some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That
is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no
doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that
is because this article puts in question the very coherence, mean-
ingfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and
discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.
One question will no doubt recur to the reader throughout this
article: "But what should we do?" That question is not going to
receive a straightforward answer here, and I would like to explain
why at the outset. Suppose that you are walking on a road and you
come to a fork. This calls for a decision, for a choice. So you ask
your companions: "Which fork should we take? Where should we
go?" You all begin to talk about it, to consider the possibilities, to
5 See Schlag, Le Hors de Texte C'est Moi' : The Politics of Form and the Domestication
of Deconstruction, 11 CARDozo L. REV. 1631 (1990) [hereinafter Schlag, "Le Hors de
Texte]; Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) [hereinafter
Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go].
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weigh the considerations. Given these circumstances, given this sort
of problem, the questions, "Where should we go? What should we
do?" are perfectly sensible.
6
But now suppose that it gets dark and the terrain becomes less
familiar. You are no longer sure which road you are on or even if
you are on a road at all. 7 So you ask, "where are we?" One of your
companions says "I don't know-I think we should just keep going
forward." Another one says, "I think we should just go back." Yet
another says "No, I think we should go left." Now given the right
context, each of these suggestions can be perfectly sensible. But not
in this context. Not anymore. On the contrary, you know very well
that going forward, backward, left or in any other direction makes
no sense unless you happen to know where you are. So, of course,
you try to figure out where you are. You look around for telltale
signs. You scan the horizon. You try to reconstruct mentally how
you got here in the first place. You explore. You even start
thinking about how to figuire out where you are.
Meanwhile, if your companions keep asking "But what should we
do? Which road should we take?," you are likely to think that these
kinds of questions are not particularly helpful. The questions
(Where should we go? Which fork should we take?) that seemed to
make so much sense a short time back have now become a hin-
drance. And if your companions keep up this sort of questioning
(Which road should we take? Which way should we go?), you're
going to start wondering about how to get them to focus on the new
situation, how to get them to drop this "fork in the road" stuff and
start using a different metaphor.
8
6 Notice that the generative metaphorical schema at work here is what Lakoff calls
the "source-path-goal schema." G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS:
WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 275 (1987). The basic logic of this
recursive schema is to go from a source to a destination on a path. Id. As Lakoff puts
it, "[p]urposes are understood in terms of destinations, and achieving a purpose is
understood as passing along a path from a starting point to an endpoint." Id.
Much of normative legal thought can be understood as structured by this source-
path-goal schema. Teleological ethics are destination-oriented, requiring the travelers
on the journey to act in ways appropriate to achieve the destination. Deontological
ethics by contrast are backward looking and source-regarding, requiring the travelers
to refer back to what has already transpired on the journey in order to decide what
to do at each point.
7 1 think it's been a while since any of us have seen jurisprudential pavement. See
Schlag, Cannibal Moves: The Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN L. REV.
929, 930 (1988).
8 The "fork in the road" metaphor for normative legal thought is very much one
of problem solving- "Which way should we go?" For an argument that the "essential
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Now one metaphor that recurs throughout this essay is that of
the theater. 9 Now, you might reasonably think that it's a bit
difficult to get from the "fork in the road" metaphor of normative
legal thought to the metaphor of law as theater. But actually, it's
not that difficult-especially not if you understand at the outset that
those individuals who keep saying "Where should we go? What
should we do?" are themselves already doing a kind of theater. They
are engaged in a particular kind of dramatic action appropriate for
a particular kind of scene, agon, and actors. They are doing the kind
of theater that is particularly appropriate for forks in the road.
Now, one problem with normative legal thought is that it is
constantly representing our situation as a fork in the road-calling,
of course, for a choice, a commitment to this way or that way. Now,
you might think: well, this is not so bad. At least we get to choose.
We are free and we can choose which way to go. But, of course, we
are not free. The rhetorical script of normative legal thought is
already written, the social scene is already set and play after play,
article after article, year after year, normative legal thought requires
you to choose: "What should we do? Where should we go?" We
are free, but we must choose-which is to say that we are not free at
all. On the contrary, we (you and I) have been constituted as the
kind of beings, the kind of thinkers who compulsively treat every
intellectual, social, or legal event as calling for a choice. We must
choose.
What should we do? Where should we go? These questions are
not helpful now. It's time to do a different kind of theater. And
the first thing to do is figure out where we are and what we're
doing. What we're doing, of course, is normative legal thought.
difficulties in social policy have more to do with problem setting than with problem
solving," see Sch6n, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem Setting in Social
Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 254, 255 (A. Ortony ed. 1988).
9 Theater features as an important metaphor in the work of Kenneth Burke and
Erving Goffman. See K. BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1969); E. GOFFMAN, FRAME
ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1983). In those works,
and in this article, theater is not used as metaphor in the usual weak sense of
metaphor. The claim both there and here is not the weak notion that life or law is
like theater; the claim is that life and law are already theater, are already invested in
and invested with theater.
For one of the early precedents of theater in legal thought, see Ball, The Play's
the Thing. An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 81 (1975).
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I. (VIRTUALLY) ALWAYS AND ALREADY NORMATIVE
The orientation of American academic legal thought is perva-
sively and overwhelmingly normative. For the legal thinker, the
central question is "what should the law be?" Or, "what should the
courts do?" Or, "how should courts decide cases?" Or, "what values
should the ubiquitous (and largely non-referential) 'we' (i.e., us)
believe?" Or, "how should...."
These questions and their doctrinal derivatives constitute,
organize, and circumscribe the tacit agenda of contemporary legal
thought. The key verb dominating contemporary legal thought is
some version of "should." Sometimes this "should" does not quite
rise to the moral "ought," and remains merely an instrumental,
technical, or prudential "should." Sometimes it is a covert
"should"-hidden beneath layers of legal positivism. But the fact
remains that "shoulds" and "oughts" dominate legal discourse. And
the question of whether any given "should" is a true moral "ought"
or another instrumental "should" turns out to be just another
internecine squabble among competing normative perspectives.'
0
The normative orientation is so dominant in legal thought that
it is usually not noticed. No doubt the very pervasiveness and
dominance of this thought has enabled it to escape conscious
thematization.1 1  Indeed, while the concept "normative legal
thought" is hardly unknown or unintelligible to American legal
thinkers, its precise significance, its precise movements in social or
intellectual space, remain largely unrecognized and undetermined.
Indeed, the understanding (or rather understandings) of normative
legal thought within the legal academy are not nearly as refined or
contested as the understandings, for instance, of legal formalism,
legal realism, legal process, law and economics, critical legal studies
(cls), or the like.
Nonetheless, normative legal thought does not arrive on this
scene without meaning, without a history. On the contrary,
normative legal thought arrives an already loaded term-one that has
already been engaged in jurisprudential skirmishes with conceptual-
ism, positivism, and nihilism. Indeed, our image of normative legal
10 For instance, the running feud between deontological and teleological ethics.
For an early and sophisticated instantiation of this clash in the legal literature, see
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
11 Strikingly, normative legal thought is so confident of its own position, its own
importance, that virtually no one has bothered to ask just how it is that normative
legal thought produces its effects.
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thought is already a product of some cognitively and professionally
sedimented distinctions 12 between normative legal thought and:
(a) descriptive thought (as in, for instance, the opposition
between descriptive and normative law and economics);13
(b) conceptualism (as in, for instance, the claim that norma-
tive legal thought is value-conscious, open-ended, and non-
authoritarian in contrast to conceptualism);14 or
(c) nihilism (as in, for instance, the claim that either law is
a normatively meaningful enterprise or we face the abyss of
a bleak and chaotic nihilism).
1 5
These distinctions and the patterns of argument structures
associated with these distinctions have played significant roles in
fashioning our pre-conscious, pre-reflective understanding of the
character and location of normative legal thought. It is important
to attend to these pre-reflective understandings lest they shape our
conceptualization of normative legal thought in ways that turn out
to be unhelpful. We want to avoid as much as possible "positing"
a model or "proposing" a definition of normative legal thought.
For us, then, normative legal thought is already a social
construction, already having meaning and significance. We want to
reveal our own sedimented, pre-reflective images and conceptualiza-
tions of normative legal thought so that in the process of revealing,
12 "Sedimentation" is a concept that arrives on the legal scene from Steven
Winter, from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, from Husserl:
[Sedimentation] expresses the way meanings and assumptions build up
within the subject and, once internalized, operate without the subject's
conscious awareness.
Sedimentation is the "deposit" of the subject's past interactions with its
physical and social situation. It operates as a gestalt that, once integrated,
can be invoked without being fully reactivated.
See Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 1441, 1487-88 (1990).
13 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20-22 (3d. ed. 1986) (discussing the
distinction between positive and normative economics).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 27-74.
Is This is what Bernstein calls "the Cartesian anxiety." R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
OBJECTIVISM AND RELATWIvM 18 (1985) ("Either there is some support for our being,
a fixed foundation for our knowledge, orwe cannot escape the forces of darkness that
envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos."). For expressions of this
anxiety, see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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we might learn something about how these pre-reflective conceptu-
alizations will help or hinder the inquiry undertaken here.
Indeed, it will turn out that our pre-reflective images and
conceptualizations of normative legal thought in some senses help
and in others obstruct our attempts to understand normative legal
thought. They help in the! sense that they are socially and cogni-
tively operative among legal thinkers and thus allow us to get some
shared "fix" on what we mean by normative legal thought. At the
same time these images and conceptualizations are unhelpful
because once we make their argumentative logic intellectually
explicit, they collapse. On the one hand, the three distinctions
remain socially and cognitively operative-not only in the actual
production of contemporary legal thought, but in our very represen-
tation here of that legal thought;16 on the other hand, they
collapse whenever serious intellectual attention is turned their way.
This may seem paradoxical. I prefer to think of it as a disloca-
tion between what has to be true for us as an intellectual matter and
what nonetheless often remains cognitively operative for us (despite
our intellectual ambitions). We are the ones whose thinking
continues to be shaped by formative effects of the distinctions-even
as we recognize that the distinctions collapse under inspection.
17
This situation may seem somewhat intellectually vexing to many
legal thinkers, but surely that is no reason to pretend it does not
exist. On the contrary, I think that recognizing that the aesthetic
structures or our own legal thinking are far less coherent, far less
stable, and far less advanced than we legal thinkers typically
represent them to be is itself a genuine intellectual advance.1 8 At
any rate, acknowledging these conditions seems to me more
consonant with intellectual "seriousness" than rehearsing the same
old discourse moves that unconsciously constitute us as mindless
choosers at a fork in the road.
By exploring the distinctions, their argumentative logic and their
collapse, I hope to accomplish several tasks. First, I hope to reveal
the ways in which we already conceptualize normative legal thought.
Second, I hope to destabilize some of our pre-reflective understand-
16 See infra notes 285-322 and accompanying text (describing how conceptual
distinctions become cognitively, professionally, and materially embedded through the
processes of "slippage" and "resonance").
17 1 am overstating the case somewhat here. Indeed, many of us are not in the
dislocation at all, but ensconced in a world in which the vulnerability (let alone the
collapse of) the distinctions is not even discernible.
For my demonstration of this point, see Schlag, supra note 7.
[Vol. 139:801
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ings of normative legal thought. In particular, I am interested in
demonstrating that while we tend to think of normative legal
thought in opposition to descriptive thought and conceptualist
jurisprudence, the latter are pervasively normative and must also be
considered as normative legal thought.19 Third, by considering
our pre-reflective understandings of normative legal thought and by
tracing their collapse, I hope to avoid the kinds of serious intellectu-
al problems created by the routine objectivist habit of legal thinkers
to "apply" or "posit" "models," or "ideal types," or "definitions."
Now, as you might guess, this is preliminary clean-up and set-up
work. It's not particularly fun or funny; but given the present
composition of the scene and the present constitution of the actors
(you and I), it has to be done.
A. Normative Legal Thought v. Descriptive Legal Thought
The opposition between positive and normative thought harkens
back to a Weberian dream (or nightmare) of establishing a value-
free social science.20 At present, the supposition that descriptive
or positive research can be value free is only barely intelligible.
Still, within certain select contexts, the claim can make sense.
Within the common academic language game that privileges the
context as given and accords determinate effect to the autonomous
intent of the individual thinker, it is possible to discern differences
in the degree to which the thinker intentionally allows her own moral
or political inclinations consciously to affect her thought process or
conclusions. Within this language game, we can all make judgments
about the ways in which the work of particular thinkers appears to
be motivated by overriding moral or political inclinations.
19 As will be seen later, legal positivism, technical doctrinalism, and court-centered
legal thought are not at all excluded from normative legal thought. See infra text
accompanying notes 27-74 & 89-114.
20 Weber explained:
What is really at issue is the intrinsically simple demand that the investigator
and teacher should keep unconditionally separate the establishment of
empirical facts (including the "value-oriented" conduct of the empirical
individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e.,
his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including
among these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are the
objects of investigation.).
M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11 (1949). As Bernstein
points out, Weber "insisted on an ultimate and unbridgeable gap between the Is and
the Ought, between what science can teach us about the world and our ultimate
moral norms." R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 14.
1991]
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But the status of the language game that allows such determina-
tions has come under question. Indeed, if we look at the italicized
phrases above, it becomes clear that, far from enabling non-.
problematic distinctions between the descriptive and the normative,
they are themselves normatively charged. The qualification, within
the context as given, assumes the normatively controversial claim not
just that a context has been given, but that the particulars of this
specific context have been given. The question whether the legal
thinker intentionally allows the moral or political inclinations
consciously to affect her work presumes the normatively controversial
claims that the legal thinker's intent is somehow the relevant
parameter-that she is in control of her own moral or political
inclinations.2 1 This puts beyond question the ways in which the
context and the legal unconscious already perform normative work
in selecting, establishing, and organizing.the so-called "descriptive"
categories deployed in legal thought. The major problem, then, in
stabilizing the grounds for a distinction between the descriptive and
the normative is that we know very well that the very constitution of
those grounds is already in part charged with normative implica-
tions.
22
There is another sense, however, in which this distinction
between descriptive and normative thought remains intelligible:
normative thought can be understood to aim at the recommenda-
tion or prescription of a particular course of action, whereas
descriptive or positive thought reaches its intellectual terminus in
explanation or understanding. Certainly, understood in this way,
the distinction between descriptive and normative legal thought
indicates something of a practical difference among various styles
of legal thought.
Arguably, much of the thought of law and society, law and
economics, and legal history could be described as aimed solely at
reaching explanation or understanding. But before we accept the
claim that this kind of thought is somehow beyond or outside
normative legal thought, it is important to consider the extent to
21 This conventional understanding of the privileged status of intention for
deciding on the political character of actions is echoed by Robert Bork: "Constitu-
tional philosophies always have political results. They should never have political
intentions. The proper question is not what are the political results of a particular
philosophy but, under that philosophy, who chooses the political results." R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLI'MCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 177 (1990)
(emphasis added).
M2 See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1265 (1985).
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which this work-its objects of inquiry, its methodologies, its
argument structures-may themselves be selected by, parasitic upon,
or supportive of, normative legal thought or particular normative
projects.
That such work may support normative projects is not even in
contention. 23 That such work may be parasitic upon normative
projects is evident from the fact that many of the categories
uncritically adopted in such work are already normatively charged.
For instance, in law and economics, routine assumptions are made
about the identity of markets based on uncorroborated and
unexamined assumptions that the dominant (legal) culture's
description of what is being traded in the relevant transactions is
indeed accurate. 24 In law and society work, conceptual categories
identifying institutions and institutional processes are often
borrowed from the legal culture or the wider culture to describe or
explain human behavior without the slightest question ever being
raised as to their identity, integrity, or constitution. Likewise, the
dominant (legal) culture's conceptualizations of the subject, of
agency, of causation, of motivation, etc., are often borrowed
uncritically and pressed into scholarly service.
Moreover, much of law and society, law and economics, and
legal history work is not only parasitic upon a normatively charged
discourse, but is itself selected by the discourse. For instance, much
work attempting a purportedly descriptive reconstruction of the
intent of the framers of the constitution often appears to be
selected by an unspoken, unarticulated, but deeply assumed norm
that the framers' intent should be followed. Similarly, law and
economics work that identifies "efficient" rules or legal mechanisms
often taps into an unspoken norm that efficiency should be
promoted. In both history and law and society work, the research
agendas are guided significantly by the extent to which empirical
evidence is available. In turn, this data-dependence results in an
(unavoidable) privileging of the conceptual categories, the informa-
tion retrieval systems of the very social and cultural systems being
studied. Likewise, much of law and society work is organized
23 Not even Robert Bork, the champion of neutrality in constitutional adjudica-
tion, challenges the notion that "neutral" principles can have normative or political
effects. See supra note 21.
24 See R. POSNER, supra note 13. For a demonstration and critique of this
tendency in economic thought, see Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1661 (1990).
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around orthodox assumptions about which key social and political
actors might act to remedy a perceived problem.
Indeed, one might be tempted to ask: how could it be other-
wise?2 5 That is, how could social science, economics, or history
even get started if it were not already engaged in an uncritical
deployment of some already embedded matrix of discourse? The
short answer is: it could not, and that is exactly the point here. It
is utterly preposterous to believe that one can through careful and
diligent attention avoid the always already normatively charged
character of language and culture.
If this is true, the mere fact that much of this economic, social
science, and history work does not explicitly issue ethical or moral
judgments or prescriptions; can hardly suffice to place such work
outside normative legal thought. On the contrary, it would be only
the most extreme stylistic formalism that would allow the exclusion
of works that avoid any explicit invocation of a prescriptive and
normative "should" from the ambit of normative legal thought.
Thus, while the distinction between normative and descriptive
legal thought may at times be experienced as retaining some
intelligibility, it is a context-bound intelligibility-one that in some
of our contexts (including this one) disintegrates very easily.
2 6
B. Normative Legal Thought v. Conceptualism
In the legal academy, the distinction between the descriptive and
the normative has been re-inscribed in a more local, equally
recursive dispute. Typically, in this dispute one side emphasizes the
need for considering and elaborating the moral and ethical
dimension of law and the other side emphasizes the need to insulate
and protect law from external moral and ethical concerns. While
this dispute has been carried on under different names and with
slightly different twists within legal thought, what is of interest here
is its recursive self-sameness.
27
25 This is one of Stanley Fish's favorite questions-one he pulls, true to form, when
his point has already been made. 'What could you, the reader, do, except agree with
Fish? See generally S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC,
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
26 For those who still resist this conclusion and wish to adhere to the notion that
somehow it is possible for thinkers to strive sincerely for pure description in their
work, there is this puzzle: just what does it mean to strive sincerely for pure
description in the context of a language, a discourse that is itself already normatively
charged?
2 And because of its recursive self-sameness, the chances are good that this
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One early version of the dispute pits the legal realist insistence
on making explicit ethical value judgments about how the law
should be against a more traditional conceptualist effort to restrain
the influence of ostensibly exogenous value judgments in stating
what the law is. The legal realist position is eloquently articulated
by Felix Cohen.28 Cohen criticized the ways in which the reifica-
tions and personifications of conceptualist legal argument eclipsed
the ethical and value judgments inherent in adjudication. For
Cohen, conceptualism had supplanted the sort of searching
examination of social life necessary to make meaningful value
judgments. As Cohen put it:
When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence
are thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or
mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached on other
grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or
argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and
the social ideals by which the law is to be judged.29
Not only did conceptualism produce decisions on unconsidered and
irrelevant grounds,30 but it eclipsed and supplanted the "real"
31
ethical, political, or economic grounds for decision. When
conceptualist jurisprudence and its attendant reifications and
personifications had done their work, it was as if legal decisions
flowed inexorably from the canonical meaning of the legal concepts
themselves. What the law is appears to require no value judgment
whatsoever. The law appears to emerge from the is without ever
encountering a conscious, explicit ought.
debate plays a very important role in our pre-conscious understanding ofwhat we call
normative legal thought.
28 See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L.
REv. 809 (1935).
29 Id. at 812.
30 Cohen argued that the tendency of scholars and judges to reify or personify
legal concepts or legal relations like "corporations" had noxious effects. One noxious
effect for Cohen was that reification and personification produced decisions informed
by unexamined, unconsidered, and often irrelevant concerns-as indeed he graphically
illustrated in his famous commentary on Cardozo's opinion in Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). Cardozo had ruled on the amenability
of a Pennsylvania corporation to suit in New York state. Much of Cardozo's opinion
turned, according to Cohen, on the assumption that corporations, like persons, either
were or were not "present in" the state. For Cardozo, "the essential thing" was that
"the corporation shall have come into the state." Id. at 268-69, 115 N.E. at 918. But
as Cohen argued, to accept Cardozo's view of the matter was already to buy into the
notion that the corporation (this set of legal relations) was somehow to be treated like
1991]
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For Cohen and other legal realists, conceptualism was as
unbelievable as it was ethically obtuse. Much of the work of the
legal realists was thus devoted to developing the jurisprudential
brief for a more candid recognition of the importance of practical
and ethical judgment 2 in legal decision-making.
But, of course, the realist call for candid and practical ethical
judgment was not received without objection. It prompted a lively
dispute with responses along two major lines. One prototypical
response was that conceptualist jurisprudence did encompass
practical and ethical judgment, but that these ethical and practical
judgments had already been internalized in conceptualist doctrine
itself 33  The other major response was that the realist call for
a person. Cohen put it succinctly:
In actual practice I have never found it necessary or useful to assume that
a corporation is anything more than a bundle of legal relationships between
actual human beings. The bundle of relationships exists, in a very real
sense, but it is not a human being. It does not travel from state to state,
and when eminentjudges say that it does, they do reverence to a language
habit that helps to obscure important issues of social policy.
Letter to the Editor from Felix S. Cohen, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 548, 549 (1936)
(responding to Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5
FoRDHAM L. REv. 272 (1936)).
31 "Real" here is obviously quite a problematic expression. One can agree with
Cohen that the treatment of the corporation as a person is a fiction produced by
metaphor-specifically, the metaphor ofpersonification. In what sense, however, are
Cohen's "real" ethical, political, or economic concerns any less fictional, any less
metaphorical, any more "real" than Cardozo's fiction? For exploration of this
question, see Winter, Transcendental Nonsense Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
2Joe Singer puts it this way: "The legal realists wanted to replace formalism with
a pragmatic attitude toward law generally. This attitude treats law as made, not
found. Law therefore is, and must be, based on human experience, policy, and
ethics, rather than formal logic." Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 465, 474 (1988). Many legal thinkers understand legal realist ethics as
consequentialist or instrumentalist in character. See generally Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Centuty American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique
of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981)
(elaborating as pragmatic instrumentalism the ethical/legal theories of a group of
thinkers commonly associated with the label legal realism).
-1 As Walter Kennedy's response to Cohen put it:
The advantage of stare decisis-its safety valve and brake-is that it is a
system which accumulates the wisdom and experience of the past and offers
it to the judges of the present as a substitute for, or a warning against,
precipitate, individualized and arbitrary action .... The present rule that
the foreign corporation may be sued when it is "doing business" in the
distant state was not the special "brain child7 of the New York Court of
Appeals. This well considered principle of today evolved slowly, painfully
and after many pauses .... Surely the realists do not insist that each time
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practical and ethical value judgments would itself destroy law and
order, that it would lead to an explosion of restraints on the
development and articulation of law and that it would deprive law
of its meaning.
3 4
This dispute between a realist functionalism bent on expanding
the role of ethical judgment in law and a formalist conceptualism
bent on maintaining the authoritative status of conventional legal
concepts and reasoning has played a significant role in forming our
understanding of normative legal thought: We tend to treat
normative legal thought as opposed in some sense to conceptualism
and legal formalism. And indeed, the argumentative logic of this
sedimented opposition continues to organize a much more recent
dispute that pits normative legal thought, but which, to avoid
confusion, I will call "moralist jurisprudence," against a traditional
"technical doctrinalism."
In our time, this dispute is aptly personified by the opposition
of Ronald Dworkin to Robert Bork,3 5 or Robin West to Henry
Monaghan, 6 or Michael Perry to William Van Alstyne. 7 In this
more recent dispute, not surprisingly, the relationship of the
arguments between moralist jurisprudence and technical doctri-
nalism bear a striking similarity to that between functional realism
and conceptual formalism.
the court repeats this principle it must likewise repeat in a fulsome manner
all the previous arguments collectable out of past decisions.
Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5 FORDHAM L. REV.
272, 292-94 (1936).
34 This somewhat hysterical response slides into the next distinction-the
opposition of normative legal thought to nihilism. Note that within a rationalist
cognitive mode, still operative today in many sectors of the legal academy, this
otherwise hysterical response makes perfect sense. See Schlag, Missing Pieces: A
Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1195-1200 (1989).
35 Compare Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971) with R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
36 Compare West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 531 (1988) with Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353
(1981).
37 Compare M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982) with Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of
Special Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
And then compare the sort of oppositions described supra notes 35-37, with the
opposition set forth in Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958), and Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Har,
71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958). It is striking how much these disputes and these
stances all echo one another from different regions ofjurisprudence.
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The moralists are an assortment (not quite a group) of legal
thinkers, usually self-identified as left-liberal, who favor open-ended
forms of value talk and argument in both the courts and the
academy. Their theory of legal legitimacy and legal meaning
depends heavily and very rapidly on the explicitjustification of legal
decisions in terms of moral or political values.3 8  The moralists
hold that law is dependent upon moral or value choices, that law is
not neutral, or otherwise exempt from the contestable, value-laden
character of politics generally. Beyond asserting that law is political
in this sense, the moralists also affirm that this is a good thing, that
law should be political,39 and that the legal community (legal
academics, law students, lawyers, and judges) should acknowledge
that law is politically charged and should engage in frank political
argument.
40
The moralists understand themselves to be opposed to a
doctrinalist tradition dominant both in the academy and in the
courts. Hence, the moralists argue that legal thought is not
sufficiently normative; that, indeed, legal thought is too inclined to
accept arguments from authority, too steeped in convention.41 In
this kind of argument, moral thought and normative deliberation
are represented as opposed and preferable to an authoritarian style
of doctrinal argument. 42 In constitutional law, for instance, it has
38 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 35.
39 See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985) ("Law... is deeply and
thoroughly political. Lawyers andjudges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense of
political theory.").
40 For example, this sort of argument has found expression in R. DWORCIN, supra
note 35; Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 888 (1988); Chemerinsky,
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989); Michelman,
Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantmen 74 CORNELL L. REv. 256 (1989);
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984);
West, supra note 36.
41 See, e.g., West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv.
641, 678-79 (1990) ("Thus, progressives conclude, political and jurisprudential
conservative thought rests not only on attitudes of deference to a community's
normative authority, but also on attitudes of deference toward the social power that
underlies it.").
42 For instance:
The devastating effect in Bowers of a judicial posture of deference to
external authority appears in the majority's assumption, plain if not quite
explicit in its opinion, that public values meriting enforcement as law are to
be uncritically equated with either the formally enacted preferences of a
recent legislative or past constitutional majority, or with the received
teachings of an historically dominant, supposedly civic, orthodoxy. I will call
such a looking backward jurisprudence authoritarian because it regards
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been argued that it is very different to ask what the Constitution
means as opposed to what it should mean.43 The former question
is seen as text-based and intrinsically authoritarian whereas the
latter question is portrayed as less text-focused and non-author-
itarian. 44 The structure of the claim here is very much an echo of
Felix Cohen's earlier complaint that conceptualist thinking, in its
very structure, not only precludes ethical value judgment, but
eclipses the sense that ethical value judgments are even needed. 45
Things look a bit different from the perspective of the technical
doctrinalists, who, far from seeing themselves as dominant,
represent themselves as defenders of an embattled tradition-one
that has perhaps already been overwhelmed by moralist jurispru-
dence.46 Like the legal formalists, contemporary doctrinalists have
questioned the origins, structure, and effectiveness of the contem-
porary call for open-ended value-orientedjurisprudence. They have
condemned the normative orientation as an undesirable politi-
cization of legal discourse, 47 as ill-advised legal perfectionism,
48
as legal adventurism, 49 and even as an Eastern Establishment
conspiracy. 50 While the technical doctrinalists tend to be center
to right in political orientation, they do not announce themselves as
such. They tend to insist on a relatively sharp distinction between
law and politics and on the irrelevance of the latter to the former.
Instead of a value orientation, the doctrinalists prefer more
technical, more traditional forms of legal reasoning. This tradition-
al kind of legal reasoning is claimed to be distinctly legal-different
and separable from the general cultural run of moral or political
argument. The doctrinalist theory of legitimacy and legal meaning
inclines heavily and very rapidly to legal positivism.
This conventional dispute between the moralists and the
doctrinalists has been extremely influential in fashioning the legal
adjudicative actions as legitimate only insofar as dictated by the prior
normative utterance, express or implied of extra-judicial authority.
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988).
43 See West, supra note 36, at 534-35.
44 See id. at 534-39.
4- See Cohen, supra note 28, at 812.
46 In this age of dissonance within the legal academy, one commonality is that
virtually every group or assortment presents itself as a beleaguered minority
struggling against insurmountable odds.
7 See Van Alstyne, supra note 37.
48 See Monaghan, supra note 36.
49 See R. BoPK, supra note 21.
So See id.
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academy's understanding of normative legal thought. Indeed,
throughout the legal academy, normative legal thought is often
conventionally associated with what I have described here as
moralist jurisprudence and opposed to technical doctrinalism. And
because the moralists have charged the doctrinalists with formal-
ism 51 and authoritarianism, 52 one prevalent understanding in the
legal academy is that normative legal thought stands in opposition
to formalism.
Yet as one strives to understand the character of this dispute
and its arguments, they collapse. What, for instance, supports the
moralists' demand for greater recognition of the normative in law?
Like the realists before them, the moralists typically argue that there
is not enough candid recognition of the value-laden and dialogic
character of law. Often this claim is represented as turning on the
form/substance dichotomy. In form/substance terms, the claim is
made that foundationalistform in legal discourse prematurely closes
off dialogue, illegitimately placing certain substantive concerns or
questions off limits. 53 This foundationalist form is then found to
be objectionable because it is exclusionary, or inauthentic, or
mystifying, or simply lacking in candor. At times, however, the
moralist claim is articulated on the theory/practice pivot, with the
moralists contrasting their favored brand of explicitly value-oriented
theory with what they describe as an essentially authoritarian practice
of legal argument and legal interpretation. The criticism here
seems to be that technical doctrinalism is insufficiently developed
as a self-conscious theoretical and communicative enterprise; that
it remains too much of an unthinking, unthought, and unexamined
practice 54-one that prema:turely terminates a self-conscious and
thorough moral or ethical questioning of the conceptual framework
used to create law and to judge.
Now, these arguments are intelligible. There are, after all, many
differences between the jurisprudence of Robert Bork and that of
Ronald Dworkin. 55 At the same time, however, these differences
51 See Singer, supra note 40.
52 See West, supra note 36.
5 3 See, e.g., id. at 539 ("The authoritarian tradition in constitutional decisionmaking
by definition precludes moral debate.").
54 See West, supra note 41, at 678-79.
55 Consider, however, the following argument:
The best reason to oppose Bork, in short, was that he reminded us of
ourselves; if we rightfully condemned him, we condemned our profession.
Indeed, I suspect that mixed in with all the other fuel that fed the intense,
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are not absolute, and their intelligibility as well as their importance
are functions of the extent to which one is already implicated in the
intellectual force field defined by this normative dispute. The fact
is that many of us are deeply implicated in the conceptual matrices
and social alliances associated with this dispute. Nonetheless, the
matrix of oppositions organizing this dispute deconstructs. Moralist
jurisprudence turns out to be authoritarian and technical doctri-
nalism turns out to be value-laden. If this claim seems counter-
intuitive (and it does), it is because our stereotyped representation
of the dispute between moralist jurisprudence and technical
doctrinalism is itself so deeply sedimented.
Indeed, if the moralist is so certain that technical doctrinalism
is a formalist authoritarian mode of legal thought, it is precisely
because that is how the moralist first experiences technical
doctrinalism. For instance, if like Robin West, your jurisprudence
is organized by the grammar and categories of moral philosophy,
you will undoubtedly, indeed effortlessly, experience Borkian
conceptualism as the unselfconscious, only barely theorized
replication of unexamined legal practice. You will experience
Bork's jurisprudence as an illegitimate and premature attempt to
close off moral legal dialogue through the imposition of incoherent
and impossible dialogic criteria. For you, Borkian jurisprudence is
a thoroughgoing failure because it never even begins to give you any
plausible (i.e., moral) justifications for cutting off your moralist
jurisprudence, your moralist arguments.
The temptation, if you are anything like Robin West, is thus to
conceptualize Borkian jurisprudence as the unjustified imposition
of an unexamined practice, of an unselfconscious convention,
through an authoritarian form.56 And, in what appears to be a
logical correspondence, the temptation is very great to conceptual-
ize your own jurisprudence as thought (not practice), self-conscious
(not conventional), and open to the "real" substantive issues (not
closed off by an authoritarian form).57
almost exhilarated academic opposition to Bork was something close to self-
hatred.
Nagel, Meeting the Enemy (Book Review), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (1990).
5 See West, supra note 36 (characterizing the positivist approach to constitutional
inter retation as authoritarian and unselfconscious).
57This description finds a striking echo in Robin West's comparison of
"progressive positivists" and "conservative positivists":
The pivotal psychic difference between conservative and progressive
positivists is political, notjurisprudential: whereas the conservative positivist
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To experience the difference between your jurisprudence and
Borkian jurisprudence in this way is no doubt valid. The flattering
self-conceptualization, however, is not. The self-conceptualization
goes wrong because it imagines that the ostensibly open-ended, anti-
foundationalist, moral value-talk of the moralists somehow escapes
the enclosures, the authoritarian character of practice, convention,
and form. This view is wrong in that it imagines itself as outside of
any practice, any convention, any form, and thus, as some sort of
formalism-free, non-coercive, non-authoritarian discourse. The
short of it is: The menu of options available at present simply does
not include a rhetoric that would be formalism-free, non-coercive,
and non-authoritarian.
The moralist approach is in a sense, as authoritarian, formalist,
and coercive as the technical doctrinalism it decries. Consider for
instance, Robin West's arguments that we should replace the
authoritarian question "what does the Constitution mean?" with
what she considers the normatively open, non-authoritarian inquiry
"what should the Constitution mean?" The problem with West's
position is that this last question is hardly free from the constrain-
ing (and enabling) force of convention, privileged texts, canonical
authorities, or formal grammar that animates any professional
discourse.58 To have to argue what the Constitution should mean
is already to privilege a whole series of highly conventional assump-
tions about how to carry on dialogue.5 9 It is already to assume
that existing ethical categories, reasoning moves, and their associat-
sees in the set of acts and choices that constitute the "law" opportunities for
obedience to prior legal commands, the progressive positivist sees in the
same set of acts and choices opportunities for authenticity, freedom, self-
actualization, and judgment .... "Law," then, for the conservative positivist,
mandates obedience, while the same "law," for the progressive positivist,
mandates choice. Law creates, rather than closes, possibility and respon-
sibility.
West, supra note 41, at 687-88. As West accurately suggests, this sort of progressive
vision, along with its insistence on a radical individual subjectivism, is associated with
existentialism (I would add, the Sartrean kind). See id. at 687.
58 This sounds, of course, very much like the sort of argument that Stanley Fish
often makes. See S. FISH, supra note 25. A number of clarifications: I am not
arguing that all discourses are equadly authoritarian, though, in one often overlooked
and therefore ironically non-trivial sense, they are. I am not arguing that one cannot
recognize differences between more or less authoritarian discourses. Instead, I am
saying, first, that it is wrong to claim that there are some legal discourses that are free
from authoritarianism; and second, that the question of the extent to which a
discourse is authoritarian is always answered within a discourse.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 196-209 & 258-84.
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ed rhetoric, sociology, and psychology should be entitled to govern
the dialogue. Rather than privileging the text, conventions,
authorities, argumentative moves, and grammars of originalism and
legalism, the moralist form privileges the sort of texts, conventions,
authorities, argumentative moves, and grammars that moralists like
to read, write, and reproduce. But of course:
This is inevitable; one cannot do anything, least of all speak,
without determining (in a manner that is not only theoretical, but
practical and performative) a context. Such experience is always
political because it implies, insofar as it involves determination, a
certain type of non-"natural" relationship to others .... Once
this generality and this a priori structure have been recognized,
the question can be raised, not whether a politics is implied (it
always is), but which politics is implied in such a practice of
contextualization. This you can then go on to analyze, but you
cannot suspect it, much less denounce it except on the basis of
another contextual determination every bit as political.
60
This fall from grace of moralistjurisprudence into authoritarian-
ism, formalism, and coercion is no doubt difficult for moralists to
understand. It is difficult to understand because within the
tradition of moralist jurisprudence, the coercive, authoritarian,
conventionalist, routine character of this discourse is simply not
visible.6 1 Indeed, the moralists typically underestimate the extent
to which their agendas, their ways of framing questions, their texts,
and their argument forms operate as an unredeemed formal and
authoritarian restriction on the creation of legal meaning.62 Many
of us have been constituted to think of normative legal thought as
(the good) open-ended, non-authoritarian, anti-formalist response
to those (bad) latter-day formalists. 63 The result is that we rou-
tinely fail to recognize that, in privileging moralist inquiries, the
moralists are at the same time privileging a certain view of history,
of psychology, of sociology, of rhetoric, of the aesthetics of reason,
60 J. DERRIDA, Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion, in LImIrED INC 136 (1988).
61 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 5, at 183-87.
62 One simply cannot think that moralistjurisprudence is free from authoritarian-
ism. Rather, like every other professional group in the academy (historians,
deconstructionists, doctrinalists, etc.), moralists are perfectly willing to entertain any
inquiry-so long, of course, as it is pursued on their own terms.
63 Or to adopt the valences of the other side (the technical doctrinal side), the
dispute has constituted us to see normative legal thought as the (bad) adventuristic,
undisciplined, utopian response to the (rightful) rule of law position.
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of conversation itself-namely their own, the one that informs and
that is implicit in their own moral philosophical outlook.6 4
So the barriers erected to distinguish and privilege moralist
jurisprudence (the dichotomies of form/substance, theory/practice,
thought/convention, dialogue/authority, etc.) collapse. It is only
from within the stabilized, situated perspective of the already
committed moralist jurisprude that the specific deployments of
these distinctions are experienced as valid and can thus be success-
fully conceptualized. What we have been doing, however, is
destabilizing the sedimented matrix of oppositions that allows this
dispute to go on, that enable this moralist perspective to forget,
ironically (and fatally) its own perspectivity.
Just as the moralist position can collapse into technical doctri-
nalism, the reverse can occur as well. To argue that one should
read the Constitution by focusing on the words ofJohn Bingham or
James Madison rather than. on the words of John Rawls or Jurgen
Habermas65 is still to argue that one should do this as opposed to
that.66 Technical doctrinalists are in one sense every bit as norma-
tive as the moralists; they just try to keep the normative work off
center stage. Here, Bork's recent work is ironically (and fatally)
revealing. His work relies heavily on a rhetorical technique that
might be called concept-packing. He argues that the Constitution is
"law" and then by reference to the beliefs of the American people,
64 This privileging of moralist talk is in a sense very much a power play, the
primary effect of which, if successful, is to create power in moralist thinkers or moral
philosophers at the expense of other professional academics. See Mailloux, Truth or
Consequences: On Being Against Teory, in AGAINST THEORY: LrrERARY STUDIES AND
THE NEW PRAGMATISM 65, 68-70 (W. Mitchell ed. 1985).
65 Consider Larry Solum's use of Habermas in constitutional interpretation:
The distinction between communicative action and strategic behavior and
the principle of equality of communicative opportunity go a long way
toward explaining andjustifying the core of first amendment doctrine, but
they also enable a reinterpretation of the freedom of speech that can serve
as the basis for a comprehensive critique of existing doctrine.
Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. L. Rzv. 54, 135 (1989).
66 See R. BORF, supra note 21, at 9 ("One purpose of this book is to persuade
Americans that no person should be nominated or confirmed who does not display
both a grasp of and devotion to the philosophy of original understanding." (emphasis
added)).
Not all originalists fall into the trap of making such transparently value-based
prescriptive arguments in favor of originalism. For a sophisticated defense of
originalism, see Monaghan, supra note 36, at 384 ("For the purposes of legal
reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable of and not
in need of further demonstration.").
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or the self-evidence of what is meant by "law," he packs into that
concept immutability,67  neutrality, 68  and safeguards against
"political judging."69 Having loaded the concept law with all this
normative baggage, he then unpacks the normative implications later
when they are needed to bolster an argument. Of course, given that
we have just seen him loading major concepts like law with all sorts
of normative baggage, his implicit claim that he refrains from
normative value choice is somewhat difficult to believe. 70 His
rhetorical strategy thus depends upon an appeal to moral or
political values, and transparently so. More generally, if one listens
carefully to the technical doctrinalists, it turns out that their
criticisms of moralist jurisprudence are not criticisms of the
normative orientation per se, but criticisms of particular normative
orientations. 71 Indeed, criticisms of normativity often turn out to
be the negative part of the author's brief for her favorite normative
vision, which, when all is said and done, is no less normative than
the one under attack.
What then divides moralist jurisprudence from technical
doctrinalism? My argument here is not that they are the same.
67 See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 143 ("When we speak of 'law,' we ordinarily refer
to a rule that we have no right to change except through prescribed procedures.").
68 See id. at 145-46 ("If the Constitution is law... courts must choose principles
which they are willing to apply neutrally, apply, that is, to all-cases that may fairly be
said to fall within them.").
69 Id. (arguing that a court's use of neutral principles "is a safeguard against
political judging").
70 Indeed, this concept-packing and retrieval-as-needed constitute Bork's major
rhetorical normative move. Bork, of course, is hardly alone in following such a
rhetorical strategy. What is striking, however, is that he does his freighting of key
concepts right in front of the reader. Accordingly, we are not exactly surprised (or
convinced, for that matter) by what he unloads.
71 And the criticisms that technical doctrinalists usually make of moralist
jurisprudence are very much informed by value judgments. In Bork's case, for
instance, his criticisms of the liberal professoriat are informed by value-based
objections to the politicization of law:
Professions and academic disciplines that once possessed a life and structure
of their own have steadily succumbed, in some cases almost entirely, to the
belief that nothing matters beyond politically desirable results, however
achieved.... It is coming to be denied that anything counts, not logic, not
objectivity, not even intellectual honesty, that stands in the way of the
"correct" political outcome.
R. BORK, supra note 21, at 1. Or, "[t]he point of the academic exercise is to be free
of democracy in order to impose the values of an elite upon the rest of us." Id. at
145. Or, "[t]hose who have tempted the courts to political judging will have gained
nothing for themselves but will have destroyed a great and essential institution." Id.
at 2.
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Rather, I am suggesting that the representations of both the
moralists and the technicad doctrinalists as to their own and each
other's positions collapse. The moralists, in their insistence on
normative dialogue, are no more free of convention or practice or
even authoritarianism than are the technical doctrinalists. The
technical doctrinalists, in their canonical insistence thatjudges must
say what the law is independently of what it should be, are no more
capable of avoiding value judgments and value arguments than the
moralists.
Indeed, while there is a stylized bipolar rhetoric deployed by the
moralists as well as the technical doctrinalists, 72 it is hardly evident
that the divisions this rhetoric is designed to mark off can stay put
once the rhetoric is itself examined. On the contrary, when we
examine the arguments, we notice that they depend upon a




























72 Bork says that we "are told that the choice is between a cold, impersonal logic,
on the one hand, and, on the other, morality and compassion." Id.

















The insistence, and indeed dependence, of both sides on this
rather blunt dualism make this structure very easy to deconstruct.
There is a sense in which this recursive dichotomous vision has
already been deconstructed. This summary list of crypto-positions
(indeed, the dispute between moralist jurisprudence and technical
doctrinalism itself) looks very much like a reenactment of the
familiar argument structures deployed in classic rules v. standards
disputes, carried out on the jurisprudential fields of legal philoso-
phy, the theory of adjudication, and the theory of judicial interpre-
tation. 73 The dispute is part of a cluster of recurrent and associat-
ed oppositions that have marked out and established our jurispru-













It is no surprise, then, that this bipolar dispute between the
moralist jurisprudence and technical doctrinalism collapses.
Likewise it is no surprise that many of us already experience (prior
to this article) the dispute as collapsing in this way.74 In turn, this
73 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (both on the
classic "rules v. standards" dialectic).
7" In this essay (and elsewhere), I am trying to get beyond the conventional
understanding of the dispute. I see both sides as caught up within their own
formalism and both sides as pervasively normative. My claim here is that both the
old-style doctrinalism and moralist thought can most helpfully be understood as two
related moments within the same practice of normative legal thought that are also
highly reminiscent of the classic rules v. standards dispute. Indeed, one side
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collapse destabilizes our understanding of moralistjurisprudence as
a genre distinct from, and opposed to, technical doctrinalism. While
we retain the sense that the moralist jurisprudence of a Ronald
Dworkin is somehow different from the doctrinalist jurisprudence
of a Robert Bork, nevertheless our conceptualizations of these
differences no longer seem to be adequate.
Hence, just as we must avoid positing that normative legal
thought is somehow distinct from descriptive or positive thought,
we must also resist positing that moralist jurisprudence is distinct
from technical doctrinalism. Resisting such oppositions is not easy
because our tendency is to oppose normative legal thought to both
descriptive and technical doctrinal thought. And yet this resistance
is important because, to the extent we allow ourselves to reduce
normative legal thought to moralist jurisprudence or to evaluative
thought, we are likely to miss the way in which technical doc-
trinalism and descriptive legal thought may be shaped by the very
same practice of thought that shapes moralist jurisprudence and
evaluative thought.
C. Normative Legal Thought v. Nihilism
In the American legal academy, inquiries that appear to question
the presumed ethical foundations of the legal order are often met
with charges of nihilism. One consequence is that our understand-
ing of normative legal thought is at least in part shaped by the sense
that normative legal thought is what stands between us and the
abyss. Whereas the two previous oppositions (normative v.
descriptive) and (moralist v. doctrinalist) divided the world of legal
thought into the normative and the non-normative, this third
opposition casts normative legal thought as coextensive with legal
thought. This last opposition leaves nothing besides normative legal
thought but nihilism-a position whose identity and significance are
both so obviously horrible that apparently they do not even need to
be described. 75
emphasizes the need for openness, flexibility, context, etc., while the other
emphasizes the need for closure, certainty, and generality. As with the classic rules
v. standards dispute, each jurisprudential moment collapses into and produces the
other-and both are related to each other in the manner of an arrested dialectic. See
Schlag, supra note 73, at 426-29; see also Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses
(forthcoming 69 TEX L. REV. (1991)).
75 See Carrington, supra note 15, at 226-27; Fiss, supra note 15, at 762-63 (not
tracing out the implications of nihilism); cf. infra note 86.
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The first significant deployment in the legal academy of this
opposition between a normatively charged orthodoxy and a bleak
nihilism occurred in the attacks on the legal realists during the late
thirties.7 6  Morris Cohen, for instance, characterized realist
psychoanalytic approaches as "anti-intellectualism" and suggested
that they led to a kind of "nihilistic absolutism."77 Kantorowicz
claimed that the realist approaches would lead students to study the
"art of bribing judges."78 Bodenheimer suggested that the skepti-
cism of legal realism prepared the intellectual ground for a
tendency toward totalitarianism.7
9
But despite all this passion, the conceptualist defenders of the
faith left the opposition between their own orthodoxy and nihilism
intellectually underdeveloped. Nihilism remained under-theorized-
a sort of vacant and ominous linguistic marker signifying primarily
the utterly horrible status of whatever is not the reigning conceptual-
ist orthodoxy. Apart from some solipsistic orthodoxy-centered
arguments, the conceptualists provided no serious demonstration of
the mediations that would lead from realism to nihilism.
Despite its vacuity, the same opposition resurfaced in the early
1980s in criticisms of cls thought. In 1982, Owen Fiss attacked the
radical individual subjectivism he perceived as inherent in both cls
thought and deconstruction.80 Fiss equated this radical individual
76 For a general treatment of the legal academy's reception of legal realism in the
late thirties (i.e. on the eve of WW II), see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973).
77 Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal Though, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 681, 691 (1936).
78 Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1252 (1934).
79 E. BODENHEIMER,JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW
316 (1st ed. 1940).
80 The equation of deconstruction with radical individual subjectivism-a
conflation commonly found both within the cis movement and in the work of its
critics-is, in one sense, quite surprising. In France, Derridean deconstruction is
usually criticized, not as a celebration of unbridled individual subjectivity, but rather
on the grounds that it extinguishes or suspends the individual subject. See L. FERRY
& A. RENAULT, FRENCH PHILOSOPHY OF THE SIXTIES: AN ESSAY ON ANTIHUMANISM
15-19, 122-52 (M. Cattani trans. 1990). Ferry and Renault query: "Instead of
attempting to extend even further the "destruction of the subject," with the intention
of constructing this "hyper-Heideggerianism,". . .would it not have been more useful
and more illuminating to accept these traces and to question them instead of
ineffectively rejecting them?" Id. at 152.
In another sense, however, the radical individual subjectivist version of
deconstruction-this quintessentiallyNorth American (mis)understanding-is utterly
predictable. Indeed the North American receipt of deconstruction through the
culturally and cognitively embedded framework of a radical individual subjectivism
virtually guaranteed that deconstruction would be understood as sanctioning a radical
subjectivism in interpretation.
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subjectivism with nihilism and opposed both to objectivity and
normative coherence. 81  TIhis attack on cls thought-charging it
with nihilism-was reiterated in more emotive terms in Paul
Carrington's famous essay:
The professionalism and intellectual courage of lawyers does
not require rejection of ]Legal Realism and its lesson that who
decides also matters. What it cannot abide is the embrace of
nihilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and
principle nothing but cosmetic.... Teaching cynicism may, and
probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption:
bribery and intimidation.... If this risk is correctly appraised, the
nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter has
an ethical duty to depart the law school .... 82
Carrington's statement was vociferously opposed by a number
of legal thinkers.83 Subsequent attempts to link cls thought with
nihilism became somewhat more nuanced.8 4 But even in the more
nuanced invocations of the opposition, "nihilism" remained largely
under-theorized, signifying principally a position at once unappeal-
ing and untenable.
85
Within the legal academy, recognition of these points is rare-though not non-
existent. Drucilla Cornell, for one, has recognized that, "the 'irrationalists' in the
conference on Critical Legal Studies" re-instate the subject-centered approach to the
ethical that Derrida rejects. See Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of
Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1699
(1990). For elaboration on all these points, see Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, "supra note
5, at 1634-41.
81 Said Fiss:
The idea of adjudication requires that there exist constitutional values to
interpret, just as much as it requires that there be constraints on the
interpretive process. Lackingsuch a belief, adjudication is not possible, only
power.
The roots of this alternative version of nihilism are not dear to me, but
its significance is unmistakable. [Under this theory t]he great public text of
modem America, the Constitution, would be drained of meaning. It would
be debased.
Fiss, supra note 15, at 763.
82 Carrington, supra note 15, at 227. Note the echo of Kantorowicz's invocation
of the art of bribery. See infra text accompanying note 78.
83 For responses to Carrington's article, see the collection of essays and letters in
'Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1-
26 (1985).
84 Compare Singer, supra note 40 (arguing for a conception of legal reasoning that
is divorced from a search for certainty) with Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986) (criticizing the theories of "nihilists" as a misuse of the
philosophy they look to for support of their theories).
" For example, Joe Singer defined nihilism this way:
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As with the realists, the charge of nihilism against cls served
principally as a crude performative tool of political exclusion and
intellectual repression. In both the case of the realists and cls-ers,
those who launched the charges of nihilism seem to have been
either unwilling or incapable of thinking seriously about nihilism
and its relation to their own positions.8 6 Critics of cls seem to
have believed that because nihilism is so epistemologically or
ethically unappealing, it could not possibly describe our thought or
condition.
As it has been transmitted to us, then, the opposition between
normative legal thought and nihilism is not particularly helpful to
our attempts to understand normative legal thought. Because in
this opposition normative legal thought is everything and nihilism
is virtually nothing, it is not clear at all what we could possibly gain
by thinking of normative legal thought in opposition to nihilism.
Nihilism seems to be the linguistic marker for a sort of free-floating
and diffuse orthodox fear of difference, a fear of otherness.
The very abstraction and vacancy of the term "nihilism" in legal
thought depletes the term of any rich contrast by which to under-
stand normative legal thought. Nonetheless, something valuable can
be learned from the encounter with this opposition. What can be
learned from the experience of both realist and cls thinkers is that
attempts to question the orthodox form of legal thought are likely
to prompt nihilism-fear.
We are so accustomed to demanding value judgments and
normative stances in legal thought that any intellectual approach
that risks displacing or disorienting the normative system that
enables these value judgments and normative stances is likely to
leave us with nihilism-fear. This fear, in turn, is likely to lead us to
resist, distort, and reject any approach that risks destabilizing our
normative commitments and the conceptual approaches that sustain
them.8 7 Hence, legal thinkers routinely think that they are already
The rationalist believes that a rational foundation and method are necessary,
both epistemologically and psychologically, to develop legitimate commit-
ment to moral values; she also believes that such a rational foundation and
method either already exist or can be discovered or invented. Nihilism is
only a partial rejection of rationalism: The nihilist rejects the second
assumption, but not the first.
Sinler, supra note 40, at 5 n.8.
For a studied account of Nietzche's depiction of various kinds of nihilism, see
M. HEIDEGGER, NIETzscHE (1982).
87 Thus, currently it is apparently considered a good, or at least a worthwhile,
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in possession of a rational mode of thought that enables meaningful
normative legal dialogue. In simpler terms, legal thinkers always
already think that they are at another fork in the road. This pre-
reflective commitment of the legal thinker has significant anti-
intellectual consequences that dramatically limit what can be
thought and what can be asked. If we are going to get anywhere in
legal thought, serious effort will have to be devoted to impairing the
comfort of our own pre-reflective commitments to this engrained
tendency to jurisprudential happy talk.
8 8
D. Discussion
As we have seen, our pre-reflective understandings of normative
legal thought are constituted by a series of oppositions that collapse
whenever intellectual attention is turned their way. This raises an
interesting question: are we at all in a position to attempt an
understanding of normative legal thought?
My sense (given that there are 100 pages that follow this one) is
that we are, but not by way of the conventional strategies typically
deployed in contemporary legal thought. The usual strategies
identify the object of inquiry by providing "definitions," "models,"
"ideal types," and the like. In this sense, it is our practice as legal
thinkers to discuss aspects of legal thought by first reducing them
to an objectified, stabilized, usually essentialized object-form-
located invariably somewhere "out there." Indeed, even today,
among many legal theorists, this sort of objectification, stabilization,
externalization, and essentialization of thought continues to be
considered "good form"-an integral aspect of what it means to be
intellectually "serious."
But, arguably, this conventional approach is no longer intellectu-
ally "serious." On the contrary, part of the reason the descriptive/
evaluative distinction and the moralist/conceptualist distinction
collapsed a few pages ago is that those distinctions and their
associated argument logic are typically represented (by their
proponents) in highly objectified forms: as "theories," as "posi-
tions," as "ideas," as "models," etc.
argument to suggest that some explanatory or descriptive approach to law would
extinguish the possibility of meaningful normative discourse.
88 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 7, at 958-60; Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
supra note 5, at 187-91.
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I would like to try to avoid objectifying normative legal thought
in this way. I want to urge that normative legal thought cannot be
considered simply as a kind of thought that is "out there" already
reducible to a set of ideas, propositions, theories, definitions of its
content, or character. To reduce normative legal thought to an
object-form, to a definition, to a genre, to a specification of
boundaries, or to a definite location in social and intellectual space
is to misunderstand and miscast not only the thought to be inquired
into, but the thinking that is to pursue the inquiry itself.8 9 Such
a reduction of thought to object-forms is a bad business.
90
If we were to reduce normative legal thought to a set of ideas,
theories, or models, or any other conventionally reified space for
thought, we would be led into making certain kinds of mistakes-
mistakes that are ironically characteristic of normative legal thought
89 See Brudner, The Ideality of Difference: Toward Objectivity in Legal Interpretation,
11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1133, 1145 (1990) ("Because it mistakes its own products for
autonomous objects, ordinary [legal] consciousness remains an undeveloped
interpretive process.... The task of understanding is to re-enact consciously the
implicit creative activity of ordinary consciousness, interpreting the latter's objects as
... realizations of a project."); see also Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of
Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 795 (1988) ("When
unreflective discourse prevails, such as common sense, it is as if the lens has become
the world, rather than the portal through which it takes shape."). As Steve Winter
notes:
Because ... assumptions and beliefs are internalized as the very grounds of
consciousness, they are largely imperceptible to the conscious subject:
These conceptualizations are transparent in the sense that they act as an
invisible cognitive filter through which the subject sees the social world. As
long as the subject remains unreflective, this transparency will project the
mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political in a way that will be
experienced as "objective."
Winter, supra note 12, at 1497 (footnote omitted).
90 It is, however, a very old business:
Plato's doctrine of "truth" is therefore not something of the past. It is
historically "present" but not as a historically recollected "consequence" of
a piece of didacticism, not even as revival, not even as imitation of antiquity,
not even as mere preservation of the traditional. [Plato's doctrine of
"truth"] is present as the slowly confirmed and still uncontested basic reality,
a reality reigning through everything ....
... [M]an thinks in terms of the fact that the essence of truth is the
correctness of the representing of all beings according to "ideas" and
esteems everything real according to "values." The decisivepoint is not which
ideas and which values are se but that the real is expounded according to "ideas"
at al; that the "world" is weighed according to "values" at all.
Heidegger, Plato's Doctrine of Truth, in 8 PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
255, 269-70 (W. Barrett & H. Aiken eds. 1962) (emphasis added).
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itself. I will mention two kinds of mistakes engendered by the usual
objectifying practices of contemporary legal thought.
The first kind of mistake is that this objectification immediately
situates the subject (here, you and I) as already outside the reach of
the object under inquiry. In this one move of situating one's self
outside the form of thought, two transformations are accomplished
instantaneously. First, the inquiry has just been tremendously
simplified. Second, the value of the inquiry and the interest in
whatever it might produce have just been radically reduced (close
to zero). And the reason is this: to situate one's self outside the
thought to be inquired into is in effect to stabilize a naive subject-
object relation whereby the subject (here, you and I) eclipses from
consideration and critical inquiry what we, as authors and readers,
have already contributed in the construction, in the formulation of
the object of inquiry. In the case of "normative legal thought," for
instance, our attempts to "define carefully" a "precise" object of
inquiry might amount to little more than a mindless and self-
indulgent rehearsal of our own stereotyped discourse moves on an
empty signifier known as "normative legal thought."
There is a second kind of mistake engendered by premature
objectification. If we indulged in a reductive objectification of
normative legal thought, we would be led away from recognizing
that normative legal though: is notjust theory, ideas, substance, and
outcomes, but is simultaneously practice, activity, form, and process.
When a normative legal thinker writes, she is not just recommend-
ing some course of action. She is rehearsing a style of argument-
one that reinforces certain social relations between author and
reader; one that reinforces a certain aesthetic representation of
social life-of who the key actors are, of how they are related, of the
status of discourse, communication, and reason, of the relations of
theory and practice, form and substance, outcome and process.
Thus, if we are to understand normative legal thought, we must
try to resist as much as possible the conventional reifying practices
of contemporary legal thought. But now, ironically, this caution
turns out to have an unexpected implication. If we take seriously
the observation that the practice of objectification is conventional
and pre-reflective in the very form of our legal thought, we cannot
dispense with objectification simply by defining our terms carefully
or engaging other such conventional conceptualistic exercises.
9 1
91 We have been so accustomed to finding meaning in the text, in the Restate-
ment, in the doctrine that, despite even our most sophisticated theoretical attempts
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On the contrary, to understand that legal thought is a practice, that
it is conventional in character, and that it is a process, is to
recognize that objectification is sedimented not only in normative
legal thought, but in us.
Objectification is in some senses unavoidable. Not only is it
unavoidable-but in some senses it is obviously helpful in allowing
us to communicate. The question, then, is not whether one objecti-
fies-but how.92 Now in some sense, normative legal thought is
already self-objectifying: it reenacts consistent and recursive
strategies that solidify in visible and stereotyped patterns. Consider,
for instance, these quotes rudely excerpted from the conclusions of
articles in volume 103 of the Harvard Law Review:
Let us not fall victim to the paralysis of neutral analysis. Instead, we
must meet and talk together, ... We must talk specifically about
the kinds of community we would fashion .... 9
3
The real problem with contemporary doctrine is not that it fails
to attain some overarching reconciliation among these competing
considerations ... but rather that it fails to articulate with
sufficient clarity what is actually at stake in the definition of public
discourse. We need to establish a domain of public discourse ....
Doctrinal formulation should assist courts in the evaluation of these
to avoid such naive objectifications, the object-form nonetheless continues to rule.
Use of the "in" preposition often signals and effectuates an inside/outside distinction
that serves to objectify the field. See, e.g., Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 37, 55-56 (1987) (demonstrating how Fish uses
the inside/outside distinction to objectify and then defeat "theory"). This inside/
outside distinction, so common in law, effectuates what LakoffandJohnson call the
"container metaphor" effect. See G. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY
29-32 (1980); Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 661-
64 (1989) (showing how Fish relies upon the container metaphor to make his
arguments against "theory"). The container metaphor and the inside/outside
distinction are big in the legal meaning business. Indeed, it is common for legal
theory articles to include some footnote (usually around number 6) that reads "By
... ], I mean, that which contains [...], but not including [... ]."
92 "But there are several ways of being caught in this circle. They are all more or
less naive, more or less empirical, more or less systematic, more or less close to the
formulation-that is, to the formalization-of this circle." J. DERRIDA, Structure Sign
and Play, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278, 281 (1978) (referring to a "reasonably"
similar circle).
93 Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1044 (1990) (emphasis added).
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considerations, rather than masking them under wooden phrases
and tests.
94
The traditional understandings of statutory construction are
inadequate .... The interpretive principles suggested here are intended
for the Presiden regulatory agencies, and Congress, as well as for the
courts.
9 5
Scholarship should reveal and debate the Court's value choices....
Ultimately, the decisions must be defended or criticized for the value
choices the Court made. There is nothing else.96
The system will function, better when doctrine reflects reality ....
What is needed is a single event that will crystalize the developments
that have already occurred and focus judicial attention on a new
line of development. A sweeping Supreme Court opinion might
work, but a more promising solution is a statute.
97
If one unequivocal conclusion follows from this review of the law
of the mentally retarded parent, it is that the formal classification
should be abolished as a basis for state interference with the parent-
child relationship.... What follow are some specific recommenda-
tions . . .9
There is a recursive quality to the patterns of legal thinking
evidenced in these excerpts, a prescriptive, normative quality to the
form of this legal thought. And indeed, these recursive patterns are
not new; they have been in place a long time.99 Nor has the
94 Post, The Constitutional Comcept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 683
(1990) (emphasis added).
95 Sunstein, Interpreting Statute in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. 1Ev. 405,503-
04 (1990) (emphasis added).
96 Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 104 (emphasis added).
17 Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule; 103 HARV. L. REv. 687, 770
(1990) (emphasis added).
98 Hayman, Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Paren
103 HARv. L. REv. 1201, 1268 (1990) (emphasis added).
99 It is interesting to compare the concluding statements of volume 103 of the
HarvardLaw Review with the concluding statements found in volume 1 of the Harvard
Law Review, published in 1888 during Langdell's tenure as Dean of Harvard Law
School. What is striking in making such a comparison is how little the grammar of
academic legal thought and the role of the academic legal thinker have changed since
the days of Langdell:
In conclusion .... This proposition, it is hoped, will find favor with the
reader in point of legal principle. It can hardly fail to commend itself on the
score ofjustice and mercantile convenience.
Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARv. L. REv. 1, 16 (1887) (emphasis
added).
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In the present opinion of the author such would be the best way out of the
difficulty .... He would, therefore, close with the suggestion of three statutes,
whose rigid enforcement might, with due adjustment to meet evasions, be
expected to meet the case.
Stimson, "Trusts," 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 143 (1887) (emphasis added).
The theo0y that State laws "unreasonably" affecting foreign or interstate
commerce may be held unconstitutional ... is objectionable ....
In the opinion of the writer.., the purpose or intention of the State
Legislature ... is the only criterion... and the difficulties of the law would be
greatly lessened if the Courts would clearly and in express terms adopt this
criterion.
Greeley, What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce?, 1 HARV. L.
REV. 159, 184 (1887) (emphasis added).
Some cynic, who has had the patience to read so far, will, no doubt,
remark that the legal profession is not a charitable institution, and that men
practise law to get money... and not from philanthropic motives. To this
I answer that no profession can be great unless the money-making aims of
the individual are leavened by a sense of the importance of his vocation and
of the dignity of the body that pursues it .... This is the quality which we need
to foster ....
Lowell, The Responsibilities of American Lawyers, 1 HARV. L. REV. 232, 240 (1887)
(emphasis added).
These are the questions upon which the justice of the proposed legislation depends.
Till they shall have been understood, considered, and argued by those
competent to the task, it will never truly be said that George has been refuted.
Clarke, Criticisms Upon Henry George, Reviewed from the Stand-Point ofJustice, 1 HARV.
L. REV. 265, 293 (1887) (emphasis added).
It is preposterous to attribute any such sweeping effect to the [fourteenth]
amendment.
[ I]t has not yet been decided or provided that the independence as
to local matters, which forms the strongest bulwark against that disintegra-
tion so often predicted ... is to be subjected to the surveillance of the
national courts. And it is to be deplored that the Supreme Court of the United
States, upon which chiefly rests the responsibility for preserving the proper
relation of dependence and independence between things national and
things local, should have adopted a course which may tend to countenance
such an idea.
Dunbar, The Anarchists' Case Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 1 HARV. L.
REV. 307, 323, 326 (1887) (emphasis added).
[1it is only just that the bill-holders, whose debt has not yet been extin-
guished, should be allowed to prove against it in competition with the other
creditors.
Of the four views presented the last would seem to be the only one consistent
with justice and the intention of the parties.
Williams, A Creditor's Right to His Surety's Securities, 1 HARV L. REV. 326, 337 (1887)
(emphasis added).
These do not exhaust the kind of concluding remarks found in articles of volume
1 of the Harvard Law Review. Indeed, not all articles conclude with transparently
normative prescriptions. For instance, Langdell's seriatim survey of equityjurisdic-
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recursive character of these patterns gone wholly undetected; legal
thinkers have themselves reflected upon the dominant patterns of
legal thought:
With monotonous regularity, law review articles attempt to speak
to courts deciding today's legal issues, in the hope that some legal
actor, such as a lawyer, will refer to the article in a legal argument
and persuade some judge (or, more likely, law clerk) to adopt the
conclusions and analysis the article advocates .... 100
When viewed as an academic discourse, the most distinctive
feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice, its
consciously declared desire to improve the performance of legal
decisionmakers.
1' 1
The reason for this irreducible normativity is that the subject
of legal scholarship is law, and law is a mechanism through which
our society operationalizes its normative choices. In a society like
ours, moreover, these choices are a matter of conscious and
continual debate.
10 2
[L]egal academics often style themselves asjudges-above, beyond,
neutral with respect to the interested party or practitioner, and
after or innocent of the messiness of legislative or sovereign
choice.... [W]e may even style ourselves as judges of the
judiciary, making assessments in teaching and writing about cases
which were "correctly" or "incorrectly" decided.'
0 3
[M]ost of our writings axe not political theory but advocacy
scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the
Court to adopt our various notions of the public good. In one or
another form this has been the staple of legal scholarship and at
least has the claims of tradition.
10 4
tion, ironically entitled A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, invariably concludes each
installment with a very terse, laconic, dedarative, and unbelievably canonical
articulation of what the law is. Langdell, at least, seems to have been every bit the
legal formalist we hoped he would be. See Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity
Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55, 72 (1887); id. at 111, 130; id. at 355, 387 (1888). For
an interesting account of the theoretical architecture of Langdellian formalism, see
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PT. L. REv. 1 (1983).
100 Schauer, Constitutional Conventions (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 1407, 1409
(1989).
101 Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835,
1847-48 (1988) (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 1853.
105 Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporay Legal Scholarship, in CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 353, 380 (C. Joerges & D. Trubek eds.
1989).
104 Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
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Now, clearly, legal thinkers themselves have an understanding
of the patterned character of their own normative legal thought.
Below I have tried to describe the character of this normative legal
thought in terms of a set of family traits. I have deliberately left the
problem of objectification unstable and unresolved. Hence, the list
below can be read as describing the paradigm case of a piece of
normative legal thought. It is also possible, however, to understand
this description as an attempt to trace the network of forces and
relations that comprise normative legal thought as a process. Based
on the discussion thus far, and on our own already immersed
understanding of normative legal thought, normative legal thought
might be described as an aggregate and the aggregation-in-process
of the following family traits:
Normative legal thought is prescriptive. It recommends some
identified doctrine, theory, attitude, institutional framework,
hermeneutic methodology, or the like to the reader.
Normative legal thought is monistic, it has a single-norm
orientation. Insofar as normative legal thought is prescriptive, it
seeks to prescribe a single authoritative norm to rule within the
defined jurisdiction of the enterprise. Even when it advocates
pluralism (e.g. contextualism) or dualism (e.g. dialectical thought),
normative legal thought will nonetheless envelop such potentially
non-monistic stances within a monistic form.
105
Hence, normative legal thought strives for a textual formaliza-
tion that will produce a single norm. The aim is thus to articulate
or develop a norm that is complete, self-sufficient, discrete, separable,
trans-situationa, non-contradictory, and non-paradoxical within its
intellectual or legal jurisdiction.
10 6
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
105 This choice-orientation and norm-orientation produce monistic forms of
thought. Normative legal thought is, in Cover's term, "jurispathic": aimed, even in
its seemingly creative moments, at shutting down alternate conceptions of the
problems or the issues under inquiry. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 16 (1983) ("It is the problem of
the multiplicity of meaning-the fact that never only one but always many worlds are
created by the too fertile forces ofjurisgenesis-that leads at once to the imperial
virtues and the imperial mode of world maintenance.").
106 One can see that these criteria have some connection to the dominant belief
among legal thinkers that the law is (at least relatively) autonomous. The main
operative strategy in contemporary legal thought has been to render law autonomous
by separating it from the political and the social. Indeed, separation has been the
main source of metaphorical conceptualization for maintaining the autonomy of the
rule of law. See infra text accompanying notes 295-316.
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In turn, the self-sufficient, discrete, and trans-situational
character of the norm selected is associated with the positive
character of normative legal thought. Even critical (negative)
moments are usually presented as being in the service of the
construction of some positive norm. So even when normative legal
thought is concerned with changing insights, attitudes, tempera-
ments, epistemic frameworks, etc., it does so by enveloping these
efforts in the norm-form as a positive norm.
The single-norm orientation also implies a conclusion-oriented
enterprise. What matters to both the reader and author of
normative legal thought is the conclusion; the process of argumenta-
tion is not valued intrinsically, but only insofar as it potentially
validates or invalidates the conclusion.
The single-norm orientation also implies that much of the work
of normative legal thought lies in norm-selection, that is, the selection
by some reader or ultimate addressee of the favored norm from a
number of possible, extant or hypothetical options.
Normative legal thought is thus choice-oriented; it acknowledges
that the reader is entitled to choose norms, attempts to enlist the
reader in choosing the norm, and then attempts to channel (as
much as rhetorical effectiveness will permit) the reader's choice to
the favored norm of the author.
And because the reader is constructed as one called upon to
engage in ethical, moral choice, much of the work of normative
legal thought consists in norm-justification-in justifying the author's
favored norm to this choosing reader.
Normative legal thought also has practica worldly ambitions. It
seeks to have the favored norm not just adopted by the reader but
put into effect-even institutionalized or realized in social practice.
This choice-oriented norm-justification means that the practical
realization, the actualization of the norm is deferred. It is up to the
reader to take the further steps necessary to put the norm into
effect. Normative legal thought is thus action-deferring, contemplat-
ing that the action necessary to give effect to the norm will be done
by the reader or someone connected to the reader after the reading
This strategy is evident, for instance, in the recurrent tendency of legal thinkers
to distinguish an "internal" from an "external" perspective on law, thereby allowing
the requisite separation of law from the political and the social. For discussion of the
import of this internal/external distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 295-
316.
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is completed, outside the text, yet nonetheless subject to the norm
and the arguments proposed by the text.
The stance of much of normative legal thought is produced
within a self-defined adversarial context, thus requiring adversarial
advocacy in favor of the selected norm. Indeed, the argument
structures are often reminiscent of those employed by lawyers in
appellate argument, 107 with litigation techniques of fact recharac-
terization and issue framing often deployed even in the context of
otherwise sophisticated intellectual argument.108
Because of the adversarial advocacy and the conclusion-oriented
stance of normative legal thought, it tends to be reader-centered. In
other words, normative legal thought strives to respect and reflect
(as much as possible) the presumed belief-structures, assumptions,
ideals, and self-image of the imagined reader.
1°9
In sum then:
Normative legal thought is an enterprise of
norm-selection
norm-justification








The rhetoric of normative legal thought aims to produce,




107 See Barnhizer, The Revolution in American Law Schoos, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 227,
235-39 (1990) (observing that American legal scholars tend to be advocates).
108 Sophisticated legal academics (like their sophisticated counterparts in law
practice) will tend to downplay the appearance of advocacy and instead assume a
more neutral, dispassionate, problem-solving posture.
109 Cf Barnhizer, supra note 107, at 238 (concluding that the advocacy orientation
rests on a recognition that "even the most profound insight must capture the
attention of those toward whom it is directed").
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These characteristics are the family traits that describe and
comprise normative legal thought. At some times, and in some
instances, some traits become more dominant or more visible than
others. Normative legal thought thus does not have a static and
fixed identity.11 °  It has no pre-given boundaries. And that is
because normative legal thought is not simply an object-form or a
genre, but also a process-a kind of rhetorical economy of relations
and forces that channels and organizes legal academic thought. It
is a decentralized economy that, despite the lack of any fixed or
stable center, nonetheless exerts gravitational force on the produc-
tion of legal thought, enabling and leading it to become typically the
kind of thought described by the conjunction of traits above.
That much of contemporary legal thought should exhibit a
conjunction of these traits is not surprising. Many of these traits
are mutually entailed 111-metaphoricaly1 12  and rhetorical-
110 We should not assume, for instance, that any given instance of normative legal
thought should exhibit all the traits described above. Nor should we assume that
there is any particular privilege to be accorded to the precise way I have described the
traits above. Nor should we assume that because any given instance of legal thought
does not share many of the traits described above, that the instance falls somehow
"outside" of normative legal thought.
111 In other words, the rhetorical economy makes it likely that any work of legal
thought that is found to participate in many of these characteristics will, upon further
examination, be found to participate in many of the remainder as well.
112 This entailment is in part metaphorical, often subconsciously so. For instance,
the notions that normative legal thought yields single-norms that are complete, self-
sufficient, discrete, distinct, positive, etc., stem from the common generative
metaphor that understands ideas as objects. See G. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, supra note
91, at 206-09.
Indeed, all these characteristics pertain to objects, and it is easy to see that
normative legal thought tends to treat the production of the norm through the norm-
selection and norm-justification enterprise very much as ithe production of an entity,
thing, or object.
The work of Steven Winter provides a general introduction to the metaphorical
character of cognition, culture and law that informs these observations. See Winter,
supra note 91; Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Cognitive
Dimension]; Winter, supra note 12; Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, Standing];
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ly.113 The repeated coalescence of this same set of traits is pre-
cisely what gives normative legal thought the appearance of a genre.
It is this repeated coalescence of the same set of traits that malkes
law review articles almost always look the same: the structures of
law review articles are extremely easy to identify precisely because
the articles-as products of the rhetorical economy of normative
legal thought-already arrive on the scene in a highly stereotyped
form.114 "We must do this." "They should do that." And so on.
The process of normative legal thought typically (though not
necessarily) yields its paradigmatic object-form, but the power, the
relations, and the forces of this process exceed the paradigmatic
case of the object-form. Normative legal thought shapes, enables,
and distorts all legal thought, including that sort of thought which
(like this very article) seems so far removed, so distant from the
paradigmatic case.
To understand that normative legal thought is both paradigmatic
object-form and process helps explain why one moment we seem to
think of it as a genre (opposed to such other genres as descriptive
thought or technical doctrinalism) and why the next moment we
think that normative legal thought is all there is-short of nihilism.
II. How To BE NORMATIVE, WIN FRIENDS, AND INFLUENCE
CONNECTIONS
One of the consequences of the unquestioned dominance of
normative legal thought in the academy is that there has been little
or no articulate consideration of just how it is that this thought
produces or expects to produce its effects. Yet normative legal
thought clearly represents itself as having practical, worldly
ambitions. Much normative legal thought reveals an expectation
and a desire for its own realization in judicial or statutory law (for
formalists) or by effective action in the social sphere (for realists).
While this much is clear, what is not clear and indeed has not even
Winter, supra note 31.
113 For example, the reader-centered character of normative legal thought, its
solicitous attention to the belief structures of the audience, leads to a choice-oriented
rhetoric that explicitly and implicitly acknowledges that the reader can and is entitled
to make a choice among which norms should govern. Likewise, this same reader-
centered character often leads to argument structures and strategies commonly used
by lawyers--adversarial advocacy.
114 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 5, at 170-71.
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been seriously questioned, is how normative legal thought expects
to realize these ambitions.
That this question should arise only now is unsurprising. For
most of the history of American legal academic thought, it would
have been unthinkable to ask such a question. It is only now, when
the effectiveness of normative legal thought is in doubt, when the
receptivity of judicial (and other) audiences is questionable,
1 15
when the very identity of any fixed paradigm for legal thought is
uncertain, that the question can even arise. Because the question
arises seriously for the first time, we are without any strong, self-
conscious, widely shared theoretical frameworks to help our inquiry.
Still, we are not entirely without markers or resources. If we pay
close attention to the normative legal thought that emerges from
the academy, we may yet understand how normative legal thought
thinks it produces its effects. The more popular normative legal
theories, for instance, indirectly reveal a great deal about what
normative legal thinkers believe they are doing with their normative
legal thought. Instead of reading normative legal theory in terms
of what it means for adjudication or "law," we can usefully read
these theories for what they reveal about the enterprise of norma-
tive legal thought. Indeed, many of our contemporary jurispruden-
tial theories can easily be seen as instances of projection, where
115 As one study found:
The number of citations [in Supreme Court opinions] to legal
periodicals decreased from 963 in the 1971-73 period to 767 in the 1981-83
period. We find this decline substantial....
Our study suggests a decreasingjudicial reliance on legal periodicals by
the court that would seem to be the most receptive to the contributions of
legal scholarship.
Sirico & Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study,
34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 134-37 (1986) (footnote omitted).
If anything, this decrease in the number of citations to law reviews probably
understates their increasing irrelevance tojudicial decisionmaking. With the advent
of increasingly bureaucratic modes ofjudicial decisionmaking and the expanded role
of law clerks, I would expect that citation of law review articles is more and more a
kind of window dressing and that law review articles are less and less significant to the
production of the actual decision.
For discussion of the increased role of law clerks, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-19 (1985); Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the
Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 787, 799
(1983); McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 785-
87 (1981); Richman & Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U.
MICH.J.L. REF. 623, 626-28 (1988); ViningJustice Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80
MICH. L. REv. 248, 252 (1981).
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authors and readers displace onto the judiciary their own idealized
self-images as legal thinkers.
Not surprisingly, those theories that are most popular within the
legal academy are those that project the most attractive self-image.
Consider, as an example, Dworkin's theory of law as integrity and
his depiction of the ideal judge as "Hercules."116 Regardless of
whether Hercules is an accurate or a desirable model of the
appellate judge, he certainly resonates profoundly in the self-image
of the contemporary legal academic. Indeed, it is easy to under-
stand Hercules as the projection of the legal academic's idealized
self-image onto the character of the appellate judge. Similarly,
Dworkin's theory of law as integrity can easily be understood as a
projection of the kind of elegant theory-construction that character-
izes the most esteemed legal scholarship onto the appellate judicial
opinion writing process.
And of course, as self-images go (for either judges or legal
academics), the one provided by Dworkin is extremely flattering:
Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard
cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about
people's rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of
the political structure and legal doctrine of their community.
They try to make that complex structure and record the best they
can.
117
As a conceptual field for projection by legal academic readers, one
of the great advantages of Dworkin's theory is that it can slide easily
from concrete and determinate interpretations to extraordinarily
moving and generous abstractions about what "making the law the
best it can be" might mean.11 Dworkin's theory is thus construct-
ed as a tour de force that permits both author and reader to
oscillate between sophisticated (though thin) and meaningful
(though controversial) readings.
1 9
116 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 35.
n 7 Id. at 255.
118 If one does not hypostatize or reify the main terms of the Dworkinian
description, it appears to provide a highly sophisticated account of what judges do
and should do. The cost of such a sophisticated reading, however, is that Dworkin's
meta-theory becomes ample enough to accommodate (and rather indeterminately so)
just about any contemporary version of jurisprudence including, cis, feminist
jurisprudence, and law and economics. It suffers from a certain thinness. To the
extent, however, that the main terms of Dworkin's theory become hypostatized and
reified, the thinness of the description disappears and Dworkin's theory becomes at
once much more meaningful though also much more controversial. See Schlag, "Le
Hors de Texte" supra note 5, at 1660-64.
119 Though it is rarely self-evident when Dworkin means to advance his "concept"
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While these points about the ambiguity or ambivalence of the
Dworkinian theory could easily be turned into objections, that is not
the point here. Rather, my claim is that Dworkin's theory articu-
lates indirectly something very important about what many legal
academics believe courts do. His theory gives an extremely
eloquent, sophisticated, a-ad respectable voice to the otherwise
simple legal academic belief thatjudges who experience precedent,
law, and doctrine as constraint, nevertheless often do and likely
should strive very hard to "read" this law, to "stretch" this doctrine
or positive law in order to do the right thing. At the same time,
Dworkin's theory also gives voice to the typical legal academic
concern with judicial imperialism by insisting that the "stretching"
be done in a principled and coherent manner. Dworkin's theory
delivers what legal academics want: neither mechanical jurispru-
dence nor freewheeling utopia-but rather the middle way.
Hence, Dworkin's text gives sophisticated and respectable
expression to precisely this sense of what adjudication is and should
be. In turn, this sense is a projection of what legal academics
themselves do in their scholarship. Indeed, the vast bulk of
contemporary legal scholarship attempts to read and organize
authoritative legal materials in such a way as to make a normatively
pleasing arrangement. Legal academics stretch the cases-sometimes
very far, 120 sometimes hardly at all. 121 But they virtually always
try to arrange the cases in a coherent and principled manner.
122
of adjudication as opposed to hi:i "conception" of adjudication. See R. DWoRKIN,
supra note 35, at 70-72.
120 What counts as "stretching cases very far," of course, depends upon the
stretcher's (or stretchee's) baseline understanding of what the cases mean in the first
place, a baseline understanding which, these days, is generally quite insecure.
Without delving into the issues posed by these last observations, I will note that most
legal thinkers would think that Tribe's interpretation of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), stretched that case pretty far. See Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977) (arguing that the case cannot be
understood as anything but an effort by the Court to provide the states leeway to
afford their citizens basic governmental services guaranteed by the Constitution, and
thus it is not a move by the Court to restrict personal rights, but a step reflecting an
underlying recognition of affirmative rights in a just constitutional order).
121 Keeping in mind the cavealt supra note 120, one can say that many contempo-
rary legal thinkers consider Nowak's treatment of constitutional law cases, see J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONsTrTUIONAL LAW (1986), as hardly stretching
the cases at all.
122 Even cls scholarship (in the early days of that movement) sought to arrange
cases in the coherence of a stabilized pattern of "the fundamental contradiction." See
Feinman, Promissorj Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1984)
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The main points of difference among legal thinkers turn upon
what they think constitute "the authoritative legal materials," how
they rank or organize conflicting values, what import and what twist
they place on aesthetic criteria like coherence, consistency, etc., and
the extent to which they understand all of these variables to be
interpenetrated and interactive. All of this is to say that whatever
its relevance for judges and adjudication, Law's Empire is an
extraordinarily sophisticated account of what the vast majority of
contemporary legal academics think they are doing with their legal
thought. Indeed, the paradigm of contemporary legal thought-
whether in treatises, articles, or the classroom-is the rendition of
an interpretation of precedent, doctrine, theory, and law that will
make them better, more just, more fair, and more efficient in a
principled and coherent way.123 What Hercules does is what legal
academics do: apply intellectual faculties to the rewriting of the law
so as to make it more principled, coherent, and morally appeal-
ing.
124
(arguing that theoretical and methodological developments exemplified in promissory
estoppel cases represent failed attempts to overcome the fundamental contradiction
of classical nineteenth century legalism).
123 Depending upon how fast and how loose we are with the main terms
"principled" and "coherent," we can expand or contract the number and the kinds of
contemporary jurisprudential stances that are plausible candidates for Dworkin's
meta-theory of law. If we play fast and liberally, as Dworkin sometimes means to, we
can even argue (and quite plausibly so) that the cls positions are the ones that make
the law "the best it can be." Even as cis-ers describe case law and doctrine as
internally contradictory, they nonetheless represent this recognition of our legal
"tradition" as offering a normatively appealing stance. See, e.g., Fischl, Some Realism
About CriticalLegal Studies, 41 U. MIAMi L. REV. 505,525 (1987) (arguing that judicial
interpretation is not objective and neutral because "thejudge's own moral values and
ideological assumptions inevitably play a powerful role"); Singer, supra note 40, at 9
(proposing that legal reasoning's lack of a rational foundation liberates us to develop
"passionate moral and political commitments").
124 Indeed, the Dworkinianjurisprudence is such a good idealized account of the
self-image of legal academic thought that it even serves as a sort of ceremonial
exorcism of some pervasive ambivalences of legal thinkers. Its oscillation between
sophisticated (though relatively empty) abstraction and concrete (but controversial)
meaningfulness at once simulates and defuses the ambivalence that most legal
thinkers experience in reconciling established legal tradition and moral principle,
truth and politics, law and utopia, order and morality. Part of Dworkin's success is
attributable precisely to the fact that he places the concerns of legal academic
thinkers in the foreground and manages to allay these concerns in a "relentlessly
interpretive" approach that represents itself not only as coherent, but as the very rule
of principle on earth. See Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of
Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 943-44 (1991) (describing the
anxiety-reducing role of normative legal thought).
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But what do the normative legal thinkers think they are doing
when they are being Hercules? What do they think is being
accomplished by this discursive enterprise of norm selection and norm
justification? Here, I want to give an empathic, sympathetic account
of the experience of doing normative legal thought.125 Again
Dworkin is an excellent guide.
126
What does Hercules want to do in his Empire? Like the legal
academic, he is relentlessly interpretive, we know. But at what does
all this interpretation aim? If it is not exactly clear what Hercules
seeks to accomplish (render a decision? write doctrine? issue an
appellate opinion?), there is the same sort of ambiguity among legal
thinkers. What we do know is that normative legal thinkers want to
persuade an important institutional actor (usually ajudge) to adopt
a particular norm. Their self-conscious motive is thus norm-adoption.
While the normative legal thinker typically does not imagine
himself as serving a particular named client (in either the lawyerly
or the social theoretical sense), neither does he envision himself as
choosing proposed norms in a normative or political vacuum. On
the contrary, the normative legal thinker has a rich picture of the
legal field-the argumentative framework, the beliefs and percep-
tions of the relevant audience, its fears, hopes, aspirations, and
much more. 127 The normative legal thinker also has a set of
political or moral values.
Both the representation, of the field and the moral and political
values are to some extent plastic, but not infinitely so. The
125 Thus crass careerism, political self-advancement, status elevation, psychological,
or sociological motivations are bracketed,just as these considerations are routinely
bracketed in the arguments made by the normative legal thinker to his or her
audience.
126 Despite my commitment to empathy, I can't put out of my mind the fact that
I will be trying to make normative legal thought "the best it can be," and that this
raises certain problems. I face (and I hope the reader will face) the paradox here.
When I try to be empathic, I am caught within an oscillation between a normatively
appealing (but partially unbelievable) account of what normative legal thought is
doing and a believable (but not so normatively nice) account of what it is doing. In
the text, I have decided to follow Dworkin's lead and provide a normatively appealing
account.
127 Here, Duncan Kennedy is substantially more helpful in his account of the legal
thinker as judge than Ronald Dworkin. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (describing the
process of legal reasoning the author would use in deciding a case and presenting a
conflict between what the law is :rd what he believes it should be). Dworkin, by
contrast to Kennedy, tends to be exceedingly abstract and vague in his understanding
of the institutional, rhetorical, and procedural forces that help shape the legal
thinker's understanding of the legal field.
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plasticity of the field depends in part on the differing capacities of
legal thinkers for reformulating both their representation of the
field and their own political or moral values. Typically, the
normative legal thinker understands himself to be choosing a norm
based upon his representation of the legal field and his normative
values. Typically, the normative legal thinker looks for channels of
argument within the legal field that can support norms consonant
with the legal thinker's own moral or political values.
All sorts of trade-offs are possible here. For example, a legal
thinker may decide to pursue a particularly promising channel of
argument within the legal field even though it appears to be only
partially consistent (if at all) with his own values.12 Another legal
thinker, on the other hand, may be so committed to a particular
political or moral stance that she will develop her stance in adverse
conditions, even though the argument possibilities in other areas or
for other norms appear to be much more successful.129
Thus, choosing which norm to support is for the normative legal
thinker already a question of norm-justification; the choice of which
norm to support is already being decided by thinking about how
and whether the norm can be justified according to the (legitimate)
reasoning criteria of the internalized external audience. Again,
what counts as "justification" and what counts as "(legitimate)
reasoning criteria" differ among legal thinkers and are subject to
reformulation. While the normative legal thinker typically experi-
ences norm-justification as governed in part by the beliefs of his
readers (the external audience), he also shares much of those beliefs
128 Here, I am referring to those surprising professions of faith that appear to be-
even though perhaps they are not-inconsistent with the author's past professions of faith.
Consider this surprising statement by the author of the three editions of Economic
Analysis of Law:
Perspective-not theory. Even if skepticism as dogma is not a
contradiction in terms (as well it may be), my own skepticism is a mood or
attitude-a disposition to scoff at pretensions to certainty, to question claims
(even my own) to the possession of powerful methodologies founded on
professional expertise, and to disbelieve in absolutes and unobservable
entities-rather than a theory.
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 829 (1988).
129 Consider the following passage:
So what is the value of another article on state action? First, I hope
that change, at least in the long term, will occur if it is demonstrated
emphatically and repeatedly that limiting the Constitution's protections to
state action makes no sense. History shows that if doctrines and concepts
are attacked long enough and hard enough they may begin to crumble.
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 556 (1985).
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himself (the internal audience). Thus though it is true that the
normative legal thinker may sometimes advance arguments that he
does not believe or considers make-weight, or trivial, that certainly
does not describe the whole or even the main part of the norm-
justification experience. On the contrary, for the normative legal
thinker, the process of norm-justification is never simply, neverjust,
a matter of public relations or rhetorical manipulation.
The appeal of normative legal thought is grounded precisely in
the fact that it is rational, deliberative, authentic, and non-coercive.
Normative legal thought appeals to shared values and shared
understandings of what law is and what it ought to be. As Frank
Michelman puts it, "[t]he persuasive character of the process depends
on the normative efficacy of some context that is everyone's."
130
It presupposes "that such a fund of normatively effective material-
publicly cognizable, persuasively recollectible and contestable-is
always already available."
131
In this account of normative legal thought, two crucial assump-
tions are being made. First, there is an assumption that there is
some normatively charged context that is both retrievable and
universally shared. This assumption is crucial if normative legal
thought is to avoid collapsing into authoritarianism or coercion. It
is precisely this assumption. that allows normative legal thought to
claim that it is respecting the dignity of the individual. The second
critical assumption is that the fund of normatively charged beliefs
and ideals is normatively efficacious. It is this assumption that
allows normative legal thought to claim that its normative content
is not epiphenomenal, bu: does in fact regulate and guide the
practices of legal thinkers, judges, and their institutions.
While normative legal thinkers typically hold to these assump-
tions, they are nevertheless aware that their arguments and thought
operate in a rhetorical field. This poses a problem for my empathic
account of normative legal thought. On the one hand, to suggest
that normative legal thinkers believe that their thought cuts through
the field of rhetorical manipulation would be to treat them as naive
(out of touch). What's more, on some level, it would be wrong:
normative legal thinkers show some recognition of how the
rhetorical power of legal thought lies and how this power is
deployed to achieve instrumental ends. But now here's the
180 Michelman, supra note 42, at 1513.
131 Id. at 1514.
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problem: if normative legal thinkers are aware of the rhetorical, the
power dimensions of normative legal thought, they can no longer
claim that their thought is outside the field of coercion and manipu-
lation.
Normative legal thought seems to be in a quandary here, and it's
not at all clear how normative legal thinkers resolve this tension. It
may be that I have been misled in my empathic attempts at
describing what it is normative legal thinkers think they are doing
and that the self-understanding of normative legal thinkers is much
more along the lines of Plato's "noble lie." 1 2  Perhaps.133  For
the most part, normative legal thinkers typically try to avoid the
problem with moves like this:
Participants in argument cannot avoid presupposing that the
structure of their communication both excludes all force other
than that of the better argument and neutralizes all motives other
than the cooperative search for truth. These presuppositions may
be counterfactual; still, the cost of giving them up is what Habermas
following Apel, calls a performative contradiction.
34
The intimation is that we must give up the recognition that we are
involved in a rhetorical enterprise, that is, that we indulge in denial,
lest we get caught up in "performative contradictions."
13 5
15 2 See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 106-07 (F. Cornford trans. 1945) (setting forth
what has come to be known as the "noble lie" which legitimizes class inequality
through the idea that God fashioned farmers and craftsmen with iron and brass,
"auxiliaries" with silver, and rulers with gold).
133 My sense is that most legal thinkers probably understand on some level that
normative legal thought is a coercive rhetorical enterprise, but so longas theybelieve
in a pre-reflective way that normative legal thought "works," they will refrain from
dealing with the kinds of questions posed in the text. This is in part why I have been
concerned to show not simply that normative legal thought is coercive and boring, but
also ineffectual and (ironically) aimless. See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra
note 5.
" Warnke, Rawls, Habermas, and Real Talk: A Reply to Walzer, 21 PHIL. F. 197,
202 (1990) (emphasis added).
15 While this is a traditional way of framing the problem, at least from the
perspective of moral philosophy, it is itself rhetorically curious, because one senses
that this way of framing the problem has not yet taken full cognizance of the
rhetorical situation in which the problem is framed.
One can understand this point when one considers how strange it is in an activity
like conversation-so fluid, so reflexive, so obviously temporal-to assume the necessity
of static presuppositions at all. Indeed, why frame the problem in terms of this rigid
either/or (either we make the presupposition that we are engaged in authentic
noncoercive communication or we have to give up these presuppositions)?
One answer is that these kinds of conceptualizations are part of the embedded
conventional modes of thought that constitute the present practice of academic moral
philosophy. Cf. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in 8 PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH
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Generally, normative legal thought has not paid much attention
to its own rhetorical situation and thus it has not given much
serious thought to this problem-or even recognized it as one. In
part, this oversight helps account for the upbeat and cheery
character of normative legal thought. Typically, normative legal
thought exhibits a confident Enlightenment vision-largely oblivious
to the challenges that modernist and postmodernist thought poses
to its status as a "serious" discourse. And, as we have begun to see,
normative legal thought is not terribly self-conscious or self-critical.
Indeed, only the rudest, the most sudden shocks to the system seem
capable of jarring normative legal thought out of its complacency.
III. L.A. LAW'S EMPIRE
On Thursday, March 29, 1990, at approximately 10:00 p.m.,
Stuart Markowitz was arrested for DWI. Stuart Markowitz is a 50
year old mid-level partner in a small L.A. law firm-a bit of a
buffoon, something of a schlemiel, soft around the edges, but not
entirely spineless. 136 He is one of the less ego-centered, one of
the more principled characters on L.A. Law.13 7 He is even (at
times) surprisingly politically correct on gender issues.
As you might expect, it was an incredible shock to witness
Stuart, this soft, kind, harmless man being rudely arrested. You can
picture the scene. The cop is a predictable six-foot something, a
Nordic blond Visigoth sporting the ubiquitous, standard cop-issue
aviator glasses. Clear proto-fascist material. The shock of Stuart's
arrest is compounded by our having learned just moments before
that Stuart and his wife Ann had planned to go off to a motel to do
(as Stuart announced in his best muffled baritone voice) "some
unbelievably sinful things."
In a few short T.V. frames, the promise of innocent sex is
violently and definitively crushed by the powerful long arm of the
law. If you are a member of the legal community, this scene has
particular resonance for you: it evokes the iconic intrusion into the
CENTURY, supra note 90, at 270,273 ("One no longer thinks, but one occupies oneself
with 'philosophy.'").
Is6See LA. Law (NBC televi;,ion broadcast, Mar. 29, 1990). L.A. Law is a
television show depicting the lives, foibles, and failures of lawyers in a contemporary
small Los Angeles law firm. The show's romanticization of the legal profession in
terms of sex, power, and money was informally believed among the legal academics
in the late 1980s to have played some part in producing the otherwise inexplicable
upsurge in law school applications.
137 Not that this is a highly principled or selfless crew, you understand.
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marital bedroom condemned in Griswold v. Connecticut;138 Orwell
comes to mind.15 9 Note the image of law here: it is on the wrong
side, unaccountably random and awesomely powerful.
Stuart's breathalyzer tests reads .09.140 This comes to us as
somewhat of a surprise. True, Stuart had been seen sipping wine
with Ann moments before the arrest, but he certainly did not look
drunk, and besides, it's not in Stuart's character to drink and drive.
Fortunately, we find out that Stuart will be represented by Michael
Kuzak, Stuart's brash, young, sexy, terribly competent, and ruthless
partner. In fine form, before taking Stuart's testimony, Michael sits
down with Ann and Stuart to explain the law:
141
Michael: Peter Himeson is the best toxicologist in
the state. If he testifies for us, our stock
goes way up. O.K. to the facts.... Now,
you had a glass of wine minutes before
leaving the restaurant right?
Stuart: Well, I had wine with lunch so I guess, it
was...
Michael: Yes, but timing is very important. Let me
explain something. It takes thirty min-
utes for a drink to get into your blood-
stream. That means that if you had a
glass of wine, just before you got into
your car, our expert witness could testify
1ss 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asking "Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms... ?").
139 See G. ORwELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1964).
140 California's DWI statute reads in pertinent part:
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable presump-
tion that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his
or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the person had 0.08
percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of the
performance of a chemical test within three hours after the driving.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West Supp. 1991).
141 Consider the ethical implications of such advice:
A lawyer who advises a witness about the law or about desired testimony
before seeking the witness' own version of events comes dangerously near
subornation of perjury; whether a violation is in fact committed is a
question of the lawyer's intention and of his or her knowledge about the
client's foreseeable reaction to the lawyer's information.
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 648 (1986) (discussing lawyer interviews of
witnesses in preparation for testimony).
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that it wasn't in your system when you
were arrested .... This is very impor-
tant testimony .... So... When do you
think you had that last glass of wine?
14 2
Stuart and Ann understand implicitly:
Ann: He drank it right before we left.
Michael: Are you willing to testify to this?
Ann: Yes.
Michael: Good ... Very good. 4 -
Note that Michael has just elicited precisely the testimony he would
like the witness to give without once inviting any reference to the
truth of the matter. Michael understands, of course, that his role is
circumscribed. He cannot overtly suborn perjury, or, more
precisely, he cannot knowingly allow Ann or Stuart to lie about the
chronology of Stuart's drinking. On the other hand, there is no
rule of law, no provision of the ethical code, nothing at all that
compels Michael affirmatively to find out the truth about when the
drinking occurred.
We thus come to understand that whether or not Stuart will be
convicted for DWI has virtually nothing to do with whether or not
he was legally drunk at the time of the arrest. It has everything to
do with the quality of the performances by various actors (most
notably, Michael, Stuart, Ann, the cop, the D.A., and the experts)
within the stylized, sometimes highly circumscribed roles that the
law has scripted and structured for them.
144
The image of law presented here is the performance of
rhetorical moves within scripted, stylized roles that can be used by
142 L.A. Law, supra note 136.
143 Id.
'4 This description resonates in autopoictic social theory:
Legal communications are the cognitive instruments by which the law as
social discourse is able to see the world. Legal communications cannot
reach out into the real outside world, neither into nature nor into society.
They can only communicate about nature and society. Any metaphor about
their access to the real world is misplaced.
Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 727, 740 (1989).
And if one tries to think of adjudication in terms of the metaphor of the "real
world," adjudication begins to seem utterly bizarre:
It is a Kafkaesque world in which people testify to what they neither saw nor
heard accurately, nor recalled nor communicated fully, and in which victory
was an end in itself, and men and women compromised to reach a decision
which they based upon partially understood testimony, partisan arguments
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the various actors to invoke or suppress institutional power. 145
There are ratios of power among the various actors, and depending
how all the actors deploy their power possibilities, it will be this
outcome rather than that one which will be produced. So far
Michael Kuzak is performing his role well-so well in fact that he
would like to make the case go away before trial. To this end, he
has prepared the entire case before going to see the D.A. The
provable facts are as follows:
1. Stuart had a .09 blood alcohol level, which is barely over the .08
DWI limit in California.
2. Two witnesses (Stuart and Ann) will testify that Stuart drank the
wine just moments before he got into his car.
3. The state's top toxicologist-a highly respected person in the
field-will testify that based on this time line, it would have been
impossible for Stuart to be drunk at the time of the arrest.
Armed with these rhetorical obstacles to conviction, Michael Kuzak
goes to see the D.A., a woman he happens to know by name. He
tells her the provable facts. He adds that the case has been
scheduled before Judge Matthews-ajudge whom both Michael and
the D.A. know to be a friend of the senior partner in Michael's firm.
She looks skeptical. Michael pleads with her. He asks for a favor:
"I need this one." Michael's tone implies: "come on, please, just
this one time ... ."
146
Michael and the D.A. apparently have a "professional friend-
ship," an informal relation that arises from the repeated contacts of
the routine. Very likely they have had cases against each other. It
is this kind of professional friendship that sustains the vast informal
network through which the long arm of the law does much of its
work: plea bargains, settlements, consent decrees, etc. This is the
network of the law within the law-the shadow law. 
147
and abstract judicial charges. Life and liberty, property and reputation are
staked on bets or guesses as to what really happened.
J. MARSHALL, LAw AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 106 (1966).
145 Of course, the importance of the performative quality of the communicative
acts is borne out in other ways as well. At one point, for instance, Michael observes
that their trial date is scheduled late, and that this is a good thing because the cop
probably will not recall the incident very well.
146 LA. Law, supra note 136. This, of course, is preposterous, given that this case
will be followed by an endless line of other cases-each also richly deserving of special
treatment.
147 Of all criminal defendants convicted in United States District Courts, the
percentage who pled guilty are: 85.3 percent in 1989, see 1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 279
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The shadow law works sraoothly and efficiently in the shadow of
the unwieldy bilateral monopolies created by the state's statutory
criminal law. The shadow law reduces transaction costs through an
institution known as "the fivor bank, " 148 a huge, constantly rear-
ranging assembly of ties, loyalties, debts, and obligations. To
outsiders, it is the secret economy of the law operating in the
interstitial spaces left by the rational structure of explicit doctrinal
law. The favor bank is in significant part a feudal institution-
hierarchical in structure 149 and operated on principles of loyalty
and honor, and on ties of professional friendships, like the one
between Michael and the D.A. 150
(1989); 86.0 percent in 1988, see 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 297 (1988); 86.0 percent in
1987, see 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 120 (1987); 85.7 percent in 1986, see id. at 120.
It has also been noted that
an almost irreconcilable conflict is posed in terms of intense pressures to
process large numbers of cases on the one hand, and the stringent
ideological and legal requirements of due process of law, on the other hand.
A rather tenuous resolution of the dilemma has emerged in the shape of a
large variety ofbureaucratically ordained and controlled work crimes, short
cuts, deviations, and outright rule violations adopted as court practice in
order to meet production norms. Fearfully anticipating criticism on ethical
as well as legal grounds, all the significant participants in the court's social
structure are bound into an organized system of complicity. This consists
of a work arrangement in which the patterned, covert, informal breaches,
and evasions of due process are institutionalized, but are, nevertheless
denied to exist.
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 22 (1967).
The shadow law is an expression coined from Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorc4 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).
148 The "favor bank" is ajurisprudential concept developed by Tom Wolfe. See
T. WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 400-02 (1987).
149 For example, compared to Michael and the D.A., Michael's senior partner and
Judfe Matthews are major players in the hierarchy of the favor bank.
50 As in all "professional friendships," there is an inherent ambiguity in the
relation of Michael and the D.A.: is the emphasis on the "professional" or on the
"friendship"? Michael plays the ambiguity for all it is worth. He brings the D.A. a
bouquet of daisies and he says "I need this one." L.A. Law, supra note 136. What do
the daisies say? Perhaps the daisies say that Michael really is dealing in a personal
capacity, that he wants to change the plea bargaining from the usual favor bank
channel to a more personal one. Or perhaps they are part of a flirtation Michael is
trying to offer as a quid for a drop-in-the-charges quo; maybe Michael is trying to con
the D.A. into giving him something for free that should rightfully be handled through
the favor bank. Ifso, Michael's ploy fails: the D.A. hands the daisies back to Michael,
saying, "You owe me big." Id. So it is clear: the deal will be recorded in the favor
bank, and Michael's account debited the appropriate amount.
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In the end, the favor bank, the shadow law, and Michael's
performance have done their work: the charges will be reduced to
"reckless driving-dry."151 And that's what matters to us: Stuart
is just too nice a guy to be convicted. How does Michael come out?
From the perspective of law in the books or law in the law school,
Michael has engaged in some very questionable practices. Yet from
a purely instrumental perspective, he has done a good job of it.
Besides, this is what real law is like-playing the power ratios and
manipulating the performances to get the right result. And in our
role as TV viewers, we know the right result: it is to get soft, kind,
harmless Stuart out of the sex-hating, life-denying, fun-killing,
Orwellian grasp of the law.
At the end of this episode, Stuart and Ann are back at their law
offices and Stuart drops the inevitable bombshell. "I was guilty:
three glasses of wine," he says. 152 This is a brilliant piece of script
writing. It is brilliant because it confirms the central point that law
is a game of power and manipulation. The lawyers manipulate and
control. The law manipulates and controls as it tells its story
through the mouths of the various legal actors-the lawyer, the D.A.,
the suspect, and the witness-all acting in their legal roles. And it
is only when the long arm of the law is retracted and the choreo-
graphed legal roles have been dropped, that Stuart can tell us that
he was in fact drunk.
Did we see this coming? Probably. Could we have missed it?
Sure: if we had insisted on believing that the statements made by
Michael Kuzak, the lawyer, Stuart Markowitz, the suspect, and Ann
Kelsey, the witness, were part of a field of undistorted rational
discourse whose ultimate criterion is truth. We could have been
taken in. But only if we indulged in one hell of a category mistake.
We would have had to misconstrue a field of performances, of
performative utterances, of power moves-that is, the field of law-
for a field of undistorted rational discourse.
In our role as T.V. viewers of L.A. Law, we usually don't make
that mistake. We understand that the law represented to us is not
simply or even primarily a system of undistorted rational discourse.
151 LA. Law, supra note 136. And this is utterly predictable: "One statistic
dominates any realistic discussion of criminal justice in America today: roughly
ninety percent of the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal courts plead
guilty rather than exercise their right to stand trial before a court orjury." Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1979); see also supra note 147.
152 L.A. Law, supra note 136.
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We understand implicitly that it is an institutionalized arrangement
of performative roles and possibilities that both enable as well as
delimit the possibilities for truth-telling and deception. We
understand that there is a great deal more going on than could
possibly be captured by a medium that reduces law to stabilized
"propositions," to rational arrangements of "ideas," to overarching
"theories."
This is a world in which deceit plays an important part. Ann,
Stuart, and Michael succeeded in deceiving some of the other
characters on the show (including each other). By the end of the
show, Stuart even ends up deceiving himself: reflecting upon the
fact that by being able to pay $3000 for a top toxicologist, he was
able to beat the rap, Stuart says to himself, "I'm just lucky, I guess."
This is an extraordinary moment of self-deception. Indeed, it
hardly classifies as luck for an upper-middle class, well-connected,
white male lawyer to be able to beat an isolated DWI rap. On the
contrary, it's part and parcel of what it means to be part of that
class. But Stuart abstracts himself away from this unwelcome bit of
social self-knowledge, denies to himself that he is part of this web
of social power, and avoids any reckoning with the social sources of
his power: it's just plain, dumb, ineffable luck. Here we get a
wonderful insight into how the average lawyer manages to deal with
the web of social power in which he is enmeshed. Like Stuart, the
typical lawyer denies that he is of the web. He claims that he is
outside or above the web.
One of the striking aspects of L.A. Law is that, for all its obvious
and not so negligible shortfalls, it is often a better approximation of
the world of law practice than the routine academic productions of
normative legal thought.153 This perception is likely to be shared
by anyone who has had any actual practice experience, anyone who
understands that professional power is the juice that makes the
wheels of the law-bureaucracies run. Lawyers tend to see their
professional power as resting, "not on rules, but on local knowledge,
insider access, connections, and reputation." 154  For instance,
153 Gillers notes: "I watched many hours of LA. Law. The shows were uneven
internally and from week to week. Some were heavy with adolescent humor and
crude stereotypes. Others were admirable, occasionally masterful, in their depiction
of legal and ethical issues. Lean and subtle, they could inspire class discussion."
GilIers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE LJ. 1607, 1620 (1989).
154 Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 4, at 1685. As Sarat and Felstiner observe:
"Lawyers often suggest that their most important contribution is knowledge of the
ropes, not knowledge of the rules; they describe a system that is not bureaucratically
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"lawyer regulars" within the criminal justice system maintain
intimate relations with all levels of personnel in the court setting as
a means of obtaining, maintaining, and building their practice:
"These informal relations are the sine qua non not only of retaining
a practice, but also in the negotiation of pleas and sentences."
1 55
The favor bank and the shadow law, more than the reason of the
better argument, is the stuff of law. The favor bank cannot be seen
in Law's Empire, but only on L.A. Law. Law's Empire is predicated
on the separation of "law" from the social and on the confinement
of law to the space of the rational, the conscious, and the
originary. 156 Normative legal thought implicitly assumes that "we
are a government of laws, not men." 1 7 L.A. Law reminds us that
it is also the other way around. Practicing lawyers know very well
that "[i]t makes all the difference which judge is deciding a
case."
158
When a lawyer presents a case to ajury, the opening argument,
the direct examinations, the cross, the objections, and the summa-
tion all typically aim toward the paramount objective of making the
jury believe the lawyer's story line and disbelieve the other
side.159 To this end, the lawyer will establish her authority,
credibility, and rapport with the jury. Moreover, she will not
presume on them too much but will construct a relatively clear and
simple story line. This will be a prototypical story that resonates
within the culture and evokes stereotypical responses such as pity,
admiration, contempt, fear, and so forth. Each of the trial lawyer's
actions in the courtroom will be designed to bolster, repeat, and
reinforce that story line.
160
rational but is, nonetheless, accessible to its 'priests.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
155 Blumberg, supra note 147, at 21; see alsoJ. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN
105-09 (1962) (discussing the mechanics of a small-scale, solo criminal practice).
156 Once in a while, normative legal thinkers will acknowledge that law is nof
originary, that it is in part an unconscious social construction and that it need not
necessarily conform to a rational structure. See e.g., Posner, supra note 128, at 854
(acknowledging that "[t]acit knowledge is important in legal reasoning"). But no
sooner are these points acknowledged, than they are safely cabined within an
overarching deliberative rational structure that serves to shut down the lines of
inquiry they might open up. The legal unconscious remains virtually unexamined.
157 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
158 A. DERSHOWITZ, TAKING LIBERTIES: A DECADE OF HARD CASES, BAD LAWS,
AND BUM RAPS 2 (1988).
159 The discourse of lawyers is "a paradigmatic case of strategic, success-oriented
communication." Dan-Cohen, Law, Community, and Communication, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1654, 1668.
'60 Such practices have been widely recognized:
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For the trial lawyer, the substantive doctrine and the law of
evidence and of civil procedure, will serve two main functions. In
one sense, they will be the filters, the screens through which the
stock story-line must pass. 161  In this screening capacity, the
positive law is obstructive. But the positive law is enabling as well:
it organizes, echoes, and dignifies the lawyer's story-line. In this
second sense, the law signals to the jury that this is not any sort of
story being told but one that fits a prototypical pattern (i.e.,
defendant intentionally harmed plaintiff) and that therefore the
story warrants a prototypical response (i.e., jurors should make
defendant compensate plaintiff). 62
In crafting this story, the lawyer will consider the self-image of
the jurors, their values, and their beliefs about themselves. The
lawyer will frame the story with a simple rhetorical structure in
mind: believe my story because it will confirm your sense of
yourself as decent, courageous, sensible, etc.; disbelieve my
opponent's story because in order to believe it, you will have to give
up part of your favorable self-image.
Thus, for the effective trial lawyer, truth, rationality, and moral
values play a role but only in an instrumental sense-only insofar as
they aid the lawyer in effectively manipulating the jury to reach the
pre-determined desired outcomes. Control and manipulation are
the objective. What matters is not the rationality of a story but
whether the story will rhetorically and cognitively produce the
In an actual case there will be many potential frames of reference which
could be recalled byjurors from their schematic databases.... However...
cognitive biases and limitations cause jurors to filter out many of these
potential frames of reference. Cognitive filtering explains whyjurors do not
consider much of the relevant evidence they have heard as they reach
tentative conclusions about the case prior to deliberations....
*.. The advocate, therefore, must develop a strategy to accommodate
the juror's cognitive filters, thereby maximizing the possibility that the jury
will appreciate the evidence favorable to her client.
Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 277
(1989).
161 "Our criminal justice system is more appropriately defined as a screening
system than as a truth-seeking one. This screening process is directed at accurately
sorting out those whose deviancy has gone beyond what society considers tolerable
and has passed into the area that substantive law labels criminal." Mitchell, The Ethics
of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293,
299-300 (1980).
162 See Winter, Cognitive Dimension, supra note 112, at 2272-74 (describing the ways
in which the advocate's story-line can persuade by tapping into an existing story-line
shared by his or her audience).
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desired result;165 what matters is not moral value, but the moralis-
tic self-image of the jurors.
164
For the trial lawyer, the field is already in part constituted. As
the litigation proceeds, countless factors increasingly limit the trial
lawyer's possible strategies. The positive law sets the bounds of
possible litigation. Discovery sets the bounds of the possible factual
positions in the case. The identity of the judge sets the bounds of
permissible evidence. Still, many of the power relations are the
creation of the trial lawyer herself. She will establish a relation with
,the jurors and judge, and in doing so, will influence the jurors'
relation with the judge, their task, and opposing counsel.
Neither the truth, nor the rational content, nor the moral effect
of this relation matters. What matters is the relation itself: who
commands, who silences, who is believed, etc. The trial lawyer
knows all this. And the last thing she wants to do is re-present to
herself all these relations in terms of a conventional separation and
stabilization of truth, rationality, or moral value. On the contrary,
to be effective, all of this must be implicitly understood-indeed
internalized-as a system of differentiated relations among power,
truth, rationality, rhetoric, and deceit. As Dauer and Leff put it:
A lawyer is a person who on behalf of some people treats other
people the way bureaucracies treat all people-as nonpeople. Most
lawyers are free-lance bureaucrats, not tied to any major estab-
lished bureaucracy, who can be hired to use, typically in a
bureaucratic setting, bureaucratic skills-delay, threat, wheedling,
needling, aggression, manipulation, paper passing, complexity,
negotiation, selective surrender, almost-genuine passion-on behalf
of someone unable or unwilling to do all that for himself. 65
All of this, of course, appears to be very far from the reigning
image of law on the contemporary normative legal thought channel.
Listen to Dworkin and experience the dissonance:
What is law? ... Law's empire is defined by attitude, not
territory or power or process.... It is an interpretive, self-
165 There are nicer ways of saying the same thing- "Understanding how and why
individuals view the world as they do will make advocates more effective in
negotiations, strategic planning, client counseling, and other recurringlegal contexts
outside the courtroom." Moore, supra note 160, at 341.
164 This description of the modern lawyer, of course, is not wholly unlike Plato's
description of the sophistic views of Thrasymachus, who insists that justice is the
effective exercise of power by the stronger. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note
132, at 41-174 (Books I-V).
165 Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer as Friend 86 YALE L.J. 573, 581 (1977).
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reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest sense....
Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to
lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better
future, keeping the right faith with the past.166
Listen to Owen Fiss:
I continue to believe that law is a distinct form of human
activity, one which, as Ronald Dworkin and others have insisted
for some years now, differs from politics, even a highly idealized
politics, in important ways. Political actors can and often do make
claims ofjustice, but they need not.... Judges on the other hand,
have no authority other than to decide what is just, and they
obtain the right to do so from the procedural norms that surround
their office and limit the exercise of their power.1
67
These visions of law offered by Fiss and Dworkin are a far cry from
L.A. Law. Against that backdrop, the Dworkin-Fiss visions advertise
an extraordinarily idealized, romanticized account of law-impossibly
clean and orderly. They certainly seem quite distant from the vision
of lawyering offered by Dauer and Leff.
And yet, is there really any contradiction here between the two
visions? Does the validation -of the Dauer-Leff view of the lawyer-as-
bureaucrat somehow falsify the Dworkin-Fiss visions? Or, corre-
spondingly, does the Dworkin-Fiss vision somehow falsify the Dauer-
Leff account? The answer, surprisingly, is no. What Fiss and
Dworkin describe as the practice of law is what Dauer and Leff
describe as the practice of law. We have to understand that when
Dworkin and Fiss give their idealized or romanticized accounts of
law, they are not talking about a separate reality: the Dworkin and
Fiss visions are real-and they are realized every day in precisely the
ways described by Dauer and Leff. "Laying principle over practice"
and "making the law the best it can be" is the harassment, is the
aggression, is the manipulation. All this stuff about "deciding what
is just" and showing "the best route to a better future, keeping the
right faith with the past" is exactly what Dauer and Left's bureau-
cratic-lawyers say and do as -they delay, threaten, wheedle, needle,
manipulate, and otherwise kick people around.
Normative legal thought never quite manages to understand this
point. Indeed the continued viability, the continued respectability
of normative legal thought as an enterprise in the academy depends
166 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 413.
167 Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 249 (1989).
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upon its failing to understand this point. Normative legal thought
routinely fails to understand this point by relentlessly repeating two
errors.
First, normative legal thought believes that in the abstraction of
the normative terms from their bureaucratic setting on L.A. Law,
their meaning, their significance, has nonetheless been pre-
served. 168 Normative legal thought tends to disavow its own
performative dimension; it tends to hide from itself the kinds of
social and rhetorical uses to which it is put. Rather uncritically and
solipsistically, normative legal thought tends to concern itself only
with its own "substantive" propositional normative content and its
own normatively sanctioned uses.169 In this sense, we can say that
normative legal thought is not a "serious" enterprise-but rather one
that presumes uncritically that its main, or critical, significance is
self-determined.
This fixation of normative legal thought on its own "substantive"
propositional normative content is sustained by a second kind of
prototypical mistake. Having abstracted its own discourse from the
bureaucratic setting of L.A. Law, normative legal thought tends to
assume that its own "substantive" propositional normative content
somehow controls the way in which normative legal thought is
used-that somehow its propositional normative content regulates
the ways in which people get kicked around. Normative legal
thought is thus prone to a naive form of identity thinking where the
normative significance of a legal term in the legal academy is
blithely assumed to correspond roughly to the same normative
significance in law practice. But it's not so.
170
168 This is a variant of Cover's criticism of the tendency among legal commenta-
tors to reduce law to the interpretation of de-contextualized texts. See Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (arguing that law cannot be understood
apart from its own relation to the violence it occasions); see also Coombe, "Same as it
Ever Was': Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation, 34 MCGILL LJ. 601, 649
(1989).
169 Later, we will see how the internal/external distinction, the separation of law
from the social order, enables normative legal thought to excise from its own purview
its own aesthetic, political, social and psychological significance. See infra text
accompanying notes 295-319.
170 Consider the observations of ProfessorJohn Mitchell, who represented some
600 criminal defendants over a period of nine years:
It has been said that those who commit street crimes recognize the necessity
of law, but do not incorporate the norms of the law into their own view of
what is right. I disagree. Street criminals accept the norms of the law, or
at least see those norms as giving validity to their own internal value
structure. The norms they assimilate, however, are not the idealized norms
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And rhetorically, it is relatively easy to see that it is not so. We
need only ask what kind of role normative legal thought, or
Dworkin, could play on L.A. Law. The point here is not the usual
one of trying to assess wheiher Dworkin's vision of Law is right or
not. Rather, the question is, what role can Dworkin perform-what
role can normative legal thought credibly perform on L.A. Law?
What is the performative significance of normative legal
thought?
171
It is not easy to see what role Dworkin could play. For one
thing, it is extremely difficult to imagine a normative thinker like
Dworkin on L.A. Law. To the extent that we understand Dworkin
as the author of Law's Empire or Taking Rights Seriously (as opposed
to Ronald Dworkin, the man), it is implausible that he should
become a regular character on L.A. Law: there is no leading role on
the show for a regular character whose primary (if not sole) mode
of communicative interaction is "authentic" normative legal thought.
Perhaps, then, we should think along more modest lines.
Perhaps we could introduce Ronald Dworkin in a flashback.
Michael Kuzak, faced with a very difficult appeal on constitutional
grounds, could remember his old professor from law school. At a
critical point in the case preparation, Michael would remember his
old professor's words and these would, of course, provide the
crucial missing link to win the case. "Yes-I've got it," exclaims
Michael Kuzak. The judge "constructs his overall theory of the
present law so that it reflects, so far as possible, coherent principles
of fairness, substantive justice, and procedural due process, and
reflects these combined in the right relation."
172
No. Dramatically, this does not work. It is not credible.
Normative legal thought cannot contribute to the practice of law in
of a just legal system; rather, they are the norms that the legal system
conveys to the poor and nonwhite who experience it daily. They are norms
that when taken back to the streets readily fulfill the value system of the
archetypal street criminal, the armed robber: (1) no one cares about you,
and the only way to survive is to have money; (2) those who have power can
do whatever they please, including treating another human being any way
they like.
Mitchell, supra note 161, at 324-25 (footnotes omitted).
171 American (legal) culture is experiencing a shift from meaning based on
constative value to meaning organized in terms of performative value. As this
transition accelerates and becomes widely recognized, we experience an erosion of
meaning. See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 5, at 185-86.
172 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 405.
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this way. Its prescriptions and its subtle intellectual moves are
simply not important to the practice of law in this way.
Perhaps, then, Ronald Dworkin could be allowed to make a
speech at some bar convention about the rule of law and law's
empire? Now, this dramatic option does work; this is credible
theater. It can be scripted. Ronald Dworkin could even play the
part himself. But there is something disturbing about this. The
only role we have found for Ronald Dworkin or normative legal
thought on L.A. Law's Empire is the ritualistic ceremonial one of
providing the lawyering profession with a pleasing and admirable
self-image. In other words, the one role dramatically possible for
the normative legal thought of the legal academy is that of self-
image maintenance for legal academics and lawyers. 173 This, of
course, raises a disquieting question about the social significance of
normative legal thought, suggesting that its primary significance is
the performative one of providing and disseminating an appealing
rhetoric and self-image for the lawyering profession.
In part, these observations bring us back to the early days of the
cls legitimation thesis, when legitimation was a description applied
to legal thought, as distinguished from judge-made law. In the early
days of cls, Duncan Kennedy suggested that various kinds of legal
thought were a kind of legitimation of existing legal institutions and
practices.1 74 As applied to academic legal thought, there is not
much doubt that this legitimation thesis was and is right: virtually
regardless of what is going on in the courts or the legislatures, most
173 This point is suggested in Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59
TEX. L. REv. 639, 667-68 (1981).
174 In the early days, Kennedy's articulation of the apologetic or legitimating
character of academic legal thought was targeted at legal thought-in fact, legal
theory. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387,387-89 (1981) [hereinafter Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 209-11 (1979).
Quite possibly as the result of the typical identification that academics make
between their legal thought and the law put out by courts, the legitimation thesis
somehow became a claim about the function or role of law/courts relative to the
social order. But, of course, this slippage of the legitimation thesis from the academy
to the courts, from theory to positive law, presented some serious conceptual
problems (to say the least).
This unfortunate slippage was no doubt prompted by the unconscious self-
identification of legal thinkers with courts andjudges. By virtue of their continued
identification with courts and judges, legal thinkers tend to assume that they, like
judges, are doing "law." They think that when they use the same three letter word
("law"), it means the same thing in the academy as it does in the courts. This is
wrong. It is a routine mistake.
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legal thinkers spend their intellectual energies rationalizing (i.e.,
making rational, coherent, appealing, etc.) whatever it is the courts
are doing. Very often this legitimation effort takes the form of
criticizing certain opinions or tendencies-but it is always in the
attempt, in the effort to redeem, to celebrate, to validate the vast
bulk of positive law, the legal institutions, and the thinking and
practices of the contemporary American legal community.
While there can be little doubt that normative legal thought is
always launched in the enterprise of legitimation, its role may go
well beyond apologetics to the actual creation, production, and
maintenance of the discourse and rhetoric that enables bureaucratic
institutions and practices to organize themselves. 175 The norma-
tive legal thought of the academy may thus serve to keep the
techniques and strategies of bureaucratic harassment, needling,
wheedling, aggression, etc. in working order. There is a great deal
to be said for this view. For one thing it helps to explain how the
Fiss-Dworkin visions are completely consistent with the Kafkaesque
Dauer-Leff vision of bureaucratic lawyering: when lawyers harass,
coerce, intimidate, etc. they do it with the nice words, the nice
arguments, the nice jurisprudence crafted by normative legal
thinkers.
In accordance with this last view, the primary role played by
normative legal thought is to constitute students (and to a lesser
extent, lawyers and judges) as polite, well-mannered vehicles for the
polite transaction of bureaucratic business. Law's Empire spells oqt
the proper etiquette for the actors on L.A. Law's Empire.176 This
is not as surprising as it might first seem: remember that Law's
Empire begins with and draws its inspiration from a discussion of
courtesy. 177  Courtesy, of course, is nothing if not the studied
observance of the idealized self-image of an existing social regime.
175 On legitimation and apologetics, see Kennedy, Cost-BenefitAnalysis, supra note
174, at 444-45 (arguing that efficiency analysis is a kind of legitimation for the system
of private law). For discussion of the less morally appealing roles of normative legal
thought, see Delgado, supra note * 24, at 947-55.
176 This is a slightly more gracious and slightly different way of saying what
Stanley Fish has already said of Dworkin's theory: it's a nice piece of rhetorical work.
As jurisprudence goes, it is in the genre of cheerleading. See S. FISH, supra note 25,
at 390-92; see also Smith, Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 444-47 (1990)
(suggesting that legal pragmatism is a kind of preaching, a kind ofjurisprudence-as-
exhortation).
177 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 46-70. If one's basic motif for law is
"courtesy," it's a pretty good (though not a sure) bet that the analysis is not going to
take a searching self-critical turn.
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So it is certainly plausible to think that normative legal thought's
crucial role goes beyond apologetics to the maintenance and
refurbishing of the rhetoric deployed on L.A. Law's Empire. But
such a conclusion is hardly inexorable. After all, there is something
quite unorthodox in trying to put Dworkin or any other normative
legal thinker on the set of L.A. Law-they clearly do not belong
there. And if I persist in trying to put them on the stage of L.A.
Law, they will try vigorously to gef off. This is quite predictable; we
can expect normative legal thinkers to try to marginalize and deny
L.A. Law's Empire.
From the perspective of normative legal thinkers, L.A. Law's
Empire is tosh; it is a fallen and degraded world not worth thinking
about or even recognizing.1 78 If the world of law practice has
become L.A. Law's Empire, then so much the worse for law practice-
or so normative legal thinkers might argue. But this dismissive
posture is not really available to them. Normative legal thought,
after all, does not present itself as a mere intellectual exercise bereft
of social or political ambitions. On the contrary, normative legal
thought wears its worldly ambitions on its literary sleeves, as the
names of its major productions-Law's Empire and The Rule of Law-
indicate.
Owen Fiss reminds us eloquently of these worldly ambitions:
The judge might be seen as forever straddling two worlds, the
world of the ideal and the world of the practical, the world of the
public value and the world of subjective preference, the world of
the Constitution and the world of politics. He derives his
legitimacy from only one, but necessarily finds himself in the
other. He among all the agencies of government is in the best
position to discover the true meaning of our constitutional values,
but, at the same time, he is deeply constrained, indeed sometimes
even compromised, by his desire-his wholly admirable desire-to
give that meaning a reality.'
79
Owen Fiss is entirely right: normative legal thought demands and
desires not merely to be performed, but to be enacted in some
realm beyond itself-to be realized in the social realm. This sociality
of law is true even of the most austere, ascetic formalist approaches
178 "Tosh" is one of Lon Fuller's expressions. It is meant to signify (and dismiss)
the trivial, inessential packaging surrounding law's essence. See Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 360 (1979).
179 Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justic4 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 58 (1979).
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that claim that law has an immanent moral rationality. 180 Even
for such self-announced formalist accounts, there is a demand that
law be not simply thought, but enacted, realized.
To recognize the significance of these worldly ambitions is to
recognize that normative legal thought cannot be indifferent to L.A.
Law's Empire. On the contrary, normative legal thought's ambitions
are precisely to rule over the domain currently occupied by L.A.
Law, to submit the conduct of the various legal actors to some
normatively appealing overarching rational pattern. Normative legal
thought cannot so quickly dismiss L.A. Law's Empire-for that empire
is the realm where law is enacted. L.A. Law's Empire may be a
degraded, fallen world, but it is most assuredly not tosh.
There is another reason why normative legal thought cannot
simply dismiss or deny L.A. Law's Empire: it is in some senses a
more resonant and richer source of intellectual inquiry about law
than many of the genteel productions of normative legal thought.
Obviously, there are things that L.A. Law gets wrong;18 1 it is, after
all, prime time TV. But despite its romanticization of law prac-
tice, 182 the program, in comparison with normative legal thought,
is much more consonant with what we are told by psychology,
'go See Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 982, 1012-13 (1988); id. at 1003 ("[T]he forms ofjustice cannot be understood
detached from the particularity of the external interactions that they govern and from
the specific regimes of positive law that actualize them.").
181 Several are noted in the following passage:
Convene a gaggle of lawyers and you will hear several varieties (and
different intensities) of criticism of LA. Law. The criticisms tend to focus
on three aspects of the show: it makes lawyers' cases seem a good deal
more significant than they are; it does not accurately recognize or describe
the ethical issues lawyers face; it makes the work tasks of lawyers seem a
great deal more exciting than they are.
Gillers, supra note 153, at 1607.
What strikes me, however, is that the very same three criticisms apply obviously-
and perhaps even more readily-to much of the normative legal thought that issues
from the legal academy.
182 The romanticization of law practice on L.A. Law is sometimes very much like
the romanticization of law practice in law school.
First, the action on LA. Law is characterized by an over-abundance of "sexy"
(soon-to-be-appellate) cases with odd or compelling facts, much like the casebooks
and the classroom.
Second, if there is an over-abundance of moralization of law in the law school,
L.A. Law suffers from the same defect. Every third Thursday is a replay of the Lon
Fuller/H.L.A. Hart dispute. See supra note 37.
Third, like law school, L.A. Law tends to replay as live drama thejurisprudential
disputes of ages and questions, frameworks and scenes, that have long since lost their
intellectual vitality.
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sociology, rhetoric, or even personal experience about the actual
practice of law itself. In fact, one would have a very difficult time
finding intellectually respectable sources of authority to credit the
sort of psychology, sociology, and rhetoric that is (and must be)
implicitly or explicitly assumed into methodological-and often-
ontological existence by normative legal thought.
183
Indeed, where is the intellectually respectable documentation to
validate the main social and psychological categories of normative
legal thought? Where is the psychological or sociological documen-
tation to authorize normative legal thought's routine invocations of:
the integrity of the sovereign individualist self?
the phenomena of choice, consent, free will?
the concept of unitary intent?
the notion of individual agency?
and so on?
There isn't much. By and large, normative legal thought has
assumed its own psychology, sociology, rhetoric. The sociology,
psychology, and rhetoric assumed into existence by normative legal
thought is largely the unconscious concretization of its own posited
aesthetic of social life-an aesthetic inherited from worlds now long
since gone. There is little to support the social aesthetic of
normative legal thought other than fiat and the power of academic
inertia. Unfortunately for normative legal thought, its posited
understandings of the psychological, the social, and the rhetorical
are now stunningly anachronistic and strikingly discordant with
much of what leading work in the humanities and social sciences
have to tell us about human beings and what they do.
1s4
To the extent, then, that normative legal thought remains
concerned about the adequacy of its representations of the social
sphere, it cannot afford to dismiss L.A. Law's Empire. To the extent
that normative legal thought is or wants to consider itself an
"authentic" enterprise, it must recognize the advanced bureaucrati-
zation of the practice of law, and strive to understand how its own
183 Some normative thinkers attempt to escape this problem by specifying that
they are operating within the normative realm-hence, adopting normative
conceptions of the person distinct "from an account of human nature given by
natural science or social theory." Rawls,Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysica4
14 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 223, 232 n.15 (1985).
184 The point is made most globally by Alasdair Madntyre, who demonstrates how
the history of moral philosophy has evolved along tracks that have little relation to
the aesthetics of our own social and psychological practices. See A.. MACINTYRE,
AFrER VIRTUE (1984).
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psychological, sociological, and rhetorical maps are so discordant
with those on L.A. Law's Empire.
IV. WHY HERCULFs CAN'T Do L.A. LAW'S EMPIRE
Even if the dramatic requirements of L.A. Law do not leave
much in the way of roles for a Dworkin, normative legal thinkers
continue to strive to communicate to the actors on L.A. Law's
Empire. Normative legal thinkers write articles, they write books,
they seek to "intervene." And indeed, given their worldly ambi-
tions, the normative legal thinkers must strive to intervene. For
them, L.A. Law is a moral outrage-a fallen world, a bureaucratic
shadow image of "real" law.
But how do normative legal thinkers intervene in and communi-
cate to the world of L.A. Law?i85 Well, they say some very norma-
tive things. They appeal to conscience, to doing the right thing, to
justification, to intellectual consistency, to normative coherence. In
one sense this is utterly unremarkable and routine. Yet against the
185 How does normative legal thought imagine that it effectuates its recommenda-
tions and prescriptions? Its options are actually quite limited. The following list
describes in increasing order of sophistication the ways in which normative legal
thought might without self-contradiction imagine that it produces its implications or
effects:
1. Normative legal thought persuadesjudges to adopt the outcomes, principles,
or values prescribed in the scholarship.
2. Normative legal thought provides rhetorical or stylistic comfort for judges
who are already persuaded of the wisdom of the normative position, but need
something to cite as authority.
3. Because normative legal thought provides better, more compelling, more
encompassing versions of the legal analyses that judges have already developed,
normative legal thought succeeds in extending the half-lives ofjudicial opinions and
makes these opinions much more influential than they would otherwise be.
4. Normative legal thought influences courts by virtue of its political power.
5. Normative legal thought is influential, but only with very intellectualjudges.
Intellectual judges are a minority, but they are extremely influential among their
peers.
6. Normative legal thought does not so much influence judges as it influences
the moral-political belief systems of the community of 6,000 or so legal academics.
The moral-political beliefs of this group of people is very important because they are
teachers and their beliefs are transmitted to their students who in turn act on these
beliefs once the students become lawyers.
These hypotheses share the presumption that normative legal thought is an
authentic originary form of thought somehow distinct from the domains of power,
psychology, and rhetoric. They share the presumption that the self-representation
of normative legal thought is identical with normative legal thought itself. Ironically,
this very (rationalist) way of thinking about normative legal thought is, as I will
demonstrate later, itself a product of normative legal thought.
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backdrop of L.A. Law, these sorts of interventions seem nalve,
unworldly, and inappropriate. To try to engage in authentic
normative legal thought on L.A. Law is to recognize just how out of
place it is. The dramatic relations of L.A. Law are substantially
more complex and richer than the stylized formalizations repro-
duced by even sophisticated normative legal thinkers. What we get
by trying to put Dworkin or any other normative legal thinker on
L.A. Law is a graphic depiction of the fragility of the assumptions
that underlie normative legal thought.
But now we must ask: what is it about normative legal thought
that makes it stand out as so obviously inappropriate for L.A. Law?
The inadequacy of normative legal thought on L.A. Law stems from
its routine and largely unconscious dependence on rhetorical
assumptions that simply do not hold on L.A. Law. First, normative
legal thought assumes that its addressees are actually or potentially
normatively competent. Second, it assumes that its own categories
and grammar resonate deeply and authentically within the culture
in such a way that normative legal thought can be effective in
transforming and regulating the culture. These assumptions greatly
simplify normative legal thought's academic mission. In making
these assumptions, it has assumed into methodological and
ontological existence a world mapped in its own image, a world
charted in its own categories.
Most of this kind of thought is addressed (at least nominally) to
judges, either directly or via the selective mediation of lawyers or
clerks.1 8 6  While it is commonly assumed that legal thinkers
"speak to judges and other formulators of law, helping them to
understand and perform their job, "1 8 7 this seems to be a case of
wishful thinking. Perhaps at one time legal thinkers did speak to
judges and did routinely help convey some useful prescriptions or
helpful recommendations.18 8 But it is difficult to believe that this
186 See Barnhizer, supra note 107, at 251-52 (emphasizing the symbiotic relation
of legal scholars and the judiciary).
187 McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 273
(1990).
188 Certainly judges might have led them to believe so. This is what Learned
Hand said in 1925:
"[Law teachers]... will be recognized in another generation, anyway, as the
only body which can be relied upon to state a doctrine, with a complete
knowledge of its origin, its authority, and its meaning. We [the judges] shall
in very shame, if we have sense enough, acknowledge that pre-eminence
which your position and your opportunities secure."
1991]
872 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:801
is generally (or even often) the case now. Judges simply do not have
the time, the inclination, or the patience to read this stuff.189
Besides, normative legal thought tends to be just about as bor-
ing,190 lifeless, and unedifying as the judicial opinions it reflects
and refracts. 19 1 Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the pre-
scriptions, recommendations, and solutions produced by this
thought will never reach a judge, or any other legal actor.
Some of these prescriptions, however, may, and in fact often
will, find their way into the classroom. They may even seem
appealing or persuasive to the students.192 But even then, it is
Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of
the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 187-88 (1930) (quoting HANDBOOK OF THE ASsoCIA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 47 (1925)).
And certainly legal academics back then may themselves have engaged in some
wishful thinking. Consider this wonderful attempt to buttress the importance of the
academic role:
The ideas and citations injudicial opinions, it seems certain, are frequently
drawn from law reviews, either by the judge directly or through briefs of
counsel, although no reference to law reviews appears in the opinion.
A change is in progress, however. Law-review matter is, to a slight but
increasing extent, being viewed by judges as "authoritative."
Id. at 187.
189 What chance is there that judges are listening? Indeed, there is very little
evidence to support the view that judges do in fact read or follow normative legal
scholarship. Citation of scholarly artides in judicial opinions is probably the strongest
piece of evidence that judges are reading them. But to conclude from the fact of
such citations thatjudges are indeed persuaded by normative thought requires some
significant leaps of faith. For one thing, it assumes that the understanding byjudges
of the articles they cite has some strong correspondence to the understanding of the
authors who actually write the articles. This correspondence is hardly self-evident;
creative use of citations byjudges; is a frequent phenomenon. What's more, many
non-creative citations of academic work are to marginal or obvious points that the
academic author often considers peripheral to her enterprise. But even if these
problems did not exist, it is still not clear thatjudges cite normative legal scholarship
because they are persuaded.
It is at least equally plausible that the judges (or clerks) deploy citations to legal
scholarship in their opinions as a matter of style-in an effort to bolster already pre-
formed opinions. Indeed, in informal conversations with judges at both the federal
and state level, judges have told me that this is often the case. If this is descriptive
of the judicial practice of citing scholarly works, then normative legal scholarship
might have some marginal effectiveness. Thus, it might be the case that the existence
of scholarly authority for a given normative position provides the intellectual comfort
necessary for a court to adopt a given position or for ajudge to write a dissent. See
also supra note 185.
19o See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 5, at 177.
191 On the boring, deadening quality of recent Supreme Court constitutional
opinions, see Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 177-82 (1985).
On the boring, deadening quality of contemporary legal thought, see White,
Intellectual Integration, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1987).
192 While I think that most students and law teachers would readily agree that the
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exceedingly unlikely that they will survive the institutional frame-
works within which the students become employed. To the extent
that these normative arguments do survive, it will be precisely when
they are least necessary, that is, when they already fit the pre-
formed agenda of interests and world views of the client, the court,
or the legislature. Normative legal thought (even if it seems to be
all the rage among left-liberals) is thus an extremely conservative
enterprise-conservative in the sense that it tends to reproduce
whatever regime is already in place.
193
And indeed, because normative legal thought is so miscast for
this scene, it would be surprising if normative legal thought did
have much success pressing its recommendations and prescriptions
on L.A. Law's Empire. Normative legal thought presupposes that its
normative thought of legal academics does have effects on the normative orientation
of students as well as other legal academics, this is not to claim that it has any effect
on the normative character of their behavior. For instance, it is certainly conceivable
that a thoroughgoing reading of Rawls could persuade some student or academic to
drop her previous attachment to Nozick, and to embrace the difference principle.
One result might be for the student or academic to then say, and perhaps even with
great conviction, that she has become a Rawlsian. But apart from this new
representation about her political beliefs, it is hardly self-evident that the behavior of
the student or the academic will be affected in any other significant way. After all,
the possibility of implementing the difference principle in legal practice, either
explicitly or implicitly, is extremely remote.
And this is my point exactly: most normative legal thought (and the vast majority
of academic moral philosophy) is quite simply irrelevant to the kinds of concrete
political and social choices confronting the academic, the law student, or the lawyer
or thejudge or the citizen. In our society, no one is authorized to operationalize the
vast majority of what normative legal thought considers to be important. The issues
are neither before the courts nor the legislatures, and they only barely feature in our
electoral campaigns and social life. Of course, the possibility that students and
academics will become normatively sensitized as a result ofexposure to this literature
cannot be discounted, but the connection to any actual choice the student or the
academic might make remains exceedingly remote.
193 Even when it is left-liberal, normative legal thought has a conservative effect.
Normative legal thought recommends and proposes, and then attempts to make these
recommendations and proposals seem appealing by taking the reader's presumed
belief structures and showing how they logically entail the "left-liberal" solution or
proposal. The left-liberal solutions or proposals typically drop off into the abyss
because there is no social structure (i.e., no jobs) within the legal profession to put
them into effect. And while the left-liberal recommendations drop offinto the abyss,
what remains is the performative reinforcement and re-enactment of the reader's
same old belief structures. Left-liberal normative legal thought is Sysiphean in
character.
These arguments are taken from or inspired by Duncan Kennedy's perceptive
and insightful description of the politics of law school pedagogy and curriculum. See
Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum, 14
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1983).
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relation to its addressees is already regulated by shared commit-
ments to values (like truth, good, right, neutrality, etc.) and rational
discourse criteria (coherence, consistency, authenticity, etc.).
Accordingly, normative legal thought yields arguments that depend
upon the presence of shared values and criteria of discourse of the
speaker and listener. But now, if the aim is to regulate the actions
and the actors on L.A. Law's Empire, these presuppositions are
inappropriate in at least two major ways.
First, the values and discursive criteria presupposed by norma-
tive legal thought are not shared at a sufficiently concrete level to
enable conclusions to follow in a relatively unproblematic manner.
Rather, the values and concerns are far too abstract to enable an
unproblematic resolution of serious disputes among the contestants.
This point carries particular force when the community becomes
thin and fragmented, as it is now. In those circumstances, norma-
tive legal thought will itself be incapable of recognizing, let alone
reconciling, the concrete psychological, social, and rhetorical
motivating forces that lead actors to disagree. 194 On the contrary,
normative legal thought becomes increasingly epiphenomenal: the
serious argumentative work is done at a preliminary stage, in the
differing aesthetic accounts of social events and social action offered
by the contesting parties.
There is a second way in which the presuppositions of normative
legal thought are inappropriate for L.A. Law's Empire. Normative
legal thought routinely represents the scene in which it is operating
in its own image, as if its values and its discursive criteria already
occupied a distinct and regulative role. Hence, normative legal
thought represents the forces and relations identified by terms like
rhetoric, psychology, and sociology as domains somehow distinct
from and subordinate to the normative vocabulary and grammar.
For normative legal thought, the identity of the normative is always
known and already stabilized: a normative position is either
contaminated by power or it is not; it is either genuine or it is not.
In this either/or way, normative legal thought not only represents
194 See Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
963 (1991). To the extent that it does recognize its own crisis ridden state, normative
legal thought will reflexively seek to de-formalize, and to embrace otherness (hence,
the current appeal of pragmatism, contextualism, and postmodern pluralism). But
to the extent that normative legal thought fails to consider its own situation, its own
project, it will remain oblivious to the character of its problems. If this remains true,
de-formalization will likely result. in the production of increasingly contestable,
inconclusive, and ineffectual normative propositional content.
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itself as distinct and separable from the contaminations of power
and deceit, but as regulative of discourse and action.
What makes L.A. Law's Empire more interesting than the routine
productions of normative legal thought is that on L.A. Law's Empire,
normative argument is not assured of such a pre-scripted, regula-
tive, leading role. On the contrary, on L.A. Law's Empire, the very
identity of the normative is in question. On L.A. Law's Empire,
there is no implicit assumption that the legal discourse provides
access to a normativity insulated from power, deceit, or rhetoric.
On L.A. Law's Empire, normative statements are just as likely to be
received by the actors as rational persuasion as they are likely to be
experienced as power moves.1 95 The most troubling prospect for
normative legal thought then, is that its principal contribution to
the world of L.A. Law's Empire might be to furnish an increasingly
elegant, polite, and appealing rhetoric-a rhetoric that is itself
already the production of unexamined exercises of power.
The divergence between normative legal thought's ambitions
and the possibility of their realization is all the more apparent when
one takes note that normative legal thought is at once extremely
ambitious and yet seriously out of touch with the world it seeks to
rule and govern.
Normative legal thought often understands itself to be playing
for very large stakes. Law's Empire, the leading popular work in
jurisprudence, modestly confines itself to the study of "formal
argument from the judge's viewpoint," yet nonetheless manages to
bill itself as "Law's Empire" and to exalt the reader to become a
legal "Hercules." This is not the jurisprudence of modesty.
195 When Michael Kuzak is telling the D.A. his provable facts about Stuart's
drinking and arrest, just what is the status of those statements? Is Michael saying:
"You ought not go ahead with this case because, given these facts, the likelihood is
my client is not guilty and therefore should not be convicted." Or is Michael instead
saying "Look, if you go ahead with your case, you are going to have to get around
some fairly difficult obstacles that I have already put in your way-so you are going
to be spending a lot of time trying to achieve something you probably won't get
anyway." Now, Michael could be understood to be making either or even both of
these statements at once. And without more information-information that is not
forthcoming--there is simply no way to tell. What's more, there is no necessary or
usual relation or correspondence between the two kinds of statements. To put it in
the Austinian terminology, there is no necessary correspondence we can establish in
the abstract between the felicity of the performative significance of the statement and
the truth of its constative significance. See J. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH
WoRDs 1-11 (1975).
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Such intellectual confidence might be justifiable if normative
legal thought had a firm understanding of the social situation, or if
there were some reason to think that the discourse of normative
legal thought had tapped into the cultural sources that would allow
us "to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better
future, keeping the right faith with the past."196 But the gestures
of normative legal thought do not map very well onto the scene of
social and legal action. 197 The aesthetics of normative thought
effect a rationalist simplification, stabilization, and subordination of
the political, the social, the psychological, and the rhetorical. In
normative legal thought, they have always already been subordinated
to an overarching normative rationality that is already in command.
On L.A. Law, as in law practice, by contrast, the political, the social,
the psychological, the rhetorical, and the rational are all differential-
ly related in complex ways.
Indeed, the various domains are difficult to distinguish from
each other and their relations are far from being stabilized in some
pre-existing hierarchy. On L.A. Law, as in law practice, it is often
a real-that is to say, a dramatic-question whether acts of con-
science are acts of morality or acts of rationalization, whether acts
of persuasion are acts of rationality or acts of power, and whether
the relations among the various actors are overdetermined, undeter-
mined, or determined at al.198 By contrast to L.A. Law, norma-
tive legal thought seems thin and two dimensional-like a text.
199
196 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 413.
197 One striking example of this systemic discordance is the recent advocacy of
Civic Republicanism-a position that repeatedly bumps against the fact that there are
no institutional mechanisms that could implement or otherwise host such a dialogic
renaissance. For various formulations of this point, see Epstein, Modern Republican-
ism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE LJ. 1633,1637-38,1640-41 (1988) (asserting
the primacy of the pluralist view of political markets as self-interested rent-seeking);
Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1703, 1708 (1988) (noting the tension
between the Republican ambition to design political institutions that promote
discussion within the citizenry and the imperative of shielding political actors from
private interest).
198 1 am not claiming that L.A. Law-or law, for that matter-can *only be
represented adequately as an undifferentiated mass of rationality-power-rhetoric
(although as methodological starting points go, this would certainly be an improve-
ment over the starting points of normative legal thought). Rather, I am suggesting
that the differentiation is not single, but plural. In law practice, there are various co-
existing differentially differentiated relations among power, rhetoric, rationality, etc.
199 There is an author-centered character to normative legal thought that is well
captured in one of Goffman's comparisons of theater to the novel:
Onstage one character's interpretive response to another character's deeds,
that is, one character's reading of another character, is presented to the
THE POLITICS OF FORM
In one sense, then, the flatness of normative legal thought
proves to be a peculiar advantage-one that enables normative legal
thought to operate in a world it systematically represents as "first
best."200 Normative legal thought routinely assumes that it is
operating in an epistemic regime in which the thinker already
possesses a series of reasoning moves that are themselves secure,
self-identical, and stable. It assumes a world of reasoning in which
the medium and channels of communication are already established
between author and reader, academic and judge;0 1 in which the
matrices carved by language and reasoning are already adequate to
say anything worth being said. In this world, the autonomous self
of author and reader is in control of its own thinking processes; it
already stands whole, outside the duplicities of ideological and
institutional distortion.
Now, as you might guess, to assume such a world of already
secure, linear, non-paradoxical, and fully compliant communicative
links simplifies the intellectual situation tremendously. The
intelligibility and coherence of all the reasoning moves have been
secured a priori; questions and inquiries can stand still; the impact,
scope, and consequences of reasoning moves are already predict-
able. In such a world, the only significant intellectual task is to
police the formal relations between the premises and the conclu-
sions and to ensure that they are correctly observed.
20 2
audience and taken by them to be no less partial and fallible than a real
individual's reading of another's conduct in ordinary offstage interaction
would be. But authors of novels and short stories assume and are granted
definitiveness; what they say about the meaning of a protagonist's action is
accepted as fully adequate and true.
E. GOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 152.
200 am using "first best" here in opposition to the economic concept of "second
best." See generally Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best 24 REV.
EcoN. STUD. 11 (1957).
201 This belief is already anticipated and produced by the metaphoric expressions
we use to describe linguistics acts-our language already leads us to describe linguistic
acts as occurring within weightless, shapeless, unobstructed lines or "conduits" of
communication. See Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language about Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 284, 286-92 (A. Ortony ed.
1979). As Reddy shows, we are often trying to get our thoughts across better and so
we try to pack our thoughts in as few words as possible, though sometimes, our
sentences are filled with too many thoughts and thus the reader has problems
extracting the meaning. See id. at 310.
202 For an account of some of the techniques of this intellectual police work, see
infra text accompanying notes 295-319.
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This sort of thought-police work is extremely easy: The set of
formalized symbols (legal categories) already bear a certain set of
formalized relations to each other (consistency, coherence, and so
on); they have already been codified. The basic legal object-forms
(legal categories) have already been largely sedimented. The
transformational grammar is fairly easy to learn. Duplicity, paradox,
ideology, and instability have already been ruled out from the start
as serious forces constituting or disabling the thought of the author
and the reader. The thought and the thinker are already whole,
competent, and unquestionably in charge of the production of the
normative legal text.203  What is more, the normative grammar
assures that nothing can really disrupt this formal rhetorical
economy.
204
But while, in this sense, normative legal thought is extremely
easy, in another, related sense, normative legal thought is very
difficult. Its terminus is so demanding: normative legal thought
must end on a concluding note that is non-paradoxical, non-
contradictory, positive, and presumably capable of adoption on L.A.
Law's Empire. The conclusion is normative legal thought's moment
of high anxiety: that is where the normative text hopes to forge a
connection to social action. Consider, for instance, Robin West's
recent normative recommendation that "[p]rogressive constitutional-
ists, as well as progressive legislators ... try to create a viable
progressive interpretation of the Constitution, congressionally and
popularly supported, with the explicit aim of creating a modern
203 True, the law may have to reckon with relativity, see Cohen, Field Theory and
Judicial Logi, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 270-72 (1950), or even Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle, see Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1989). But normative legal thought
apparently authorizes the legal thinker to think and write about both relativity and
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle from the confident, secure framework of
Euclidean geometry, within which the grounds of thought do not shift. The thinker
remains in charge.
Indeed, Tribe's and Cohen's presentations of modernist physics are offered
within the very traditional and Euclidean framework, form, and practice of legal
academic thought. See Cohen, supra, at 251-52, 272; Tribe, supra, at 5-23. I have
previously tried to trace the ways in which traditional legal thought, taken quite
seriously, defeats the assumptions it routinely makes about its own status and
character. See Schlag, supra note 7, at 958-61.
204 Richard Epstein, for instance, asserts that "[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory,"
Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and
Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983); see also Fischl, supra note 123, at 512 (citing
Epstein with the comment that "often a theory's own adherents can do the job
faster").
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'constitutional moment."' 20 5 This call for a constitutional mo-
ment, for the relocation of constitutional practice from the courts
to the legislature, for "a Constitution that is at once more progres-
sive, more political, more challenging, more just, and more aspir-
ational than we have yet imagined,"206 is deeply moving. And yet,
it moves nothing. Missing from West's recommendations is what is
typically missing from normative legal thought: any sense of how
the prescription (we should all try for a constitutional moment)
might realize itself in the social sphere. The connection between
works of normative legal thought and the social situation is often
not a connection at all, but a rupture masquerading as connection.
Very often, the graft does not take-we are left with an aporia-and
the normative recommendations, left unconnected to any social
reality, simply drop off into the abyss.
As in virtually all the work of normative legal thought, the social,
rhetorical, institutional, or professional mechanisms of realization
are assumed to be present, functioning, and responsive to the
ideational recommendations of normative prescription. It is as if
the machinery of the social and political world were already
constructed with a series of workers waiting at the levers for
instruction from normative legal thinkers.
Now it is precisely this sort of widespread, sedimented under-
standing of the situation that enables normative legal thought to
believe that its issuance of prescriptions constitutes "serious"
intellectual or political work. Yet to proceed with such first-best
world assumptions about the situation, character, and role of legal
thought and thinkers is to begin thinking after the crucial issues
have already been begged off. The problem here is not that the
structure of normative legal thought is an abstraction of the social
or legal field. Rather, the problem is that it is the wrong sort of
abstraction, one that, by way of selective essentialization, has
succeeded in leaving behind most of the difficult and interesting
problems.
20 7
In this sense, even though normative legal thought makes life
very easy for itself within its own simplified homeostatic matrices,
it makes life very difficult for itself when the problem is how to
205 West, supra note 41, at 721.
206 Id. at 720.
207 Hence, the response that any form of thought must, even to get started, effect
an abstraction of its object-field is inapposite here. See infra notes 290-94 and
accompanying text.
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translate normative prescriptions into the order of things. There is
a ratio operating here.20 8 The more the matrices of normative
legal thought are stabilized, simplified and reductively organized,
the easier life will be within the normative system and the harder it
will be to translate normative productions into the order of things.
Formalism, including normative formalism, has advantages, but
these advantages ultimately have to be paid for: the cleaner, the
more austere your normative conceptual universe, the less chance
you can achieve anything meaningful with it on L.A. Law's Empire.
Applying this ratio to normative legal thought, we see that its
prototypical matrices are so stylized and so insulated from any
"outside"20 9 that its prospects for the realization of any normative
prescription is questionable except perhaps when the prescription
is so modest in its utopian leanings and hopes for change that it is
already virtually an abstracted reflection of extant positive law.
If normative legal thought fails to understand its own rhetorical
construction as a kind of formalism, it also fails to understand the
character of L.A. Law's Empire. Indeed, the scene on which
normative legal thought hopes to play is increasingly defined by an
aesthetics of bureaucracy incommensurable with the aesthetic of an
"authentic" normative discourse. Consider, for instance, the
primary categories around which the grammar of normative legal













Compare these prototypical terms, which assume rational and
normatively competent agents, with the scene of law-the law firm,
208 For discussion of ratios in this aesthetic, social sense, see K. BURKE, supra note
9, at 3-9, 15-20.
209 See text accompanying notes 276-322 (showing how legal thought deploys the
inside/outside distinction to stabilize itself and insulate itself from challenges).
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the courtroom, the jail, the social realm-a world increasingly




conceptual and organizational hierarchy
instrumental forms of consciousness/operationalized value
systems
dependency on expertise
high specialization of functions
jurisdictional compartmentalization
fragmentation and sectorization of knowledges
strategic uses of linguistic, cultural resources
The incommensurability of normative discourse with bureau-
cratic practice suggests that opportunities for the exercise of any
"authentic," normatively competent behavior are extremely
restricted within bureaucratic forms of life. For one thing, the
organizational structure of bureaucracy-its zero-sum quality, its
diffusion of causal lines of responsibility, its incentive/disincentive
structures, and its routinization of rationalization (raison de
bureaucray)-are often structured in a way to preclude and obstruct
normatively competent behavior. For another thing, the incommen-
surability makes it unclear how one would recognize or name
"authentic" normative bureaucratic behavior in the first place.
Once we notice our bureaucratic circumstances, the character,
identity, and possibility of the ethical becomes highly problematic.
As a simple example, consider whether traditional moral virtues like
honesty, sincerity, loyalty, honor of craft, etc., are "authentically"
applicable or even intelligible in the context of bureaucratic
institutions. To facilitate matters, consider the two lists of bureau-
cratic responses below and ask yourself two questions. 210 First,
which list most plausibly conforms to traditional moral virtues?
Second, when you have personally experienced these responses,
which set seemed closest to doing the right thing.
211
210 These questions are not rigged to provide an answer. They are rigged to
produce an ethical disturbance.
211 And, if you want, here's a third question: to what extent do your answers to
the first two questions correlate with whether you have pictured yourself as giving or
receiving these responses? This list was created with my friend and colleague David
Eason and used in our seminar on Power, Ethics, and Professionalism.
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Bureaucratic Morality I:
It's not my job.
Some other department.
I don't make the rules, I just follow them.
I'm sorry, this is not the proper form.




Oh, I would never have said that.
I'm sorry, your file is not in here.
Bureaucratic Morality IL:
I really shouldn't be telling you this, but if...
No one will check on this.
You can't do it that way, but if you call it this instead...
Technically, it doesn't comply but...
Well, it's really supposed to be done that way, but what really
matters is...
I'm sorry your file is not in here...
My point is that absent further specification of the context (and
often even with it), it is difficult to determine which set of responses
more nearly corresponds with the traditional virtues.
The sort of uneasiness prompted by the presentation of these
responses is a reflection, an instantiation of the inadequacy and
incommensurability of our normative grammars and categories with
the configurations of our present bureaucratic practices and
institutions.212 And while these normative grammars and catego-
ries continue to occupy our attention, the most thoughtful and
sophisticated attempts to reconstruct the ethical in light of our
modern or postmodern condition have the performative effect of
revealing just how narrow and insecure the jurisdiction of the
ethical has become. 2 13 This is why, in sophisticated accounts, the
212 See generally A. MACINTYRE, supra note 184.
213 Consider Michelman's discussion of what is required if we are to regard as
possible "the historic American idea of constitutionalism":
Given plurality, a political process can validate a societal norm as self-given
law only if ... there exists a set of prescriptive social and procedural
conditions such that one's undergoing, under those conditions, such a
dialogic modulation of one's understandings is not considered or experi-
enced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or
freedom .... [This stipulation] contemplates, then, a self whose identity
and freedom consist, in part, in its capacity for reflexively critical reconsid-
eration of the ends and commitments that it already has and that make it
THE POLITICS OF FORM
ethical voice often reduces to very fragile and highly abstract, almost
mystical pleas to heed, as Drucilla Cornell puts it, "the call to
witness to the Other,"214 or the commitment "to the not yet of
what has never been present, cannot be fully re-called, and
therefore cannot be adequately projected."215 The very fragility,
abstraction, and mysticism of our most thoughtful and sophisticated
ethical thought is testimony to the retreat of the ethical from our
world.
If one recognizes the advent of bureaucracy and takes it
seriously-admittedly a difficult task-we are returned to the
question of just who or what normative legal thought thinks it is
addressing? What messages are being received and what roles do
the normative messages serve? What sustains normative legal
thought? How does it manage to seem so plausible and meaningful
to so many legal thinkers? If the effects of normative legal thought
are not what it imagines them to be, what are they?
Strangely, these seemingly different questions all beget the same
answers-answers that entail re-orienting our attention. Normative
legal thought's hegemony has directed us for long to try to control,
who it is. Such a self necessarily obtains its self-critical resources from, and
tests its current understandings against, understandings from beyond its
own pre-critical life and experience, which is to say communicatively, by
reaching for the perspectives of other and different persons.
Michelman, supra note 42, at 1526-28 (footnotes omitted). I do not think that these
conditions hold even among those individuals who have had the most privileged
access to the cultural and intellectual resources to construct the kind of self described
by Michelman. (Just consider the character of faculty meetings.)
Michelman's conditions are exceedingly exigent, especially when counterposed
with our unredeemed social situation. From our social situation, meeting Michel-
man's conditions seems hopeless, which is why I think that his account performatively
confirms the very troubled character of the ethical in our time.
214 Cornell, supra note 80, at 1689.
215 Id. Drucilla Cornell represents the ethical with great passion and energy-yet
her work also evidences a deep recognition of the awesome force that the stabilization
of linguistic and cultural embeddedness, performativity, and representation create to
confine and deny the ethical.
Hence, the ethical dream that she represents is always and already an extremely
abstract, barely articulable, and always deferred hope against hope that the ethical
may find expression and realization somewhere. When Cornell exemplifies her
projection of a redeemed world, she writes, "The most obvious example of a
'redemptive legal movement' is the struggle to overthrow and outlaw apartheid in
South Africa." Id. at 1713. But is this the most obvious or is it virtually the only kind
of example? It is a stark testimony to the anachronistic character of the current
conception of the ethical that it is most at home dealing with issues like apartheid,
where the ethical thing to do is quite evident. But on questions like how should you
and I live in our bureaucratic settings, ethics has little to say.
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reform, and improve the legal order through normative good works
that we have come to believe that the lines of force run predomi-
nantly one way (that way).2 16 But normative legal thought, de-
spite its ambitions and self-representations, is not an origin. It can
acquire object-forms, but it is also in the nature of a process, a
rhetoric, a social enterprise that enjoys a certain hegemony in the
legal academy. What I want to show in the next section is that
rather than thinking of normative legal thought as providing a basis
for critique, reform or social change, normative legal thought
instead reproduces its own. aesthetic in ways that are intellectually
as well as politically unhelpful. Normative legal thought sustains a
kind of jurisprudential theater that in effect leaves legal thought
arrested-the uncritical automatic production of academic bureau-
cracy and its inertia.
V. THE THEATER OF THE RATIONAL
Among the many reasons to put the jurisprudence of Ronald
Dworkin on L.A. Law is to draw attention to the theatrical aspect of
legal thought.217 It is very easy for legal thinkers to forget that
they are performers in an enterprise whose characters, roles, and
action are always already largely scripted. 2 18 In part that is be-
cause most legal thinkers do not see themselves as engaged in
theater in the first place. And they do not think that they are
engaged in theater precisely because of the kind of theater they are
already doing: they are doing the theater of the rational. The theater
of the rational is precisely the kind of theater that is grounded in
the forgetting of its own theatricality. To play a part in this theater
is to rule out the recognition that one is doing theater.
Indeed, consider the dramatic scandal were Ronald Dworkin or
Owen Fiss or even Bruce Ackerman to stop in the middle of their
own works to contemplate seriously, the historical, psychoanalytic, or
the cognitive scene of their own normative jurisprudence. Some-
thing would seem out of kilter, rhetorically askew. Reflexivity may
be fine for Andre Gide2 19 or John Fowles,2 20 but it is not
216 Note how well the normative orientation tracks with the instrumentalist
aesthetics of bureaucracy. See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
217 Precedents here include Ball, supra note 9.
218 "[O]ften what talkers undertake to do is not to provide information to a
recipient but to present dramas to an audience." E. GOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 508.
219 See A. GIDE, THE COUNTERFEITERS (1951).
220 For instance:
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acceptable for a Dworkin22 1 or a Fiss or an Ackerman: we simply
do not expect this sort of critical reflexive act to originate from
these particular agents, or any like them.
222
While it is predictable that many schooled in the older juris-
prudences will fail to engage in such critical reflexivity-that they
will in their usual subject-object separations think that "theory" is
When Charles left Sarah on her cliff edge, I ordered him to walk straight
back to Lyme Regis. But he did not; he gratuitously turned and went down
to the Dairy. Oh, but you say, come on-what I really mean is that the idea
crossed my mind as I wrote that it might be more clever to have him stop
and drink milk... and meet Sarah again. That is certainly one explanation
of what happened; but I can only report-and I am the most reliable
witness-that the idea seemed to me to come clearly from Charles, not
myself. It is not only that he has begun to gain an autonomy; I must
respect it, and disrespect all my quasi-divine plans for him, if I wish him to
be real.
J. FOWLES, THE FRENCH LIEUTENANT'S WOMAN 105-06 (1969).
221 And, interestingly, Dworkin knows all aboutJohn Fowles. He says:
Intentionalists make the author's state of mind central to interpretation.
But they misunderstand, so far as I can tell, certain complexities in that state
of mind; in particular they fail to appreciate how intentionsfor a work and
beliefs about it interact. I have in mind an experience familiar to anyone
who creates anything, of suddenly seeing something "in" it that he did not
previously know was there. This is sometimes (though I think not very well)
expressed in the author's clich6, that his characters seem to have minds of
their own.
R. DwoRxIN, supra note 39, at 155-56. Dworkin then cites the Fowles passage, see
supra note 220. But, of course, despite Dworkin's familiarity with this reflexive move,
he seems to be quite incapable of critically examining the scene of his own writing,
of his own productions.
222 In other words, the problem is an incongruity in the act/agent ratio. But
perhaps the problem is different. Perhaps the problem is that self-conscious reflexive
action is not appropriate on the scholarly scene or that this sort of action just doesn't
fit with the purposes of these particular actors. If so, then we would then say that the
act/scene ratio or the act/purpose ratio is askew. Or perhaps the sense of awkwardness
does not so much turn on the identity of the agents as it does on the character of the
psychoanalytic or rhetorical arguments, which simply may not be the sort of
instrumentalities or agencies appropriate for the legal scholarlyscene or to thepurposes
ofjurisprudential inquiry. If so, we might say that the agency/scene ratio or the agencyl
purpose ratio is askew.
And if we were to say all this, we would be borrowing a great deal from Kenneth
Burke, who writes:
Act, scene, agent, agency, purpose. Although over the centuries, men
have shown great enterprise and inventiveness in pondering matters of
human motivation, one can simplify the subject by this pentad of key terms,
which are understandable almost at a glance. They need never to be
abandoned, since all statements that assign motives can be shown to arise
out of them and to terminate in them.
K. BURKE, ON SYMBOLS AND SOCIETY 139-40 (1989).
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"objective" and "independent" of the agents that produce "it"-what
is striking is that this failure is by no means limited to orthodox
thinkers. On the contrary, the failure to inquire into the constitu-
tion of the subject that produces legal thought is (virtually) universal
in contemporary legal thought.223 Ironically, this failure occurs
even where the jurisprudential approach would seem to lead almost
unavoidably to a serious examination of the scene of academic
production. I will give three examples of this striking, though
utterly routine, lack of critical reflexivity: one from the so-called
"right," one from the so-called "center," and one from the so-called
"left." In each case, I argue that the jurisprudential approaches lead
readily to, and would indeed benefit from, an articulate consider-
ation of the scene in which their own thought is produced and
disseminated. Yet in all three cases, no such consideration is
forthcoming.
On the so-called right, my example is drawn from law and
economics. One of the interesting contributions of law and
economics work is its consideration of the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of various social coordination systems. Ronald
Coase, for instance, discussed various ways of conceptualizing the
comparative advantages of different types of social coordination
mechanisms-most notably, the market, government regulation, and
market by-pass mechanisms such as the firm.224  Coase argued
that in some situations, each kind of social coordination mechanism
could be expected to be more desirable than the others.
2 25
Coase's analysis found an echo and a normative elaboration in the
work of Guido Calabresi, who developed the "cheapest cost avoider"
approach to tort law. According to Calabresi, the function of tort
law is to provide institutionally effective conceptualizations of the
relevant actors and of the various cost-benefitjudgments to be made
so that the actor who is in the best position to make a certain kind
of cost-benefit judgment is in fact led to make it.
226
223 See Schlag, The Problem of the Subject (forthcoming 69 TEX. L. REV. (1991)).
There are, of course, some counter-examples. See Frug, Argument As Character, 40
STAN. L. REv. 869, 921-27 (1988) ("We come, then, to the question of the character
ofArgument as Character."); Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1545, 1556 (1990) ("[I]n addition to the usual footnotes, the bottom of the
page will also contain occasional 'rhetorical notes' in which I shall identify and
sometimes reflect upon the rhetoric of the article that you are reading.").
224 See generally Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Coase, The
Problem of Social Cos4 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost].
225 See Coase, Social Cos; supra note 224, at 18-19.
226 See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
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The approach pioneered by Coase and Calabresi has now
blossomed into a variety of sophisticated and complex variants.
Much of this law and economics analysis strives to identify which
institutional actor or social coordination mechanism can most
efficiently acquire or manufacture the relevant choice information,
make "correct" decisions, and act on those decisions.227 Law and
economics thinkers are thus extremely attentive to the sorts of
informational advantages and disadvantages that the various
competing social coordination mechanisms create.
228
Tellingly, however, even though law and economics thinkers are
quite capable of recognizing that every social coordination mecha-
nism has informational blinders that must be considered in
assessing its desirability, there is one institutional framework that is
always implicated in the choice and yet (virtually) never examined
by the law and economics thinkers: their own. Like almost all other
legal thinkers, law and economics thinkers routinely situate
themselves, their discourse, and their institutional framework
somewhere "outside" the problem posed, as if they had no informa-
tional blinders, cognitive deficits, or conceptual disabilities
whatsoever that would affect or skew the choice among various
social coordination mechanisms.229 What is strange about this,
of course, is that once this simplifying supposition is brought to
light, it appears to be not only wrong, but completely contrary to
ANALYsIs 135 (1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
227 Among law and economics thinkers, it is common to treat the market and its
pricingsystem as an information dissemination device. See, e.g., Shavell, Strict Liability
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-9, 22-25 (1980) (demonstrating how strict
liability can lead the pricing system to reflect the costs of product risks in such a way
as to lead to efficient consumption levels). For a general discussion of the
informational character of pricing markets, see Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945).
228 They have to be, given that the question they seek to answer is often precisely
which social coordination mechanism-the market, firm, or government regulation-
will produce the most desirable results.
229 Coase, by contrast, did attend to this problem. This is evident from his
consideration of what he saw as the paradoxical tendency of academics to support a
free market of ideas, but not a free market of goods:
What is the explanation for the paradox?... The market for ideas is the
market in which the intellectual conducts his trade. The explanation of the
paradox is self-interest and self-esteem. Self-esteem leads the intellectuals
to magnify the importance of their own market. That others should be
regulated seems natural, particularly as many of the intellectuals see
themselves as doing the regulating.
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the very theory that law and economics thinkers deploy to assess the
relative comparative advantage among various social coordination
mechanisms. Perhaps even. more striking is that the reliability of
such assessments could only be enhanced by the consideration of
the institutional advantages and disadvantages that law and
economics thinkers experience in making such assessments.
2 30
Law and economics thinkers are hardly alone in this kind of
oversight. Many other jurisprudential approaches would seem to
require, as a matter of their own intellectual seriousness, a critical
examination of the scene in which their legal thought is produced;
yet again no such examination is forthcoming. Consider an
example drawn from the so-called center-legal neo-pragmatism.
Neo-pragmatists believe many things, and a brief essentialist
description would hardly do justice to the many pragmatist themes
that have emerged. Still, one belief the legal neo-pragmatists seem
to share is that the pragmatists understood truth as situated,
practical, social, and contextual.
3 1
Now, with all this emphasis on the situated, social, practical, and
contextual character of legal thought, it would seem appropriate for
legal neo-pragmatists to examine their own context: the social,
cognitive, and rhetorical scene of their own thought, the scholarly
situation within which their talks and articles and classes are being
produced. But legal neo-pragmatism has yet to consider the scene
of its writing2 3 2 in any serious manner. Instead, it shuns what
Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for
Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 386 (1974).
For another rare deployment of this kind of reflexive insight, see Epstein, supra
note 197, at 1642 (stating that academics "applaud republicanism because it gives
skilled academics a comparative advantage: this is the public choice explanation as
to why intellectuals prefer politics to markets").
230 For the general argument tracing out this claim, see Schlag, supra note 24.
281 As James put it:
Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as
health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with
life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just
as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.
W.JAMES, Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM AND THE MEANING OF TRUTH 104 (1978); see
also Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798 (1989) (arguing
that the pragmatists "treated thinking as contextual and situated; it came always
embodied in practices-habits and patterns of perceiving and conceiving that had
developed out of and served to guide activity"); Minow & Spelman, In Contex4 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1599-1600 (1990) (noting that a key aspect of contemporary legal
neo-pragmatism is its insistence on "contextual" analysis).
2'. The expression is borrowed fromJ. DERRIDA, Freud and the Scene of Writing in
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 196 (1978).
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would have seemed to be among the most pragmatic of questions:
what are the functions, character, and possibilities of legal academic
thought?
233
Two neo-pragmatists who come close to discussing these
questions are Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman. They begin
their recent article on pragmatism with exactly the right (that is, the
pragmatic) question. "As we turn to address the meaning of
'context' in these contexts, we are pointedly aware of a plausible
question likely to occur to a sensitive reader: What is the context
for our inquiry?" 234 But then, rather than answering the question
and exploring the context of academic legal thought or law review
writing or conference papers, or any other aspect of their scene,
they define the context of their inquiry in terms of three scholarly
and rather conceptualistic definitions of context.35
This failure to examine the scene of the writing is exactly the
same pattern we observed in law and economics. In both cases, the
jurisprudential commitments require examinations of the scene of
writing, yet in both cases, having been brought to the brink (or
beyond), the scene is left untouched and undisturbed, as if it had no
impact upon and no significance for the thought being produced.
This pattern is not restricted to the "right" or "center." On the
"left," consider the radical project of deconstruction. While the
politics of deconstruction continue to be generally in question, in
the legal academy, deconstruction is generally associated with the cls
left. In France, deconstruction has often been characterized (and
criticized) as a kind of radical and extreme intellectual move-
ment.23 6  Deconstruction, as a postmodern phenomenon, thus
arrives on these shores in opposition to liberal humanism and its
centerpiece, the sovereign individual subject. Derrida's own
description of deconstruction proclaims as much: "Deconstruction
does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in
overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the
233 For an early contribution linking the scene of writing to the character of its
productions, see Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
24 Minow & Spelman, supra note 231, at 1597.
235 Note how there is a sense in which this conceptualism is in fact the (dominat-
ing) context within which legal thought is produced. Ironically, in a pragmatic way,
this makes Minow and Spelman right to have focused on that conceptualist context.
But the point from a pragmatic perspective is that there is much more to be said
about how such a context structures, enables, and distorts our thought.2
36 See L. FERRY & A. RENAULT, supra note 80, at 122-52.
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nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articu-
lated."237 Given this radical project of displacing and overturning
not just the conceptual order, but the nonconceptual order within
which the conceptual order is articulated, it would seem particularly
appropriate for deconstruction as it is imported into American legal
thought, to examine the scene in which it is operating-or rather, to
displace and overturn the conceptual and nonconceptual matrices
and forces within which it is received.
We might expect deconstruction, for instance, to attempt to
displace the legal advocacy mentality so prevalent in academic legal
thought, as well as to displace and overturn the authority structures
of legal thought. We might expect a displacement of the sovereign
legal author, the matrices of his thought, or the like. Little of this
has occurred. On the contrary, rather than turning deconstruction
on the scene of legal academic thought-which would correspond
with Derrida's own deployment of deconstruction on the scenes of
structuralism, Plato's philosophy, and academic thought gener-
ally 2s-virtually all the legal deconstructionists, like the law and
economics thinkers and the neo-pragmatists, have shied away from
such a critical turn on the scene of their own writing.239 Instead,
they have compressed deco nstruction into an utterly traditional
ldgal role: in their hands, deconstruction has become just another
legal resource, just another set of reasoning moves, just another
237j. DERRIDA, Signature, Even Contex in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 307, 329
(1982).
238 Derrida claimed that
"[p]recisely because it is never concerned only with signified content,
deconstruction should not be separable from this politico-institutional
problematic and should seek a new investigation of responsibility, an
investigation which questions the codes inherited from ethics and poli-
tics.... Deconstruction is neither a methodological reform that should
reassure the organization in place nor a flourish of irresponsible and
irresponsible-making destruction, whose most certain effect would be to
leave everything as it is and to consolidate the most immobile forces within
the university."
J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITIcISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 156
(1982) (quoting Derrida, The Conflict of Faculties).
29 Of course, the validity of thi:i statement depends upon who you call a cls-
deconstructionist, how much deconstruction may have had a sub-textual influence on
cls-thinkers not usually identified with deconstruction, and what counts as a critical
examination of the scene of writing. But my point is that most of those cls thinkers
who have made the most explicit, self-announced use of deconstruction have not
engaged in an examination of the scene of their writing. But for a few counter-
examples, see Frug, supra note 223; Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1984).
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"analytic tool"240 for the legal academic to deploy at will against
opponents.241 As with the other two approaches, this failure of
deconstruction to disturb its own relation to the scene of legal
thought has produced a domestication of what might be a helpful
and intellectually interesting contribution to legal thought.
242
What is striking here is the repetition of the same pattern in
three ostensibly very different jurisprudential approaches. In each
case there is a manifest failure to question the scene of legal
thought, even though each approach would seem to warrant a
thoroughgoing examination or even disturbance of this scene. But
there is something about the way the theater of contemporary
normative legal thought is defined or established that leads legal
thinkers away from taking cognizance of the scene in which they are
acting or the kind of action in which they are engaged. Within the
unspoken norms of legal thought, it is not considered legitimate,
relevant, or serious to draw attention to this scene.
As you might imagine, this is an interesting recognition to
achieve at this point because the very enterprise pursued here is
precisely the sort that normative legal thought considers beyond
inquiry-illegitimate, irrelevant, and unserious. What I am writing
about in this article is thus the same thing as the resistance to what
I am writing; I am trying to reveal the network of social, cognitive,
and rhetorical forces that shape our thought and yet remain uncon-
scious. I am trying to reveal the character of the legal uncon-
scious. 243 And we have now encountered a serious blockage-an
240 See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743,786 (1987)
('Deconstruction by its very nature is an analytic tool. . . ."). For my discussion of
this cls tendency to transform postmodern thought into operative argument sources,
see Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, * supra note 5, at 1641-47.
241 See Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDozo L.
REV. 1613, 1629 (1990). I elaborate these points at greater length in Schlag, 'Le Hors
de Texte, " supra note 5.
242 See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, " supra note 5, at 1631-37.
243 Similar attempts in other fields have been undertaken:
The history of science, the history of knowledge, does not simply obey the
general law of the progress of reason; human consciousness does not
somehow retain the laws of its own history .... Beneath what science
knows of itself... ., there is something it does not know, and its history, its
future, its events, its accidents obey a certain number of laws and determi-
nations. These I have tried to bring to light. I have tried to identify an
autonomous domain . . ., that of the unconscious of science, the uncon-
scious of knowledge, which could have its own rules, much as the uncon-
scious of the human individual also has its own rules and determinations.
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unwillingness, an inability of legal thinkers to consider the scene of
their own thought even when such a move would seem at once
intellectually obvious and obviously beneficial.2 44
This blockage is easily understandable in practical terms. For
any of these approaches to question the cognitive, rhetorical, or
social scene of their own writing would immediately place in
question their present formal configuration. It would-at least from
their perspective-immediately trouble their intellectual authority
and legitimacy (as these terms are currently understood). For an
economist to draw attention to the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of her discourse, or a neo-pragmatist to focus upon
the academic conventions that have produced and validated her
discourse, or a deconstructionist to destabilize the very conceptual
and nonconceptual frameworks that allow her to import deconstruc-
tion into the academy, would be to challenge the very discursive
scene that enables each of these kinds of thinkers to claim intellec-
tual authority and legitimacy in the first place. It would be, in
short, to challenge the very conceptual-institutional-rhetorical
system that allows the claims to be articulated and heard.2 45 But
while these are obvious risks, the critical reflexive turn also offers
obvious intellectual rewards. Nonetheless the reflexive turn is
virtually never taken. Why not?
The very way the question has been framed here presupposes
what is routinely presupposed in legal academic thought: that legal
thinkers (you and I) are sovereign individual subjects who choose
their own discursive positions and thought processes and announce
these positions within a self-sufficient and weightless medium of
communication, that you and I as sovereign individual subjects
make rational decisions about such questions as whether or not to
take a reflexive turn.
Now, it is precisely these pervasively sedimented assumptions
that prevent us from understanding why the critical reflexive turn
is not taken. We have thus reached that critical point in this article
where the same rhetorical constructions that disable legal thinkers
from taking the critical reflexive turn are also disabling us (you and
I) from understanding how the critical reflexive turn is not taken.
Our thought, our theater, and our selves are rhetorically construct-
L. FERRY & A. RENAULT, supra note 80, at 6-7 (quoting Interview with Michel Foucault
MAGAZINE LrITTRAIRE, Mar. 1, 1968).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 224-42.
245 See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 5.
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ed so that the critical reflexive turns become (virtually) unthinkable.
The very form and practice of our thought already establishes us as
such competent conversants in an already rational and rationally
legitimated discourse-as such relatively autonomous, coherent,
integrated, rational, as originary, individual subjects-that, for the
most part, we are simply not capable of even entertaining the
requisite doubts to investigate how we are socially and rhetorically
constructed. Indeed, even as you read this (and as I write it), it is
difficult for each of us to remember that it is the way you and I
think that is being put in question and that, therefore, at this very
moment, there is no safe external place for you or me to go to
adjudicate the truth or falsity of what is being said by recourse to
some set of pre-established, noncontroversial criteria.
We are no longer having the usual sort of stereotypical scholas-
tic conversation in which we can somehow separate our selves from
the conversation that is taking place. On the contrary, we are in a
conversation aimed at demonstrating the ways in which our rhetoric
shapes us and the way we think about legal thought. And the very
difficulty of the last paragraph is in part attributable to the fact that
the intense critical reflexive turn-the one you are experiencing
now-is quite foreign to our rhetoric. It can even be experienced as
annoying and coercive.
Indeed, as you read, you experience this conversation as an
attack on the self-your self. But that is the point: it is perfectly
understandable that you should feel assaulted. The rhetorical turn
here is leading you, the reader, to deal seriously with the question
of your own autonomy as reader. And, of course, this is not easy or
pleasant because you, as a legal thinker, have already been rhetori-
cally constructed to think of yourself as an autonomous, self-
directing, rational, choosing entity, and this text, in its very form
and rhetoric, is disturbing that self-image. It is rather rudely,
without asking your permission, leading you to question the status
of your self-image as such an autonomous entity.
Believe me, at this moment, we are most definitely not having
a rational conversation among rational autonomous choosing
entities. Rather, you are being manipulated and in a way you may
not find particularly pleasant. For even as you recognize that you
are being manipulated, you are also being reminded-even as you
read the next word of this sentence246 -that you are not the
246 Don't think you can get out of this by refusing to read any further. It won't
work. You can stop reading, but you will have serious questions about whether you
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autonomous, rational, self-directing, choosing entity you assume
yourself to be. Part of what makes this text so trying at this point
is that it is refusing to honor, even in the most superficial ways, the
conceit that the reader is a rational, self-directing, choosing subject.
And we (you and I) are so invested in and invested with that self-
image that I almost feel I should apologize to you for some breach
of some unspoken rule of author-reader courtesy. There has been
a breach of good form here. And that is because the challenge has
not been just a substantive, remote, theoretical challenge, but a
challenge to the very form and practice of the thinking of the
rational, self-directing, choosing self-your self.
If we consider this breach of good form, it becomes apparent
that my rhetorical assault on the self as rational, self-directing, and
choosing occurs right on the surface of the text, right up front, in
plain view, openly. Part of the reason I'm doing it so openly is to
demonstrate that this tacit practice, of "good form," is also the way
the rational, self-directing, choosing self has been constructed in the
first place. Indeed, your expectation as a reader is that you will be
treated with a bit more deference, respect, and courtesy. No
exhumation of some deeply buried generative structure is required
to recover the rhetorical construction of the autonomous, rational,
coherent self. Rather, the social and rhetorical construction of the
sovereign individual subject occurs under our very noses-in the
open movements of the form, the practice of our own thought.
We don't notice this process of social and rhetorical construc-
tion of the self, not because it is deep and far removed from the
everyday, but because our rhetoric is itself structured to suppress
such inquiry, because it is our process, form, and practice not to
pursue inquiries into the process, form, and practice of our own
thought. Indeed, we (you and I) as legal thinkers are constructed
and reconstructed as sovereign individual subjects even at the
moments when the sovereign individual subject would seem to be
most at risk-when we are reckoning with conventionalism, social
constructivism, deconstruction, and the like.
Indeed, even when legal thinkers come close to recognizing that
the individual subject may well be a vastly overstated rhetorical,
cognitive, or linguistic construction, nonetheless the very form of
their thought succeeds in situating their selves and the selves of
decided to stop reading or whether the obnoxiousness of these paragraphs made you
stop.
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their readers outside this recognition.2 47  In fact, it is just that
tension-between the recognition that the self is socially and
rhetorically constituted and the conflicting one that the self remains
autonomous-that leads to the phenomenon I have called the
relatively autonomous self.2 48 In the end, while this self concedes
both its own autonomy and its social construction, it is autonomy,
rationality, etc., that come out on top.
Inasmuch as we are constructed as sovereign individual subjects,
the very idea of troubling the process, form, and practice of our
own thought simply does not, and often cannot, occur to us. And
insofar as it doesn't occur to us, it becomes our process, form, and
practice not to inquire into the process, form, and practice of our
thought. If we t'ake a look at the field of legal thought, it is
apparent that it is already constructed in our own image. The very
process, form, and practice of legal thought systematically situates
both author and reader in a rhetorical field that represents itself as
an already extant, self-sufficient, virtually complete mode of rational
discourse-just waiting to be put to good use by sovereign individual
subjects (conversant in the field).2 49 The rhetoric constructs both
reader and author as the beneficiaries of an already constituted,
nonproblematic, nonparadoxical, already rationalized mode of
argumentative strategies, reasoning moves, and the like-not just as
a potential, but as an already realized, already in place, first-best
world2 50 of reasoning and communication.251
This, in a sense, is the crowning success of Enlightenment
epistemology. But there is an ironic twist: Enlightenment rationali-
ty has become so successfully engrained in our processes, forms,
and practices that (ironically) we have (almost) completely lost the
quintessentially Enlightenment capacity to question, to criticize our
processes, forms, and practices themselves.2 52  So in another
247 See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, "supra note 5; Schlag, supra note 223.
24' The relatively autonomous self is a constructed self that concedes that it is
socially and rhetorically constituted yet maintains its own autonomy to decide just
how autonomous it may or may not be. See Schlag, supra note 91, at 44.
249 I.e., legal academics.
250 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
25' For instance, even the more sophisticated responses to cls claims of contradic-
tion and indeterminacy (not to mention a few cls presentations themselves) assume,
in their own form, the existence and the operational effectiveness of an already
constructed, rational, and shared discursive framework that will allow us to decide
whether the cls claims are right or not. See, e.g., Stick, supra note 84, at 332, 385-401.
But, of course, it is precisely the status of such "serious" frameworks that cls thought
puts in question.
252 To put it plainly, if somewhat misleadingly: we have come to believe in our
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sense, the rationality of the Enlightenment has become so success-
ful, so hegemonic that it has become immobilized through its own
institutionalization. 253 The Enlightenment commitments to rea-
son, to criticism, and to rebellion against unreasoned convention
have themselves become firmly embedded as a barely visible, largely
unquestioned, almost unquestionable convention.
Indeed, the process of rational thought is notjust pervasive, but
self-reinforcing. The taken-for-granted sense that this rational
discourse is already self-sufficient and adequate to the task of legal
thought in turn authorizes the deprivileging of form. There is no
particular reason to examine the form of legal thought in any
serious way because the form of legal thought is already assumed to
be adequate for its purposes and to be within the control of
relatively autonomous subjects. The form within which legal
thought is produced is considered to be weightless and inconse-
quential, such that the vocabulary and grammar of legal discourse
are assumed to be adequate and sufficient to allow any important
or legitimate substantive message to get through. In consequence,
what is considered central, crucial, and important in legal thought
is almost invariably conceptualized as substance. Hence, even on
the rare occasions when form is made the primary focus of inquiry,
it is only after form has been reconceptualized in terms of the
categories of substance. Inquiry into form-in the sense of inquiry
into the formative framework within which legal thought is
produced-remains, at this point, largely beyond the possibilities of
contemporary legal thought.
Inasmuch as it is substance, and not form, that matters, legal
thought also privileges outcomes at the expense of process. Legal
thought is supposed to materialize into outcomes and, thus, process
is supposed to be subservient to the attainment of that goal. This
privileging of outcome at the expense of process is a mimesis of the
representation of legal discourse as an already-in-place, self
sufficient, shared, rationalized mode of discourse ready for deploy-
ment by a relatively autonomous subject: insofar as the process of
rationalist discourse is already established as satisfactory, the only
action in legal thought lies in the deployment of this system to
produce outcomes-hence the usual fixation of legal thought on the
own rationality, in a fundamentalist manner; we have come to believe it implicitly, in
a manner that goes without saying, in every saying.
253 Correspondingly, those persons most seriously committed to reason and to
thinking are likely to be those most typically identified as irrational or nihilistic.
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production of "ideas," "theories," "positions," "models," and other
such conventionally reified terminal thought-analogues.
Inasmuch as the goal of legal thought is to produce (substantive)
outcomes, in what is admittedly an ongoing process, theory must
already be in a position to regulate practice. This is implicit in the
assumption that legal discourse is already a self-sufficient and
rationalized field of discourse enabling relatively autonomous
subjects to control their own thinking. Hence, in legal thought,
theory is routinely depicted as being in control of or as informing
practice. Indeed, theory is very often depicted as the source of
constraint or restraint on legal interpretation, 254 the source of
normative outcomes, and the generative origin of substantive
intellectual visions.
255
The privileging of substance over form, outcome over process,
and theory over practice is recursive. The rationality of legal
thought, the sovereignty of the relatively autonomous subject, are
preserved because that which could potentially destabilize them is
always already relegated to the excluded or marginalized region of
the subordinate term (i.e., form, process, practice) and, thus,
immediately put beyond view or subjected to control. Yet, this
establishment of the field in terms of a privileging of theory over
practice, substance over form, and outcome over process is itself
excluded from view because the work of field-definition (exclusion)
is itself performed in the excluded regions. It is our practice to
deprivilege our practice. It is our form not to inquire into our
form. It is our process not to question the process of our thought.
It is not just that we (you and I) think this way. We are this way.
Sometimes this hierarchy of privileging and deprivileging
acquires a form that is (virtually) absolute, as in the recursive
inability of legal thought to inquire into its own practice in any
serious way. But it is important to understand that the privileging/
deprivileging will usually take many forms at once, some of which
254 Hence, many legal thinkers who have pre-occupied themselves with questions
ofjudicial review or the indeterminacy debates have assumed that the only kind of
meaningful restraint on judicial behavior is either in explicit theories or in articulable
standards. See e.g., Fiss, supra note 15, at 744-46 (describing how "disciplining rules"
provide standards which constrain judicial interpretation).
255 See e.g., Perry, Why Constitutional Theoy Matters to Constitutional Practice (and
Vice Versa), 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 231, 248-49 (1989) (noting that a "constitutional
theory is an effort to justify a constitutional practice-to justify, that is, a particular
interpretive style/judicial role" and necessarily includes arguments about the good
of the resulting practice).
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are far from absolute.256 And it also important to understand
that any piece of legal thought often partakes of a plurality of
relations among the privileged and deprivileged terms at once, as
the following list suggests:
Substance, outcome, Form, process, and















It is easiest and most helpful to think of this list as describing
"default positions." This expression implies that we (you and I) can
depart from these discursive settings, but that it takes both thought
and work to do so. The default positions are most powerful and
most difficult to abandon precisely when they are set in those
sectors that have been marginalized and are decidedly difficult to
recover and examine: our process, form, and practice.
Now, even if one reads this possibly dualistic chart in the
appropriately pluralistic spirit (as I have been trying to encourage),
it still seems difficult to believe that such a simple layout could
accurately describe the generative structure of our own (ostensibly
complex, refined, and sophisticated) legal thought. Not only is this
description an unflattering, if not insulting, vision, but it also seems
improbable that legal thought itself could systematically reduce to
such simple patterns. I have four answers to this reaction-the last
of which is probably the most important.
First, this reaction is in some sense right. This dualistic account
(for all its pluralism) is inadequate in some way as an account of the
256 1 illustrate the ways in which dualist representations of our thought are already
very much pervaded by the decentering effects of pluralism in Schlag, supra note 7,
at 962-63.
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generative structure of our legal thought. It cannot be an ultimate
account because it is very likely informed by a discursive structure
that is itself inadequate or incomplete.
Second, this account does get something right. When we engage
in legal thought, we almost invariably find ourselves situated in the
left hand terms, usually trying very hard to distinguish our selves
and our thought from the right hand terms. We (virtually) never
write legal thought from a position that recognizes our situation as
one that is passive, enclosed, accessorial, derivative, mere effect, or
appearance. At times, we may think those things, but even if we
should think those things, our rhetoric will disable us from saying
them.
Third, I acknowledge both the resonance of this dualistic
structure within our legal thought as well as its inadequacy as an
ultimate account. What is being described here is the generative
structure of our legal thought as we run up against it-from
positions still organized to some extent by the default positions of
contemporary legal thought.25 7 We are encountering a blockage
that has effectively prevented inquiry into the process, form, and
practice of our legal thought. It is a recursive rhetorical blockage
(hence, unsatisfactory), yet also very much our blockage (hence,
resonant and true).
Fourth, it is striking just how much this blockage turns out to be
our blockage. This is striking, but not surprising: what is described
here (so unappealingly) as a blockage coincides with what was
earlier described (much more charitably) as normative legal thought.
And, of course, this is not accidental: one of the most significant
effects of normative legal thought is precisely to reproduce the
rationalist rhetoric-as well as the sort of self that recursively
reproduces that rationalist rhetoric.
Consider the relation of the rationalist rhetoric to the character
of normative legal thought.258 This earlier description of norma-
tive legal thought, and our previous understanding of how norma-
tive legal thought hopes to accomplish its ends, is actually quite
consonant with the rationalist rhetoric I have just described. Such
257 This is simply a description, a pattern that seems to dominate contemporary
legal thought, but has just become visible in this writing in a movement that begins
to displace the sovereign individual subject and dissolve the systemic deprivileging of
inquiry into the process, form, and practice of our own thought.
25 And consider the paradigmatic form of normative legal thought described
earlier, supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
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a rationalist rhetoric is precisely the sort of generative discursive
environment in which we would expect normative legal thought to
thrive, and it is precisely the sort of rhetorical framework that we
would expect normative legal thought to establish, entrench, and
maintain. This reciprocal constitution of normative legal thought
and rationalist rhetoric, this consonance and mutual entailment, is
evident in various ways.
It is apparent that virtually all aspects of normative legal thought
are suited to the rhetorical reproduction and maintenance of the
sovereign individual subject. As Charles-Fried put it, "[b]efore there
is morality there must be the person. We must attain and maintain
in our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to
posit choosing, valuing entities-free, moral beings."259  This
insistence of normative legal thought on the importance of a
morally competent, normative subject is quite consonant with the
rhetorical construction of the legal thinker as a sovereign individual
subject. Indeed, this rationalist rhetorical construction is at once a
prefigurement and the entailment of what Fried calls "choosing,
valuing entities-free moral beings."
The normative enterprise of norm-selection and norm-justification,
with their emphases on choice orientation, value orientation, and
prescription, is keenly suited to keeping the sovereign individual
subject in the driver's seat. Likewise, the single-norm, conclusion-
oriented character of legal thought, with its fixation on end-products
and its requirements that these end products be non-paradoxica4
non-contradictory, complete, seyf-sufficient, discrete, separable, and trans-
situational, is conducive to deflecting any serious interrogation of
either the rhetorical practices, forms, or processes that constitute
the sovereign individual subject or his rhetorical enterprise: Hence,
we are drawn toward the meticulous dissection and examination of
what the legal subject has produced and whether these end-products
have been produced in the right (non-contradictory, non-paradoxi-
cal, linear, authority-driven) way. And in turn, this orientation
draws attention away from the legal subject who is producing all this
stuff in the first place.
260
The action-deferring and reader-centered character of normative
legal thought likewise ensure that no serious challenge is posed to
the identity or character of the sovereign individual subject. The
259 Fried, TheLawyerasFriend The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1068-69 (1976).
260 See Schlag, supra note 223.
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texts of normative legal thought are supposed to have their effect
by appealing to the choice and the intellectual faculties of the
reader. The texts are supposed to honor the reader's already pre-
formed views, ideas, prejudices, and aesthetic representations of
social and political life. There is to be no overt disabling or
subversion of her identity or role. For instance, within the rational-
ist rhetoric of contemporary legal thought, it is permissible to write
articles about Derridean deconstruction of legal thought-but to
actually practice Derridean deconstruction will simply evoke
resistance, misunderstanding, and incomprehension. The expecta-
tion is that any author will, of course, explain and justify any
significant departure from the default positions and will refrain
from any rhetorical exercise that might actually require active
change on the part of the reader.
Finally, the adversarial advocacy orientation of normative legal
thought-which is attributable, at least in part, to the conflation of
the role of lawyer and legal academic-does much to insulate the
sovereign individual subject and its rhetorical supports from
scrutiny. Because so many legal academics understand their legal
thought to be positional in character-on behalf of some (intangible,
often very worthy but poorly identified) client-surrogate, much of
legal thought is produced within the explicit context of adversarial
advocacy among academics and is devoted to advancing or defeating
this or that position. Many normative legal thinkers understand
themselves to be engaged in "passionate advocacy" on behalf of
some cause. Now admittedly, there is no tribunal listening; no one
is empowered to put all this normative passion into effect. But this
does not mean that this passionate advocacy is therefore without
effect: on the contrary, it often succeeds in bracketing any serious
questioning of the rhetorical systems that enables such aimless
passionate advocacy to be produced in the first place. Indeed, when
one is engaged in passionate arguments to an imagined tribunal, the
last thing one will do is question the argumentative structures that
allow the arguments to be framed and presented in the first place.
Not only does normative legal thought conduce to the mainte-
nance of the sovereign individual subject and his rationalist rhetoric,
but one can see the reverse process at work as well. Indeed, if
normative thought occupies so much attention in the legal academy;
if normative legal thought seems like the obvious, the "natural"
thing to do; if the "what should we do?/what should the law be?"
question seems so legitimate, so important; and if normative legal
thought seems veritably like law itself, it is because the rhetorical
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situation-the default settings-have already enabled us, constituted
our discourse, and configured our roles so that we will produce
normative legal thought.
Think about it this way: suppose that, contrary to my intima-
tions, you really are a sovereign individual subject. Suppose further
that you already are in communication through an undistorted
medium of communication (known as law) with other very powerful
sovereign individual subjects (otherwise known as judges and legal
academics). Suppose as well that all sovereign individual subjects
(includingjudges and legal academics) are not only receptive to, but
obliged to follow rational argument-to put theory in charge of
practice. Finally, suppose that these judges or academics face a
series of problems that hurt a lot of people, or waste human
resources or otherwise injure the community. Given these assump-
tions, why not engage in normative legal thought? Why do anything
else?
It is important not to underestimate the importance or the
resilience of this embedded rationalist rhetoric: it is this rhetoric
that successfully deforms not only modernist2 61 but post-
modernist2 62 thought within the legal academy. The resistance of
the rationalist rhetoric is both conscious and embedded in the very
form and rhetoric of normative legal thought. Indeed, when
confronted with challenges from modernism or postmodernism, the
recursive move of normative legal thought has been to ignore the
implications of modernism and postmodernism by encasing these
implications within its same old rationalist conceptual and rhetorical
structures. Normative legal thought treats modernism and
postmodernism as new 'substance" 263 ready for assimilation
within the same old unreconstructed rationalist rhetoric.
264
Even in sophisticated legal thought, one sees the effects of this
rationalist rhetorical structure on the reception of postmodern
261 See Schlag, supra note 34.
262 See Schiag, "Le Hors de Texte, "supra note 5, at 1636.
263 That is, as new footnotes.
264 See Schlag, supra note 34, at 1204-05. That American legal thought has failed
to internalize either modernism or postmodernism is not surprising, as both in their
own ways present a very serious critique of the individual subject. Modernism
resituates the individual subject within a totalizing force field, thus allowing the
individual subject to appear as derivative, secondary. Postmodernism explodes the
individual subject from the inside, denying the subject a unitary or coherent center.
Given modernist implosion and postmodernist explosion of the individual subject,
normative legal thought, of course has been unremittingly antagonistic and resistant
to both modernism and postmodernism.
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thought. For instance, consider Robin West's recent attempts to
enlist Foucault in the service of what she calls "progressive constitu-
tionalism." She uses Foucault to underwrite the notion that
"[m]odern progressive political theory begins with a central, even
definitive, insight: conservative deference to communal authority-
whatever form it takes-directly implies a parallel deference to the
clusters of social power that invariably underlie it."265 West then
cites various works by Foucault.266 But West's point is not Fou-
cault's point at all. Foucault's argument is Nietzschean, not
normative, and his point is not that various social groups like
"conservatives" give deference to social power, but that social groups,
their configurations, and their identities are themselves effects of
truth/power. Robin West's use of the term "deference" implies that
conservatives are somewhere outside of social power-somewhere
sufficiently distinct and separate from social power that they can
apparently choose to defer to social power. This logic of deference
and choice is not the Foucaultian understanding, but is instead the
conventional rationalist separation of power from the categories of
truth and normativity.
West continues: "They may have power, in turn, because they
are right (and thus have survived centuries of critical inquiry) or, as
Foucault's social 'archaeologies' have aimed to reveal, they have
power for some other reason, such s that they serve the interests of
dominant social groups." 67 Again, this is not so much Foucault
as a distortion of Foucault's thought through the conventional
rationalist rhetoric of the legal academy. 268  Foucault does not
talk of social groups as having power for "some other reason," or
any "reason," for that matter. On the contrary, following the Nietz-
chean inversion, Foucault's enterprise is precisely to demonstrate
that "reason" and "reasons" are themselves the productions of pow-
er.269 So when West says "[iun any case, normative authority rests
on some form of social power," 270 she is not following Foucault
265 West, supra note 41, at 678 (emphasis added).
266 See id. at 678 n.70 (citing M. FOUCAULT, DIsCIPLINE AND PUNIsH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON (1977); M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978)).2 61 Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
268 And the intellectual source domain for this sort of conceptualization of
political or social life is much less Foucault and much more some sort of power elite
social theory. See, e.g., C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3-4 (1956).
269 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also M. FOUCAULT, POWER/
KNOWLEDGE 112 (1980).
270 West, supra note 41, at 678 (emphasis added).
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at all.271 On the contrary, it is precisely the conceptualization of
normative authority as distinctfrom and resting upon social power that
Foucault repeatedly questions.2 72 But it is not just normative
authority that West separates from social power, but the subject as
well. Hence for West, "when the conservative embraces, preserves,
respects, and defers to the teachings of communal authority, he or
she necessarily, whether or not intentionally, embraces the social
power that underlies it." 278 This is not the Foucaultian under-
standing, 274 but the envelopment, the encasement of Foucault's
thought within the channe]s of rationalist normative rhetoric.
Ironically, this is precisely the sort of intellectual-institutional
effect of truth/power that would have interested Foucault himself.
271 These sorts of rationalist renditions of Foucault are not isolated incidents:
they are patterned products of the routine normative rhetoric.
"[I]t is indicative of the epidemic character of the individual-as-reality-syndrome
that even critical legal authors who are deeply influenced by Foucault's ideas and
enthusiastically take over his political messages plainly refuse to draw the epistemolo-
gical consequences." Teubner, supra note 144, at 731. For a discussion of the ways
in which Derridean deconstruction has sustained the same rationalist distortion, see
Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 5, at 1636-47.
272 I understand that someone could say, "where do you stand to say all this?" and
try to get me involved in some sort of performative contradiction (i.e., the ultimate
in status degradation in the philosophy department of your choice).
I have a few partial observations. The performative contradiction objection is
currently taken in the legal academy to be a real killer move. But this move often
imagines itself as resting on a secure foundation of knowledge, some a priori
understanding of the form that intellectual activity should or must or does take. It
also usually imagines (sometimes quite erroneously) that the truth games of the
interlocutor (the questioner) and of the speaker (me) are the same-and that we stand
relative to truth on the same epistemic footing or lack thereof. Elsewhere, I've
suggested that these kinds of assumptions are products of a kind of disciplinary
solipsism. See Schlag, Normative end Nowhere to Go, supra note 5, at 181.
I think the performative contradiction move is itself an exercise of power whose
main effect is to police the bounds of intellectual inquiry in a way that reproduces the
same old homeostatic matrices of rationalist thought. You'll notice that part of what
I've done here is pull the same sort of reflexive move back on the hypothetical
objection: "Where do you stand to ask where do you stand?" I don't want to dismiss
the problem or the question of the performative contradiction. At the same time, I
must admit that I am not nearly as troubled by it as I am apparently supposed to be.
When people say, "well where can you go, what can you say if you are engaged
in a performative contradiction?," I want to say, "where don't you go, what don't you
say, if you are constantly avoiding performative contradictions?" If truth is
understood, however tacitly, as representation, then performative contradiction is a
problem. If truth, however, is a revealing, then the performative contradiction move
loses a great deal of its bite.
273 West, supra note 41, at 678.
274 See Teubner, supra note 1414, at 735 ("The human subject is no longer the
author of the discourse. Just the opposite: the discourse produces the human subject
as a semantic artifact." (citation omitted)).
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It is interesting precisely because it is emblematic of the reception
extended by normative legal thought to most modernist or post-
modernist work. Within normative legal thought, the postmodern
de-centering 75 of the self is immediately transformed from what
might be described as an activity, or engagement, or process into a
"thesis," a "position," an "idea"-a "theory," in short, into the very
sort of intellectual entity already so stabilized and so encased in the
rationalist object-form that "it" is guaranteed to leave the self of the
normative legal thinker and the very form of his thought unchal-
lenged and undisturbed.
In this way, normative legal thought continues to play well in the
academy: we have all already been constructed as actors in the
theater of the rational. The setting is in place, the parts are written,
and it's all so convincing that far from questioning the scene, we
have forgotten that it is theater we were trying to do. And, of
course, now, having lost our bearings (almost) entirely, it is theater
that is doing us: "What should we do?" "Where should we go?"
VI. THE POLITICS OF FORM
What are the politics of normative legal thought? Political stasis
and intellectual syndicalism. One of the consequences of the
dominance of the normative, its positive prescriptive aspect, and its
value orientation is that legal thinking becomes subordinated to
political value commitments. I am not saying that legal thought has
now become politicized in contrast to some imagined, prior period
where legal thought was supposedly free from politicization.
Rather, the claim is that legal thought has now become politicized
along some rather static, fairly blunt, and normatively oriented
lines.
For instance, consider this familiar division of the field: law and
economics, mainstream doctrinalism, liberal legal theory, feminist
jurisprudence, cls. Virtually each of these groups of legal thinkers
depicts its situation and its intellectual approach as embattled-as
engaged in a struggle for the direction of law. This configuration
of the jurisprudential field is quite familiar to all of us. I could call
it "premature politicization" or "the politics of nostalgia." I am
going to call it both.
275 Not to mention the modernist interrogation.
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A. Premature Politicization
The field configuration seems to be a kind of premature
politicization in the sense that it leaps from a now relatively widely
shared notion that law is politics to a shallow, yet apparently utterly
definitive, conceptualization of politics. The notion that law is
politics has de facto taken on the sense that law is informed by
normative value choice and normative value commitments. The
jurisprudential field then becomes organized around this largely
archaic understanding of politics as the value choice of individuals
about how the legal or political order ought to be constituted. The
left, the liberals, and the conservatives of the academy then come to
be defined in terms of their value choices, their value orientations,
or their stances on the importance of making value choices. This
is not confined to the intellectual plane, but has become the
hegemonic regime within which the production of legal thought
occurs. This politicization is premature in the sense that its operant
understanding of politics has yet to encounter the current forms
and practices of power. 'The pathways, the directions, and the
effects of power are rarely, if ever, subordinate to "value choic-
es." 
2 76
B. The Politics of Nostalgia
I am tempted to call this the politics of nostalgia as well, because
every political group in the legal academy wants to present itself in
terms of some worthy political tradition with strong resonant
symbols-some tradition that has long since lost any sense of
effectiveness. For example, the left in legal thought engages in a
certain celebration of old and new left ideas and personages.
Occasionally cls-ers will identify themselves as intellectual guerrillas,
or even compare themselves to insurrectionary figures like
Che. 2 7 7  Even if we put aside these few instances of political
romanticization, much of cls thought nonetheless remains inspired
by a drive to repeat, revive, and reenact the politics of the Sixties.
If this political self-identification seems a bit out of touch
currently, conservatives and liberals fare no better. Liberals still
draw their inspiration consciously (or at this point, more likely sub-
consciously) from a political text that must read a lot like A Theory
276 Schlag, supra note 223.
277 See, e.g., Binder, On Critical Legal Studies As Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1, 1
(1987) (likening cls legal thinkers with approval to guerilla fighters).
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of Justice.278 By and large, they are still writing articles for the
Warren Court (or wishing they could). They still think of the great
political problems of the age in terms of the individual versus the
community.2 7 9 What the liberals fail to notice is that while they
are talking about the individual versus community, the reproduction
and extension of bureaucratic practices routinely traverses back and
forth across the public/private distinction without giving that
venerable liberal distinction a moment's thought-thereby extin-
guishing ab initio the liberal version of both individualism and
community. It turns out that being a liberal means that you worry
a great deal about getting just the right combination of individual
freedom and community, while getting neither.
As for conservatives, they have this absolutely uncanny capacity
to arrive on the scene way too late. Conservatives always appear
bearing the gifts of tradition and the past, asking us to conserve
these gifts and thereby preserve our communities,2 8 0 and perhaps
even our very identities. 28 1 It is no doubt pleasant to stand up in
support of worthy traditions and the great constructions of the past,
but conservatives almost always forget that access to the past is
always and already mediated by the present. And in our present,
there is not a great deal left to conserve, and not too many social
practices that will help conserve whatever is worth conserving. We
live, as Baudrillard suggests, in an epoch of simulation: simulated
culture, simulated intellectual life, and for conservatives, perhaps
most vexingly, simulated conservatism. 28 2 And the simulations
have almost already lost their ability to refer back to the "real
thing."
What I am claiming here is that within the legal academy (and
perhaps outside as well), not only the political programs, but the
political identities of the left, liberals, and conservatives, are now
very much in question. The left-cls glorification of the Sartrean
individual subject helps produce a self that in its high Sartrean
moments recognizes its own absolute freedom, 283 but that for the
2'78 SeeJ. RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
279 See Symposium on The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
280 See M. OAKESHoTr, RATIONALISM IN POLmCS AND OTHER ESSAYS 169 (1962).
281 See Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066 (1990) ("We
must respect the past because the world of culture that we inherit from it makes us
who we are.... We must, if we are to be human beings at all, adopt toward the past
the custodial attitude Burke recommends.").2 82 SeeJ. BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS i (1983).
283 Seej. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 573, 616-17, 625-26 (1956).
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rest of the day is shaped and driven by precisely the same market-
bureaucratic practices that conservatives and liberals are also
helping to establish, expand, and entrench.8 4 Liberal humanism,
with its insistence on legalicizing all aspects of social intercourse
through its "rights" rhetoiric, is in effect imposing a politically
correct, totalitarian sameness on everyone. They can be called
"rights," but that does not immunize them from becoming a kind of
bureaucratic social control device. The conservative call seeks to
preserve "our" traditional values, but because it is late, it helps
entrench precisely the sort of market-bureaucratic state that has
already rationalized, regimented, and effaced those values.
In this way the "value orientation" hegemony of legal thought
does promote a kind of political stasis. Indeed, in the maintenance
of this value orientation hegemony there is a great deal of uncon-
scious complicity among the various groups. Conferences, collo-
quia, and symposia are typically arranged along the usual normative
break-lines among the camps such that all camps have to be
represented. The militancy of each group serves to police and
regiment not only its own forces, but, ironically, the forces of the
other camps as well. There is a tremendous degree of intellectual
and political reductivism among all groups. What we get is a kind
of intellectual syndicalism, in which the jurisprudential order is
maintained and the intellectual or research agenda is stabilized by
an ironic yet tacit agreement among openly antagonistic parties.
No one chooses this state of affairs. The old intellectual elites
are burdened with the call of an onerous political responsibility to
their followers. They regret the l6ss of intellectual freedom. The
young intellectual elites are burdened with honoring (or honoring
in the breach) conceptual systems, intellectual styles, and political
stances that they do not believe and no longer find useful. In the
name of scholarship, dialogue, thought, academic freedom, political
responsibility, moral responsibility, seriousness, etc., we have an
academic regime that induces massive amounts of repression and
284 As Foucault observed:
What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form
of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom. I think that
there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our
future than we can imagine in humanism as it is dogmatically represented
on every side of the political rainbow: the Left, the Center, the Right.
Martin, Truth, Power, Self An Interview With Michel Foucault (Oct. 25, 1982), in
TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 9, 15 (L. Martin,
H. Gutman & P. Hutton eds. 1988); see also Schlag, supra note 223.
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compelled production. Most of contemporary legal thought is
currently the outgrowth (one way or another) of bureaucratic
domination.
C. Slippage and Resonance
Precisely how is this system of normative legal thought main-
tained? The question has a certain bite here because the conven-
tional, benign answers upon which normative legal thought sustains
itself are no longer available. On the contrary, my claim is that the
prescriptions of normative legal thought rarely produce any signifi-
cant effects-except to provide the occasion for the reproduction
and reinscription of the rationalist aesthetic, its rhetorical organiza-
tion of law and social life, and indeed our very selves.
Thus, the claim is not that normative legal thought is without
effect, but that the politics of normative legal thought are not what
normative legal thought imagines them to be: its politics are in the
process, the practice of its construction, and the form of its
dissemination. Thus, it is only a little ironic that I will close by
examining beginnings-how normative legal thought constructs itself
and the theater of the rational.
As I have tried to show, the very ways that normative legal
thought repeatedly reinscribes itself are also the ways it insulates
itself from challenges. This is a politics ofform that establishes itself
through the related processes of slippage and resonance. These
processes are difficult to describe because they are themselves the
processes that produce the stabilized matrix of legal thought that
enables us to think as we do. Hence, to attempt to locate or define
such processes (slippage and resonance) within the usual established
categorical matrices would be to confuse these processes with their
effects.
It turns out, however, that we already have some familiarity with
slippage and resonance. Slippage has been going on throughout
this article. We witnessed slippage earlier when I claimed that the
dualism of descriptive/normative thought slides into legal
formalism/realism, which, in turn, slides into the dualism of
technical doctrinalism/moralist jurisprudence. 2 5 Slippage is the
slide of the same force (and the reproduction of the same effects)
across our sedimented and reified conceptual structures; it is a kind
of transposition that occurs unconsciously. Slippage is intellectual.
285 See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
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Slippage is what occurs when L.A. Law, the television program,
becomes a metaphor for law practice (L.A. Law's Empire), then the
rhetorical vehicle for a dermonstration of how legal argument does
its work, and then finally a stage setting for an aesthetic evaluation
of normative jurisprudence. Slippage is rhetorical. Slippage is also
what occurs throughout this article when the footnotes constantly
shift the grounds and context from philosophy to sociology, from
fiction to truth, from low culture to high culture, and so on.
Slippage is cultural. Moreover, slippage is what happens throughout
this article, when it is read as one continuous movement from a
politics that claims to be a politics of substance, of values, of theory,
and of results to what in this section turns out to be the politics of
form. Slippage is political. Slippage is the diagonal transversal
movement of the same force (and the same effects) across the
conventional reified sectors that mark our world-sectors like the
intellectual, the rhetorical, the cultural, and the political. Slippage
does its work in all directions-moving from fiction to truth (and
vice versa), from the material to the ideal (and vice versa), from
reality to appearance, etc. You may have noted that slippage has
been occurring even as we read and write this paragraph.
Resonance is the echo made by what slippage has inscribed. If
slippage has been pervasive, then there will be a great deal of
resonance. For instance, if the distinction between formalism and
realism or rules and standards seems important or true, it is because
these distinctions resonate virtually everywhere. If the dichotomies
usually associated with Plato (fiction/truth, ideal/material, reality/
appearance) resonate, it is because these dichotomies have been
inscribed pervasively in our philosophy, in our rhetoric, in the
indexing systems of libraries, 286 and in the definition of the
jurisdiction of the intellectual disciplines and subdisciplines that
have organized themselves around these dichotomies.2 8 7  Reso-
nance describes that part of the rhetorical organization of this
article where each part echoes the others in different ways.
286 See Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical
Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (1989).
287 Hence, moral philosophy typically brackets power. Political science typically
studies power by bracketing the ethical. Psychology typically studies the individual
by bracketing the social. There is a lot of bracketing going on throughout the
university. This disciplinary bracketing is not nearly as simple, as two-dimensional,
or as clean, as this footnote make:; it out to be-but I think the point has been made,
at least sufficiently to resonate.
THE POLITICS OF FORM
Slippage and resonance cannot do their work when they meet
up with resistance. For instance, as we saw earlier, neo-pragmatism,
deconstruction, and comparative institutional analysis are all
arrested by the resistance of the rationalist rhetoric and the
disciplinary defenses of the sovereign individual subject. Each of
these jurisprudential approaches could beneficially undertake
inquiries into its own situation, but the rationalist rhetoric is
stronger, and slippage is arrested. Resistance has been present as
a strategy here as well. The attempt to put Dworkin and normative
legal thought on L.A. Law is a clear example of resistance because
it is clear to everyone that Dworkin and normative legal thought
won't take on L.A. Law.
Slippage, resonance, and resistance by themselves have no
conventional moral or political value. They organize the world and
our selves and allow us to operate in ways that are sometimes
helpful and sometimes not. I have tried to demonstrate how these
processes work, and I have invoked them to show just how powerful
they are. Now that the conceptual structures of these processes is
explicit, I want to show how they help construct, stabilize, and order
our legal and social world. I understand this construction, stabiliza-
tion, and ordering to be the politics of form. This is a politics, of
course, that does not leave much room for the legal academy's
current normative thought as a politically meaningful enterprise. So
it goes.
D. Nesting
One of the classic ways the normative rhetoric extends and
insulates itself from displacement is "nesting." In this nesting
process, views, forces, and phenomena that could potentially
destabilize the system of normative rhetoric are reconfigured within
the rationalist form so that their disruptive potential is neutralized.
We have already seen this process at work with neo-pragmatism,
comparative institutional economics, and deconstruction: neo-
pragmatism becomes formalized as a set of ideas, theories, or
approaches to be applied; comparative institutional economics is
deployed from a purportedly supra-institutional vantage point; and
deconstruction becomes transformed into a set of operationalized
techniques. In each case the various approaches are in effect
reconfigured within the rationalist normative rhetoric and thereby
stripped of their destabilizing potential. In effect, whatever is
admitted within normative legal thought becomes encapsulated or
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enveloped within the rationalist rhetoric in a way that ensures
compatibility.
One effect of this rationalist nesting process is to neutralize
challenges to the orthodox), by representing the challenges in much
less salient or threatening forms-a kind of jurisprudential inocula-
tion. 28 8 Hence, for instance, the social construction of the subject
is often represented as an idea the normatively-constructed
sovereign individual subject can accept or reject without having to
confront it as the truth of her being. Likewise, deconstruction is
represented as supporting a form of radical individual subjectivism
that turns out to be at once untenable and politically harmless, or
as a set of argumentative techniques that can be wielded at any time
for any reason by any individual subject. The price of acceptance
for any destabilizing intellectual movement in the legal academy is
a kind of self-deformation in which the movement conforms to the
existing matrices of the dominant rationalism.
Not surprisingly, the effects of this rationalist nesting process
are not confined to the intellectual plane. The very process of
continuous and repetitive rationalist nesting of so many disparate
intellectual currents reconfirms the universality of rationalism, and
thus entrenches rationalism cognitively and rhetorically. Rational-
ism becomes the universal mode of discourse, confirming its validity
each time it admits (and covertly neutralizes) the disruptive
potential of any new approach.
Its success and its embeddedness ensure that only those modes
of thought most amenable to the rationalist form will be integrated
into legal discourse. It is no accident that of the various inter-
disciplinary approaches to legal thought, the most successful have
been those most rigorously formalized in the rationalist image:
micro-economics and American-Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy.
Even within the ostensibly destabilizing influences that comprise cls
thought-neo-Marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, deconstruc-
tion-the most successful strains of contestatory thought have been
those most configured in the image of rationalism: structuralism
and Sartrean existentialism.
289
288Jamie Boyle provides a good example of this inoculation strategy in his
description of H.L.A. Hart's attempt to protect legal thought from the realist
indeterminacy arguments. See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 711 (1985).
289 Indeed, the main folk-intellectual inspiration informing cls thought is the
opposition of structuralism and existentialist phenomenology. Jamie Boyle aptly
describes the ways in which the cls attempts to pursue one of these lines of inquiry
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This rationalist nesting process works on basic descriptions or
understandings of social reality as well as on intellectual approach-
es-it is, for instance, one way by which legal thinkers and their legal
thinking are abstracted from the complexities of L.A. Law's Empire.
We have already seen this abstraction at work. L.A. Law's Empire's
complicated mass of differentiated relations among power, truth,
rationality, deceit, and rhetoric is reconfigured by abstracting the
various relations through and into a rationalist form.290 Regulari-
ties are identified, relations are established, and the field of
regularities and relations becomes stabilized as if it were the
controlling schema governing the occurrences on L.A. Law's Empire.
Once this rationalist schema of relations becomes emancipated
from its social context, it becomes cognitively and rhetorically
embedded. The complicated mass of differentiated relations of
power, truth, rationality, deceit, and rhetoric are represented as
organized in accordance with the network of rationalist relations.
As a result, while recognized as important components, power,
deceit, and rhetoric are nonetheless represented and encapsulated
as isolated instances (very often deviations) subordinate to the
overarching and controlling framework of rationality.
This sort of abstraction and stabilization of the social field is
believable (and believed) because rationality does in fact have some
connection to the social field; there is some resonance. Moreover,
because the rationalist framework becomes cognitively and rhetori-
cally embedded as a discursive formation, those in whom it has
inevitably leads to consideration of the other. See id. at 740-44; see also Schlag, supra
note 223.
This is no accident: structuralism and existentialist phenomenology lead to each
other precisely because they are complementary parts of the same flawed subject-
object map-that which has channeled virtually all thinking in the American legal
academy since its inception. See Schlag, supra note 223. According to this view, ds
thought is the most advanced expression of a flawed conception of subject-object
relations. What Bourdieu says of Lvi-Strauss seems easily applicable to orthodox cls
thought:
The main thing is that Lvi-Strauss, who has always ... been locked within
the alternative of subjectivism and objectivism, cannot see the attempt to
transcend this alternative as anything other than a regression to subjecti-
vism. He is, like so many other people, a prisoner of the alternative of
individual versus social phenomena, of freedom versus necessity, etc., and
so he cannot see in the attempts being made to break away from the
structuralist "paradigm" anything other than so many returns to an
individualist subjectivism and thus to a form of irrationalism ....
P. BOURDIEU, supra note 1, at 62.
290 See supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
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become embedded lose the ability to understand the social field in
any other way. For legal thinkers, the rationalist aesthetic soon
becomes all there is. This is why critiques of rationalism like the
one offered here (or, indeed, the modernist and postmodernist
assaults on rationalism) are so often apprehended and experienced
as threatening, as signaling a total loss of order and meaning, as
nihilistic.
Once the rationalist aesthetic becomes cognitively and rhetori-
cally embedded, slippage continues from the cognitive and the
rhetorical, to the social and the professional. Indeed, to think
within the rationalist aesthetic is to acquire all the distance as a
human being from others that is implicit in the distance that
normative legal thought takes from L.A. Law's Empire. To think as
a rationalist is not just to tihink in a particular abstracted way, it is
to be one who deals with others in a particular abstracted way. The
more rationalist one's form of thought, the more one's dealings with
others is mediated by pre-figured, invariant, and sharply drawn
conceptual categories. This is why Duncan Kennedy and Mark
Kelman are correct in their observation that individuals who are
more rule-like (read here more rationalist)291 tend to favor sub-
stantively individualist regimes.
Between the rationalist rhetoric of the law-school classroom and
the ether of the eightieth floor of the Wall Street office building,
there is the process of slippage, of mimetic repetition. And, in the
end, it is the rationalist character of normative legal argument and
its self-satisfied distancing from the complexities of L.A. Law that
enables the lawyer on the eightieth floor-sharply dressed, and well-
manicured, his memoranda clean, crisp, and error-free-to save or
ruin barely known lives with magisterial detachment. These
stereotypical (but, indeed, requisite) accoutrements-the manicure,
the crisp, freshly laundered cuffed shirts, the fixation on typo-free
papers-are all vehicles and echoes of distancing between the self
and the action. In the psychoanalytic idiom, they are the vehicles
of denial that make the dirty work possible.
291 There is a certain family re.,emblance between rule regimes and rationalism.
See Schlag, supra note 34, at 1211-15. At the same time, I do not want to flatly equate
rule regimes with rationalism because standard regimes tend to be organized in highly
rationalist ways as well. That is, pro-standard legal thinking in the legal academy is
almost always very rigidly nested within second-order rule forms. That is, pro-
standard legal thinkers often tend to be (unbelievably) rule-like in their insistence for
standards.
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If the eightieth floor of the Wall Street law firm does not seem
in some sense an outrage, a grotesque episode, it is because the
eightieth floor is itself a resonance, an architectural and social
inscription of the same rationalist form of thought, cognition, and
rhetoric practiced in the law school classroom. The relation of the
eightieth floor on Wall Street to the dirty harbor indistinguishably
below, the relation of the clean white typo-free brief to the lives of
the parties, the relation of the theater of the rational to L.A. Law's
Empire, the relation of the law school classroom to life itself-these
are all the same relation. And the same relation is regularly slipping
from one sector to the other-from the intellectual to the rhetorical,
to the professional, to the social, and back again.
Rationalist forms of thought produce just the sort of rhetoric,
just the sort of "self" that enables the formation of a professional
corps of lawyers cognitively and psychologically capable of running
the sort of abstracted social coordination mechanisms known as
Wall Street law. Similarly, Wall Street law creates the sort of
stabilized, routinized, and recursive socioeconomic institutions and
practices that make the stabilized and abstracted character of
rationalist normative rhetoric possible. What we have in both cases
is a process of slippage. The rationalist form in one sector slides
(without conscious effort) into another sector, and then another,
and so on.
This process of slippage from one sector to another in turn
entails the cognitive phenomenon of resonance. If the eightieth
floor Wall Street firm seems normal to the incoming associate
rather than an outrage, it is because the relation of the eightieth
floor to the people below is a mimetic replay, an echo of the
relation of the rationalist normativity of the classroom to life itself.
The eightieth floor seems right because it resonates with the
rationalist normative rhetoric. Similarly, the rationalist normative
rhetoric seems like a helpful way to think because it resonates with
the eightieth floor.292 Resonance allows the rationalist normative
rhetoric to maintain itself. There are correspondences between
rationalist normative rhetoric and the constitution of the social
field.293 The rationalist normative rhetoric is thus not so much
292 The ability to experience (consciously or not) this kind of resonance is
considered so important to law school that the LSAT has at times tested for this
ability: "A is to B as 1 is to ?"
29 Not only does it seem as if rationalism is all there is, but slippage makes
rationalism seem to be everywhere. Indeed, as the rationalist rhetoric becomes a
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completely wrong in its conceptualization of social life as it is
systematically incomplete, overstated, and overextended.
This mimetic repetition and successive embedding of the same
rationalist normative rhetoric in different sectors of social life (the
intellectual, the professional, and the social), occurs as our attention
is focused on other matters-on prescriptions, recommendations,
substance, conclusions, theories. On the intellectual plane, one
significant effect of nesting is to colonize, defuse, and distort
destabilizing forces (such as deconstruction or postmodernism).
Nesting accomplishes its effect by admitting and reconfiguring
intellectual challenges in the rationalist format.294 The rationalist
rhetoric, however, does not replicate itself just by nesting. Some
challenges and some dislocations must simply be kept outside of the
rationalist rhetorical system altogether.
E. Border Patrol Jurisprudence: The Uses of the Inside/Outside
Distinction
Through its privileging of theory over practice and substance
over form, contemporary legal thought represents itself as "theory"








(all of which are also often represented as law).




rhetorically, and thus professionally, embedded discursive formation among legal
academics, it slips into classroom discussion and there becomes entrenched among
law students, who then become lawyers. Thus we have a continuous process of
slippage, whereby the rationalist normative rhetoric slides from an intellectual system
to a discursive formation to professional performances to cognitive and social
embeddedness.
2 Thus, for instance, before neo-pragmatism will be considered by orthodox legal
thought, its contributions must be reformulated as distinct "propositions," "ideas,"
and "theories." It must be recast in object-form artifacts that the normative rhetoric
(and normative thinkers) can recognize. See Schlag, supra note 223.




(all of which are often represented as concededly important to the
development of law, but not law itself).
When presented in this graphic manner, this either/or form of
thinking looks quite crude and unbelievable. That is because it is
crude-in the sense of basic, unrefined, and not yet mediated by
critical reflection. But while crude in these senses, this either/or
form of thinking is hardly unbelievable. On the contrary, it is
believed over and over again-even in the highest reaches of
jurisprudential thought. Indeed, this sort of either/or thinking has
a long and distinguished (albeit not always enlightened) history in
jurisprudence where it is routinely featured in the famous dichoto-
my between "the internal perspective" and "the external perspec-
tive."
295
This distinction is critical to the formation of Law's Empire and
to its insulation from L.A. Law's Empire. One of the striking things
about Law's Empire is that while it claims to be just that (i.e., Law's
Empire), the technical definition of its jurisdiction turns out to be
exceedingly narrow, almost trivial. Dworkin's exclusionary tech-
nique is utterly classic. As he is engaged in the constative enterprise
of defining the object of his inquiry, he is also engaged in the
performative enterprise of excluding unwanted complications. From
the very beginning of his book, Dworkin excludes troublesome or
potentially destabilizing considerations through a series of either/or
vacuum boundary oppositions.296 Dworkin starts his book by
announcing that he does not "discuss the practical politics of
adjudication.... [He is] concerned with the issue of law, not with
the reasons judges may have for tempering their statements of what
it is."
2 97
This is the first of what will be several major either/or opposi-
tions to come. With this one, Dworkin announces that he is
concerned with law, as opposed to the non-law and quite possibly
frivolous reasons judges may have for tempering their statements of
what the law is. Hence, Dworkin is concerned with the "real" law,
25 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-88 (1979).
2 The "vacuum boundary" notion was developed in Katz, Studies in Bounday
Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383, 383-85
(1979).
27 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 12.
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not the distortions that judges and lawyers may make of it on L.A.
Law. Dworkin continues:
My project is narrow in a different way as well. It centers on
formal adjudication, on judges in black robes .... 298
Some critics will be anxious to say ... these arguments
obscure-perhaps they aim to obscure-the important social
function of law as ideological force and witness. A proper
understanding of law as a social phenomenon demands, these
critics say, a more scientific or sociological or historical approach
This objection fails by its own standards.... Of course, law
is a social phenomenon. But its complexity, function, and
consequence all depend on one special feature of its structure.
Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena is argumenta-
tive. Every actor in the practice understands that what it permits
or requires depends on the truth of certain propositions that are
given sense only by and within the practice .... 299
Dworkin has set up a second either/or here. There is something
that is called legal practice and it is bounded: indeed, "every actor
in the practice,"-that is, any insider-knows very well that legal
propositions are given their legal sense only "within the practice."
So, one can think of law within the practice of law or outside of it.
But either way, law has an inside and an outside; it is bounded. 0 0
Dworkin does not argue this; it is simply an aesthetic consequence
of the conventional deployment of the inside/outside distinction,
or what Lakoff and Johnson call "the container metaphor." 01 It
298 Clearly, then, Dworkin does not belong on the episode of L.A. Law described
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 136-52. That episode had very little to do
with either "formal adjudication," or "judges in black robes." Note also how Dworkin
claims the center here, thereby implicitly relegating L.A. Law to the periphery.
299 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 12-13.
30 See, e.g., G. LAKoFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 29-32 (describing the
container metaphor-the establishment of inside/outside boundaries in conceptualiz-
ing events, actions, activities, and states of being). For a discussion of the container
effect in the legal context, see Winter, supra note 31, at 1150-52 (showing the links
between the container metaphor and objectivist epistemology).
301 Inasmuch as we are each embodied containers, we project our own in-out
orientation not simply on physical objects, but on the visual field itself, on events,
actions, activities, and states. See C. LAKOFF & M.JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 29-32.
Consider, for instance, the way we use the container metaphor to describe states:
he's in love; we're out of trouble now; he's coming out of the coma; I'm slowly getting
into shape; he entered a state of euphoria; he fell into a depression; he finally emerged
from the catatonic state he had been in since the end of finals week.
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is so conventional, so familiar to think that law is bounded, that it
has an inside and an outside, that one might not even notice that
something rather contestable has just been asserted.
This has been the second major either/or in less than a page.
By this point, the book begins to have some rhythm. Nothing
complex, you understand. Nonetheless, the reader is prepared to
anticipate and accept Dworkin's thought in either/or terms. And
Dworkin exploits this anticipation for he is about to formulate the
killer either/or-the one that will be ritually invoked throughout his
production to eliminate any threats to the theater of the rational or
to Law's Empire itself:
People who have law make and debate claims about what law
permits or forbids .... This crucial argumentative aspect of legal
practice can be studied in two ways or from two points of view. One
is the external point of view of the sociologist or historian ....
The other is the internal point of view of those who make the
claims.... This book takes up the internal, participants' point of
view; it tries to grasp the argumentative character of our legal
practice by joining that practice and struggling with the issues of
soundness and truth participants face. We will study formal legal
argumentfrom the judge's viewpoint.., because judicial argument
about claims of law is a useful paradigm for exploring the centra4
propositional aspect of legal practice.
302
Now as an aside, consider that on the stage of L.A. Law's Empire,
this monologue would be wildly implausible, verging on the
incoherent. On L.A. Law's Empire, judges are hardly "central" to
legal practice. And if there were a single central aspect to legal
practice, it would hardly be "propositional" in character. And as for
the issues with which the participants or the actors struggle, these
can hardly be accurately represented as "issues of soundness and
truth."
But on the theater of the rational, Dworkin's statement is
eminently plausible. Indeed, his statement is almost coterminous
with the structure of the theater of the rational itself. His either/or
establishes that one can try to make sense of legal practice from the
inside (the internal point of view) or from the outside (the external
point of view).,03 This move authorizes the author (Dworkin
here) to locate the boundary between the internal and the external
point of view in social and intellectual space. That is, it authorizes
302 R. DwoRKIN, supra note 35, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
103 With Dworkin situated in the very best place: the inside.
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Dworkin not merely to make an abstract distinction, but to allocate
the baggage of the world on one side or the other. And that, of
course, is precisely what happens. Dworkin situates (virtually)
everything that could possibly destabilize or threaten his empire on
the outside. Sociology, history, legal practice itself, the perspective
of lawyers, etc. are all already on the skids, already located on the
outside where they can have no significant disruptive effect on what
is on the inside, most notably "formal legal argument from the
judge's viewpoint ... the central, propositional aspect of legal
practice."3 0 4 In effect, the inside/outside distinction has severed
these devalued aspects of law (like sociology, history, etc.) from
Law's Empire.
This severance is made possible by another conventional effect
of the inside/outside distinction: it essentializes what is on the
inside and separates "it" from what is relegated to the outside.
3 0 5
In our case, we would expect Dworkin's rhetoric to essentialize the
internal point of view, to map out its scope and fill in its content.
But actually this has already been accomplished in the quote above.
Indeed, it is amazing how quickly Dworkin's assertion that there
actually exists an "internal point of view" to the practice of law is
reductively essentialized to the "study [of] formal legal argument
from the judge's viewpoint."3 0 6 The point so far is not that Dwor-
kin has committed some argumentative faux pas. On the contrary,
the point is to recognize that the rhetorical conventionality of the
inside/outside distinction and its derivative, the internal/external
perspective, have enabled controversial matters to be assumed into
and out of existence without being questioned.
While the internal point of view is essentialized, ,the inside/
outside distinction is performing other important rhetorical work-
important exclusionary work. Excluded from Dworkin's rendition
304 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 14.
305 As Steve Winter puts it:
Perhaps the single most identifying characteristic of the objectivist
model of rationality is the "law of contradiction" that flows from the belief
in essences.... Thus, an object either has a property or it does not. Either
a proposition or its negation must be true ....
The entire, cherished apparatus of objectivist rationality turns out to be
metaphorically structured.... [O]bjectivist categorization according to
common properties is premised on a conception of categories as metaphoric
containers.
Winter, supra note 91, at 652, 661.
306 R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 14.
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of the "internal perspective" are exactly those social features like
power, force, blind convention, history, psychology, sociology, etc.,
that would threaten his enterprise if considered.
Take sociology, for instance. Because Dworkin's deployment of
the internal/external boundary always already excludes sociology,
he can always already dismiss it as an external perspective.
0 7
Thus Dworkin does not have to consider the sociology of legal
thought, the ways in which sociological forces constrict legal
thinkers such as judges and himself. And indeed, this sort of
argument is repeated routinely throughout Dworkin's book, serving
to deflect challenges to his account of what he calls law. Yet this
marginalization of the social and the historical seems-now that we
think about it-clearly wrong. It seems clear that a competentjudge
(or legal academic) would want to think about the social and
historical location of her own thought processes.308  Why, then,
do we almost automatically believe Dworkin when he tells us that
sociology and history are part of the external perspective?
In part, it is because Dworkin is hardly the first to use the
internal/external perspective in these ways. He is following a long,
well-sedimented convention of legal thought. H.L.A. Hart, for
instance, believed that it was useful to distinguish the external point
of view of the "observer who does not himself accept" the legal
rules, from the internal point of view of the "member of the group
which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct." 09 For Hart,
the external point of view can be useful to predict the behavior of
members of the group, but it cannot reproduce "the way in which
the rules function in the lives of certain members of the
group."
10
It is precisely the embeddedness of this distinction which
routinely leads us to represent law as if it 1) has a boundary; 2) that
can be located in social/intellectual space; 3) that separates law
307 Imagine, for instance, that Dworkin's internal perspective were structured in
such a way that he or Hercules actually had to deal with the sociological relations of
LA. Law's Empire. What do Hercules and Law's Empire have to do with LA. Law?
Dworkin believes he doesn't have to answer this question because he can always
already claim that LA. Law is quite simply outside of Law's Empire. The view from
LA. Law is an external perspective that, therefore, cannot organize, disrupt, or
otherwise challenge the internal constitution of the practice called law.
308 Dworkin recognizes that the legal actor will sometimes want to examine the
historical record to the extent that some historical fact may be germane to the
litigation. See id.
309 H.L.A. HART, supra note 295, at 86.
310 Id. at 88.
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from destabilizing inquiries and knowledges; and 4) that stabilizes
the realm of law by encasing it in objectivist form. Not surprisingly,
this sedimented rationalist distinction reproduces itself automatical-
ly, without anyone questioning whether this is a useful or accurate
way of representing law. The thought of those who think about law
arises from within the sedimented intellectual practices of those
who have left their marks before. Kent Greenawalt, for instance,
writes:
In trying to develop a satisfactory account of law that appropri-
ately treats both normative and conventional elements, one can
usefully distinguish an outsider's, or sociologist's, view from that
of a participant who must actually decide what the law is. It is no
coincidence that Hart, while emphasizing the "internal point of
view" taken by officials, has been mainly interested in the former
and Dworkin the latter. Because convention looms larger in a
sociologist's view of law than a participant's, and normative
elements are more central for a participant, Hart's focus has led
him to stress convention, and Dworkin's focus has led him to
concentrate on normative evaluation.
311
There is nothing wrong with Hart focusing on convention and
Dworkin stressing normative evaluation-nothing wrong so long as
the distinction between the internal and the external perspective is
as helpful as it is cracked up to be. But it is not clear that it is.
One of the consequences of allocating the world's intellectual
baggage to one side of the dichotomy or to the other is that this
procedure eclipses some interesting questions about the connections
between sociology (Hart's focus) on the one hand and normative
evaluation (Dworkin's interest) on the other.
If one is constantly operating in a world in which these are seen
to be two different and relatively unrelated enterprises, then the
lack of connection is established and sanctified from the very
beginning. This leaves us with a sociology of law that is largely
immunized from normative argument, and a normative evaluation
that has no ready correspondence to what sociology tells us about
who we are. It leaves us, that is, precisely where we were when we
noted that the aesthetics of normative legal thought are discordant
with the aesthetics of bureaucracy that define the social sphere.
3 12
It leaves us with the awesome dissonance we earlier experienced
31' Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621,
663 (1987).
312 See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
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between Law's Empire and L.A. Law's Empire.313 And it is pre-
cisely the conventionally entrenched and normatively defended
distinction between the internal and the external perspective that
systematically enables and legitimates legal thinkers not to think
about, or even recognize, this otherwise stunning dissonance.
Moreover, this aesthetic distinction slides over into the social
field. We begin by thinking of law as bounded on aesthetic
grounds; we end up thinking of the social phenomenon of law itself
as a kind of bounded object. The problem, of course, is that
whether the social phenomenon of law is bounded is quite contro-
versial. Yet, the "aesthetic" supposition of an internal and external
perspective succeeds in presupposing this problem away; it succeeds
in establishing into existence social facts that are little more than
the predictable result of conventional metaphorical usage.
3 14
The insulation and segregation of knowledge happens at the
intellectual, cognitive, and professional levels. As Kent Greenawalt
anticipated, the intellectual/cognitive effects of the distinction
between the internal and external perspectives are translated into
professional formations/deformations. 315 Unfortunately the
professional intellectual divisions created and maintained by the
internal/external perspectives may not be particularly helpful to
serious intellectual endeavor. For example, the split between law
and social science is associated with a rather unbelievable (albeit all
too real) professional polarization. As Lawrence Friedman put it:
Probably no serious scholar clings absolutely to either one of the
two polar positions; nobody thinks that the legal system is totally
and absolutely autonomous; and nobody (perhaps) seriously puts
forward the opposite idea, that every last jot and tittle, every
crumb of law, even in the short, short run, can be and must be
explained "externally." But most lawyers, and a good many legal
scholars and theorists, tend to cluster somewhere toward the
autonomous end of the scale. Social scientists interested in law,
313 See supra notes 136216 and accompanying text.
314 Robert Summers puts it this way:
An important job for legal theorists is to develop adequate accounts of
certain general social facts of and about law, not just as a preliminary to
doing legal theory, but also as legal theory itself. Such facts must figure
directly in descriptive accounts of various general facets of law. In addition,
we could not do a lot of the normative and conceptual work in legal theory
that we now do without such facts (or such facts fairly assumed).
Summers, On Identfying and Reconstructing a General Legal Theory-Some Thoughts
Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1034 (1984).
3 5 See Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 663.
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and legal scholars with a taste for social science, tend to cluster
somewhere toward the other end .... 316
If Dworkin's invocation of the internal/external perspective
works so well, if it seems so plausible, it is in part because the
distinction resonates so well with the present configuration of the
university-the divisions of departments, disciplines, and sub-
disciplines. The sorts of distinctions that Dworkin makes are not
only professionally, but physically inscribed. The entire university
is carved up into departments that are housed in separate buildings.
This division of the university of disciplines can seem perfectly
sensible. Within each discipline and sub-discipline we have complex
formalizations that appear to be helpful, productive, and "serious."
But as one gains distance from any particular discipline or sub-
discipline and tries to make sense of the entire assembly of
disciplines and sub-disciplines, a new picture emerges. It suddenly
looks as if each discipline or sub-disciplinary group has carved up
its own jurisdiction, its own intellectual territory, so that all the truly
difficult and interesting questions, all the major intellectual
obstacles are located outside, beyond the boundaries of each
discipline and sub-discipline. From a distance, it looks as if there
is (virtually) no intellectual action to be found on the inside-just the
mindless rehearsal of disciplinary discourse moves. It looks as if the
jurisdictions have been defined so as to avoid and externalize all
intellectual challenges or dilemmas, as if the department structures
and the various disciplines and sub-disciplines have all been mapped
out so as to maximize the possibilities for formalization and to
minimize encounters with aporias, contradictions, paradox, or the
like. It looks as if the disciplines are organized to frame intellectual
problems that will minimize the necessity for any significant think-
ing.
3 17
In other words, the disciplines and sub-disciplines quite literally
organize themselves around aporias and paradoxes. They achieve a
316 Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581-82
(1989).
317 The result has been described by Heidegger:
When thought comes to an end of withdrawing from its element, it
replaces the loss by making its validity felt.., as an educational instrument
and therefore as a scholarly matter and later as a cultural matter.
Philosophy gradually becomes a technique of explanation drawn from
ultimate causes. One no longer thinks, but one occupies oneself with
"philosophy."
Heidegger, supra note 135, at 273.
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respectable formalization not because they "know" anything, but
because they are organized so that they don't have to know about
the contradictions, aporias, and paradoxes that surround them and
that effectively define and limit their intellectual jurisdiction.
As an example, consider the role of the performative contradic-
tion. Until very recently, the worst thing one could do in academic
thought was to get caught in a performative contradiction. Not
surprisingly, after decades of striving to avoid performative
contradictions, we have a sedimented academic structure and
sedimented "knowledges" all nicely arranged in discursive forma-
tions constituted to avoid performative contradictions. But after
decades of avoiding performative contradictions, there is now a new
concern: where don't you go, what do you miss, if you keep trying
to avoid performative contradictions? And, of course, there is a
political angle to all this. After all, fear of performative contradic-
tion discourages and marginalizes reflexive inquiry into the status
of our own statements and our own knowledges. Fear of perform-
ative contradiction thus has a conservative effect. And what is
conserved, of course, is the jurisdictional and structural integrity of
our knowledges. But, of course, because this integrity depends
upon such a truncated definition and establishment of the know-
ledges and the disciplines, it is almost a joke: integrity as joke.
Consider, for instance, that the jurisdiction of legal thought is
delimited largely by reference to the doctrinal pronouncements of
appellate judges. Indeed, this reductive equation of the "internal
perspective" on law with the pronouncements of the appellate judge
is at once routine and bizarre. Why should the appellate judge-
typically a passive, infrequent, thoroughly manipulated, and
generally inaccessible participant in the production of law-serve,
not just as the main, but the only referent point for "the internal
perspective?" Why not "the lawyer," "the legislator," "the bureau-
crat," "the average citizen"? And why, for that matter, should we
routinely attach so much importance to what judges think about
law?318
And there are political as well as intellectual, cognitive, and
professional effects and implications that result from the deploy-
ment of the internal/external perspective. In Dworkin's case, the
internal perspective presents an unbelievably appealing vision of
318 Can you imagine trying to make sense of the automobile market by adopting
"the internal perspective"-and then equating the internal perspective with the
dealer's point of view?
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contemporary law while relegating its less admirable aspects to the
professional oblivion of the external perspective. Thus Dworkin
begins and leaves us with a highly romanticized vision of law as an
appealing form of rational thought. This is not hard to do so long
as one, like Dworkin, is rhetorically astute in ways that we, as
participants in the theater of the rational, are already prepared to
accept.
The theater of the rational comes with its own grammar for the
suspension of disbelief; Dworkin need only hint at this theater in
order to get the audience to participate. Dworkin is very good at
this theater: he describes a minuscule fraction of the realm of law
and makes it out to be Law's Empire; rather than alerting us that the
law about which he writes is far removed from the law as it is
practiced by lawyers in late twentieth century United States,
Dworkin repeatedly invites the audience to confuse and conflate
Law's Empire with what we know to be L.A. Law's Empire.3 19 The
(not quite) final irony of this recursive rehearsal of the internal/
external perspective is that external perspective is forgotten, as the
internal perspective comes to represent everything that "really"
matters.
Meanwhile, the internal/external perspective slides well beyond
the intellectual borders of the theater of the rational.
F. The Birth of the Clinic
The reverberations of the internal/external perspective do not
stop in the genteel ether of intellectual thought. On the contrary,
the internal/external perspective is marked and echoed in the very
topography of the law school. The external, the L.A. Law stuff, is
almost always located in and sharply confined to a rigidly demarcat-
ed space. This is a space demarcated and known as "the legal
clinic." It is almost always to be found in a basement or in an
annex, or in some other peripheral, typically devalued site, located
outside the place where the main event-the traditional class-is
held.
And there should be nothing surprising about this correspon-
dence between the fancy jurisprudential dichotomy of internal/
external perspective on the one hand and the graphic, physical
separation of the traditional classroom and the clinic on the other.
The latter is simply the material inscription of the already extant
319 Dworkin, of course, is hardly alone in this.
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and ruling dichotomy between the internal and the external
perspective, a dichotomy that has already been inscribed at the
cognitive, professional, and political levels. Before the legal clinic
became a place, before the name "legal clinic" became a metonym,
it was an idea. In order to end up in a separate, peripheral, largely
devalued place, the legal clinic had to be seen as a separate,
peripheral idea-an idea separable from what goes on in the
traditional classroom.3 20  And given the standard cognitive,
professional, and political inscription of the internal/external
perspective, it was, of course, easy for law faculties to see legal
clinics as not belonging in the classroom.
Indeed, to recognize the work of the legal clinic as something
that did belong in the classroom would be to surrender professional
and political benefits already secured by the sedimentation of the
internal/external dichotomy. That is, such a recognition would
entail, for the traditional legal faculty, extensive revision of the
classroom script (a lot of hard work) and increased intellectual risk
as legal "knowledge" would be subject to the vagaries, complica-
tions, and uncertainties of actual practice (a lot of ego risk). On the
political level, to allow the clinic into the classroom would mean
that the traditional faculty would immediately have to surrender the
pleasant political fantasy that they are helping prepare lawyers for
an always already noble and admirable enterprise (something akin
to Law's Empire or the Rule of Law).
This separation between the theater of the rational and L.A. Law
thus finds one of its most material, and hence most durable and
indelible inscriptions in the division between the legal clinic and the
traditional classroom.3 21  The physical separation authorizes
3
2 0 See Clinical Legal Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations
for the Future 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 337 (1987).
321 "Clinical courses originated on the fringe of the law school, not its core." Id.
at 338 (remarks of Kandis Scott) (This is center/periphery imagery, not inside/
outside, but close enough).
"What was once the fringe, or, as one of the Presidents of the Association of
American Law Schools called it-'the side show'-now has become the main stream."
Id. at 342 (remarks of Dean Hill Rivkin).
"Life was very simple at that point. The big debate was between in-house or out-
house clinics." Id. at 347 (remarks of Roger Wolf).
It is important to recognize that the separation is repeated throughout law school
experience. In moot court competitions, for example, it is common practice for
traditional faculty to sit in as judges and ask the traditional theater of the rational
questions. After the moot court competition is over, though, the pretense somehow
drops, the internal perspective is forgotten, and both professors and students launch
into a real-politick description of the rhetorical character of the argument in particular
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student role differentiation. The social significance of this separa-
tion is that it constructs students who behave as if the two worlds-
the legal clinic and the traditional classroom-have little to do with
each other. Students quickly learn that anything assimilated in the
legal clinic is irrelevant to the traditional classroom in which the law
is explored from "the internal perspective." The student learns that
she can be one kind of law person in the clinic and a completely
different kind of law person in the classroom. She learns one of the
key lessons the legal academy imparts to its students: to internalize
contradiction and to defuse: contradiction by compartmentalizing
the self.
32 2
This ability to compartmentalize the self in terms of per-
formative roles becomes very important to the student once she
becomes a lawyer-it is the technique by which the student-become-
lawyer resolves the contradictions practice presents. It is the
technique by which ugly actions are insulated in a compartment of
the self and rationalized away. As the saying goes, "it's just my job."
It is in this way that the lawyer is constructed to become a key site
for the management of social contradictions.
Given the way the internal/external perspective becomes
inscribed in the structure of the self, it really is no surprise that this
jurisprudential distinction should resonate. It is relentlessly
recursive and reenacted at various levels, all of which, by virtue of
their synchronicity, tend to confirm each other. So not surprisingly,
after being relentlessly projected and subsequently inscribed at the
levels of the cognitive, professional, political, material, and self, the
distinction between the internal and external perspectives just
simply seems true. In a psychoanalytic, rhetorical, and theatrical
sense, the internal/external perspective is relentlessly acted out.
Now there are a few points I want to emphasize about the ways
in which the internal/external perspective works. First, to the
extent this inscription of this distinction slips from the cognitive,
through the professional, and political to the material levels, the
dichotomy and its organization of the world become more difficult
to undo. They become more difficult to undo in the crude sense
and appellate advocacy in general. Invariably, the students are quite shocked to
discover that even the more theoretical, normatively inclined teachers-whom students
are accustomed to view as actors in the theater of the rational-are not wholly
unaware of the "practical realities" of appellate advocacy.
322 For elaboration on the structure of this self, see Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte,"
supra note 5, at 1667-73 (describing the relatively autonomous self).
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that the distinction acquires greater social weight. Once the clinic
is located downstairs or in the annex, it becomes more costly to try
to integrate the clinic into the classroom. More importantly,
however, once the clinic is downstairs or in the annex, it becomes
more difficult even to imagine putting the clinic in the classroom.
Thus, slippage works in the reverse direction as well. Once
inscribed at the level of the material or professional, the embedded
inscriptions of internal/external such as "classroom"/"clinic," and
"regular faculty"/"clinical faculty" in effect confirm the "intellectu-
al" validity and plausibility of the dichotomy. In this sense, the
internal/external perspective resonates in the material and
professional organization of the law school. Once inscribed in that
organization, it is a powerful material confirmation of the idea that
clinic and classroom carry on distinct activities. The process of
resonance confirms the sense that the internal/external perspective
is indeed anchored in "reality." The internal perspective of Law's
Empire is in the classroom, and the external perspective of L.A. Law
is in the clinic. In short, the internal/external dichotomy and its
asserted content gain "intellectual" validity precisely because they
have been inscribed at the cognitive, professional, political, and
material levels.
What we learn, then, by taking the internal/external perspective
dichotomy seriously, is that the kind of theater it supports, the
theater of the rational, is itself constituted by a series of cognitive,
professional, material and intellectual practices of questionable
rationality. If normative legal thought is now in trouble, it is
because it has been the main production on a kind of theater that
is fast losing its credibility.
CONCLUSION
Normative legal thought is conclusion-oriented. Among other
things, this means that normative legal thought works very hard to
reach this point (the "Conclusion"). This is the point where the
payoff is to be found-the what to do?, the prescription, the
recommendation. This is so clearly the site of the payoff that many
legal thinkers routinely turn to the conclusion first in order to
decide whether it is worth reading the article or not. Why, after all,
endure an arduous journey through scores of pages if the pay-off is
not warranted?3
23
323 Imagine, then, the confusion of the poor reader who has picked up this article
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Conclusions are the point at which normative legal thought is
supposed to graft its thought onto a social or juridical reality
outside the text. For normative legal thought, the conclusion is the
anxious moment when the thought ceases and the prescription, the
recommendation, is urged upon the reader. This is where the
reader is supposed to make her choice whether to accept or reject
the conclusion. If the argument has been good, and the prescrip-
tions fit the argument, then the expectation of both author and
reader is that the latter should adopt the conclusion as her own.
All of this, of course, is d6j L vu. It resonates not just with the
practices of reading and writing normative legal thought in the
academy,3 24 but with a more primal experience: the structure of
the appellate brief. There is in the form of normative legal thought
a mimetic replication of the structure of the lawyer's brief. The
lawyer's brief begins with a statement ofjurisdiction, a statement of
the issues, the discussion of the facts, the argument of law, and then
the request for judicial relief. Normative legal thought closely
tracks this structure, and when it is complete, there is a conclusion.
The conclusion in normative legal thought is thus the mimetic
counterpart of the lawyer's prayer to the court for remedy, for
decision.
The big difference, of course, is that the legal brief is almost
invariably addressed to some agent who has the jurisdiction and the
power to grant the relief requested, whereas, normative legal
thought is almost invariably not. That too explains why the
conclusion in normative legal thought is such an anxious moment.
At the borderlands of consciousness, there is a sense in which
normative legal thinkers know that their prescriptions and recom-
mendations are not going anywhere. At the borderlands of
consciousness, legal thinkers know that within the tens of thousands
and engaged in precisely this practice-of turning to the conclusion first.
324 It resonates, among other things, with Lakoff's source-path-goal schema. See
G. LAKOFF, supra note 6, at 275. As Steve Winter puts it:
We identify the subject matter of a lawsuit through the elements of the
causal schema. The defendant's act is the source, the causal chain is thepath,
and the plaintiff's injury is the goal. The remedial source-path-goal metaphor
is virtually a mirror image of the causal one: The individual's injury is the
source of a process that has as its goal an order from the court redressing
that injury; the path that connects them is the plaintiff's proof that the acts
of the defendant caused the injury.
Winter, Standing, supra note 112, at 1388 (footnote omitted). For further discussion
of the role of this schema in the context of our conceptualization of causes of action
and adjudication generally, see id. at 1388-91, 1412, 1457, 1472-78, 1496.
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of pages of volumes 1 to 103 of the Harvard Law Review-for
instance-there is an abundance of prescriptions and recommenda-
tions that have gone nowhere and done nothing but serve as the
occasion for repeating argument structures and forms we now look
back upon with an odd mixture of amusement, disdain, and
humbling self-recognition.
But not perfect self-recognition. Not perfect-because if you
look back at those pages of the Harvard Law Review, it is apparent
that the old school academics, those who wrote in the earlier part
of the twentieth century, were much more self-identified with the
courts and the judges. The old school academics took themselves
to be speaking to judges, to helping judges along. They identified
with the mode of judicial thinking. It is easy to conclude that, for
much of the earlier part of the twentieth century, legal academics
were far more successful (at the very least) in fooling themselves
that their work had some effect on the judiciary.
Currently, of course, this sort of supposition is hardly believable.
For some legal thinkers, this recognition is the occasion for
nostalgia. For others, it is nothing of the sort. Who wants to
prescribe or recommend things to judges anyway? Sounds like a
recipe for formalism.3 25 What's more, if one enters the bureau-
cratic maze of doctrinal restatements restated, one ends up with
restatement consciousness. And why do that? Because it's law?
Doubtful.
3 26
Law has apparently transformed itself into a bizarre bureaucratic
form of life that reproduces itself, not just without consulting us or
our wishes, but by shaping us and our wishes. What is the role of
normative legal thought relative to bureaucratic practice? But that
is already the wrong question. Normative legal thought isn't
somewhere else, where it could then be relative to this practice.
Normative legal thought is that inseparable aspect of bureaucratic
practice that persists in mistakenly thinking that it is separate and
distinct and then compounds this error by thinking that it rules over
bureaucratic practice. Normative legal thought is at once an
325 Given that there is no case docketed and that the legal thinker is even further
removed from the scene of action than the judge.
326 Sometime in the future, the ALI will publish the Third Restatement on
Everything. It will be a comprehensive compilation of four-part balancing tests all
based on key terms that will themselves be defined in terms of four-part balancing
tests, and so on in such a way that the Third Restatement on Everything will have
achieved the first totally comprehensive, totally dosed system of totally self-referential
four-part balancing tests. It will be great. Then it will turn to mud.
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abstraction of and indistinguishable from the operations and
practices of bureaucracy.
There is no stable referent behind the bureaucratic practices'
own self-representation and self-effectuation in normative thought.
Normative legal thought haLs thus had the effect of retarding our
understanding of our social situation within the academy.
Normative legal thought, of course, is also a mode of social
control-both within and without the legal academy. As I've argued
throughout this article, the rhetoric of normative legal thought
establishes the identity and polices the bounds of legitimate legal
thought. As this article itself demonstrates-constatively and
performatively-normative legal thought is breaking down, is losing
its appeal. This is what enables me to think and write this article,
and what enables you to read and understand it.
There are enough dislocations, disruptions within normative
legal thought and within ouir social order that we can actually begin
to re-cognize (that is, to cognize again and differently) that
normative legal thought is not as it represents itself to be; that its
main significance lies in the rehearsal and the inscription of a false
social aesthetic; that its politics are seriously out of date; that its
contributions to the construction of social and legal reality are
ambivalent at best, noxious at worst.
But what should we do? This question arrives on this scene
predictably enough, but really much too late at this point. It's
already being done. We've been doing it since the beginning of this
article, and even before. We've been trying to show a whole series
of routine normative agendas, questions, and frameworks the way
off the jurisprudential stage. They are not helpful anymore. More
accurately, more mildly: their dominance is not helpful anymore.
Needless to say, this article is not a glowing report of the
enterprise of normative legal thought. Still, it is not meant as
criticism. It is more in the nature of an attempt to help destabilize
normative legal thought. What is happening here and elsewhere is
that a whole way of thinking about the law is being troubled and dis-
placed. For those who want to continue to live in the old ways, this
process is not pleasant. Indeed, it's rarely pleasant to inhabit a
social practice that is being changed without your consultation. But
don't let that distract you. It happens all the time. It's happening
now. With and without this article. It's the law.
